AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH FRONTIER CORPS COMMANDER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PESHAWAR 000109 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/23/2019 TAGS: MOPS PTER PGOV PREF EAID PK SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH FRONTIER CORPS COMMANDER CLASSIFIED BY: Lynne Tracy, Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate Peshawar, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Frontier Corps Commander General Tariq Khan sees operations in Dir and Buner winding down although Sultanwas in northern Buner is targeted for an operation o/a May 20. People are returning, particularly to lower Buner, and Khan cautioned that the IDP emergency should not obscure the need to take care of those residents who remained behind or are going back now. The FC Commander viewed the police as weak. Strong field leadership, he said, was just as important if not more so than training and equipment. Khan will leave a wing in Buner to help secure the passes. Federal level follow-through on funding promises is a continuing source of frustration. The FC Commander estimated the cost of raising one wing at $500,000 and put his additional force requirements at four wings to provide a float for training and rest. Khan did not see a role for FC forces in Swat beyond its present three wing commitment to support the 37th Division. He noted the need to "sort out" madrassas in Swat and Swabi. Mohmand, he said, has become a "primary" conduit for militants. Kurram and the Waziristans are on the operational horizon, but he offered no timeline. End Summary. ¶2. (U) Ambassador participated in the first graduation ceremony of master trainers at the Warsak Training Center on May 19. Peshawar PO, Office of Defense Representative Pakistan Chief Rear Admiral LeFever, Special Operations Command-Forward Commander, Polcouns, and UK Embassy Defense Representative Sherry also attended. Ambassador met with General Khan prior to the ceremony. Post-Operations Plans for Dir and Buner -------------- ¶2. (C) General Khan told Ambassador that operations are still taking place in lower Dir and northern Buner where Frontier Corps forces have had the lead. (Note: ICRC's Peshawar representative told us separately that fighting around Chakdarra, the intersection that controls access to Dir and Swat, was preventing ICRC access to the area.) In northern Buner, Frontier Corps was planning to tackle Sultanwas o/a May 20 where militants have managed to maintain a substantial presence. Some militants, Khan noted, are managing to escape via smaller valleys and are likely making their way to the Waziristans. Khan expected operations in Dir and Buner to be completed "soon." ¶3. (C) Khan cautioned that in the flurry of concern for the IDP emergency it was also important to line up resources to assist those who stayed behind in their communities or are already returning. He opposed cash payments to individual families, preferring to use community leaders as a check against fraud. Lower Buner is secure up to the Daggar, the district capital, Khan said, and people are returning. The area, however, was without power because operations in Swat had knocked out key infrastructure. Electricity was critical, Khan emphasized, for maintaining the water supply. Ambassador offered to procure generators for the area to meet this need. ¶4. (C) Frontier Corps, Khan continued, will establish a new fort in Dir and will re-organize its forces there. In Buner which is well inside the Northwest Frontier Province, Frontier Corps has not had a presence. However, the weakness of the police and the need to hold gains in Buner had led Khan to the decision to leave one FC wing (approximately 650 soldiers) in the district to help secure the passes and work jointly with the police on key roads. Rather than waiting for the Ministry of Interior to fund a wing which Khan commented could take at least six months, he will pull men from existing wings to form the force for Buner. Frontier Corps Funding Frustrations -------------- ¶5. (C) As a rule, Khan observed, he could count on the Pakistani military to keep resource commitments promptly. The civilian PESHAWAR 00000109 002 OF 003 government, he said, not only failed to keep new funding promises but did not have a good track record of paying standing obligations. Much of the difficulty in funding could be traced to the Frontier Corps' hybrid nature as a paramilitary force with the Ministry of Interior retaining budget responsibility for FC while the military had operational control. Responding to Ambassador's question on the cost of standing up a wing, Khan estimated $500,000 without infrastructure such as barracks. Ideally, Khan said he could needed four additional wings to give him the float he needs to rotate troops for training and rest. Role for the Police -------------- ¶6. (C) Ambassador outlined U.S. plans to support law enforcement and asked for Khan's views on implementation. Khan emphasized that the most important element that the police needed was solid field leadership at the district and station house levels. Khan recounted his role in having Dir's District Police Officer (DPO - the senior police officer at the district level) removed recently for incompetence. Within 48 hours of the arrival of the new DPO whom Khan had worked with in the past, the police were back out on the roads in large numbers working with Frontier Corps forces. Khan recommended forming a panel of senior police officers to provide suggestions for recruiting and retaining leaders in the police force. No Significant FC Role in Swat -------------- ¶7. (C) Ambassador asked whether Frontier Corps forces would assume a lead role in Swat in the future. Three FC wings would remain in Swat in support of the 37th Division, Khan said, but he did not foresee further FC expansion. Swat, he noted, was "too far into the settled areas" and outside FC's legal mandate. (Comment: FC has had a presence in Dir and Chitral, but these districts border on the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Given Khan's commitment to put a wing in Buner which like Swat is also considered a "settled area," his reluctance to commit to Swat may be driven by the substantial force requirements as much as the issue of legal mandate.) "Sorting Out" Madrassas -------------- ¶8. (C) Khan cryptically commented that the madrassas in Swat and Swabi will need to be "sorted out." In Bajaur, he continued, madrassas can be inspected at will by the Political Agent based on the February 28-point "undertaking" local elders gave the government. The PA, Khan said, also has the authority to vet Friday sermons. (Comment: Other local officials have told us that "laying hands" on religious leaders is a step that will be difficult for the government to take. Khan's reference to Swabi is likely aimed at Swabi's Panj Pir madrassa which as a reputation for espousing Wahhabism and which may serve as a networking hub for militants in the northern NWFP and Bajaur/Mohmand.) Khan also recommended instituting radio call-in programs in other areas along the lines of one the FC radio station in Bajaur is running. The call-in format, he said, gives people an immediate ability to provide feedback to the government. Other Operations -------------- ¶9. (C) Turning to other areas in the FATA, Khan said that Mohmand has become a "primary" conduit for militants. New leaders (NFI) and a few "mass attacks" that led to some FC casualties. While he offered no timeline, Khan characterized Kurram as the "next" operation. He viewed Kurram as largely a sectarian problem that could be managed with the addition of a wing from North Waziristan. Altogether, North and South Waziristan have 22 Frontier Corps wings under Pakistani army operational control. That may be enough FC contribution for any future Waziristan operations. If not, he would be reluctant to pull forces from the north given the need to be able to address PESHAWAR 00000109 003 OF 003 hot spots there. Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) The meeting with General Khan on the margins of the graduation ceremony was a reminder of how far cooperation and this project have come since 2006. While an important milestone has been met, Khan's description of the operational landscape ahead and concerns about holding territory underscore the challenges that remain for the Frontier Corps and the civilian government in the NWFP and FATA. TRACY