INDIGENOUS FUNDING FOR SWAT MILITANTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PESHAWAR 000105 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/22/2019 TAGS: PTER MOPS PGOV ECON PK SUBJECT: INDIGENOUS FUNDING FOR SWAT MILITANTS CLASSIFIED BY: Lynne Tracy, Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate Peshawar, U.S. Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) SUMMARY AND COMMENT -------------- ¶1. (C) As major operations against militants once again commence in Swat district in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), press reports and Consulate contacts provide insight into the methods of funding that Swat militants have realized from their effective control over large parts of the district. In addition to highway extortion, kidnapping and robbery, Swat taliban have used their power in the region to take a cut of illegal trade in emeralds and timber. The long-term damage they have done to the Swat economy has helped intensify the widespread poverty, making it easier for them to conscript desperate locals. While indigenous funding streams may not be the primary source of militant finance, the case study of Swat shows that militants have reaped economic gains when allowed by the Pakistani government to operate freely. End Summary and Comment. EMERALDS -------------- ¶2. (C) Multiple Consulate contacts confirmed local press reporting that Swat militants have operated three emerald mines in and around Swat over the several periods of truce between the Pakistani military operations of September 2007-February 2008, January 2009, and May 2009. On April 1, about 70 militants surrounded the second largest emerald mine in Shangla District, NWFP, just across the border with Swat. Militants reportedly built trenches and bunkers around the emerald mine at Gujar Kalay and invited locals to begin digging, promising them 50 percent of the daily find. Promising a percentage of the profits, taliban commanders enlisted over 1,000 locals with shovels and pickaxes to descend into these three mines to find emeralds. ¶3. (C) Beginning under the Wali (Prince) of Swat, the region has produced emeralds since the 1960s. During the 1980s, mines in Swat yielded over 250,000 carats of emeralds, worth $22 million in rough, uncut form. Since 1997, the NWFP government has authorized private operators to run the mines under leases obtained through an auction system. Swat has not produced adequate volume in the last decade to meet the needs of major emerald buyers from the US and Europe. A representative from the Pakistan Mineral Development Corporation states that mining ventures in the country have been failing for the last two decades because of disorganized efforts to blast and dig, compromising the quality and quantity of gems. ¶4. (C) According to Consulate contacts, once a week, usually on Sunday, the taliban held an emerald auction in Mingora, with miners retaining two thirds of the profit and the militants taking one third. These contacts estimate that militants earned $10,000 - $12,500 profit each week. According to a retail jeweler in Islamabad, most miners work in remote areas, where no authorities or official concessions are present, making it easy for the taliban to "tax" at will. The jeweler observed rising prices for local emeralds over the period of militant activity in Swat and attributed the cost increase to a "taliban tax," 25 percent of value, he said, and a broker's fee of 25 percent. Abdul Karim Shah, director of the Gem and Gemological Institute of Peshawar (GGIP),said that emeralds from Swat were smuggled to India, and transported to Thailand, Switzerland and Israel. He estimated that militants could earn up to $3 million a year from the three mines. PESHAWAR 00000105 002 OF 004 ¶5. (C) A taliban commander at Gujar Kalay emerald mine was heard by a contact saying, "it is a great opportunity for the people because there is so much poverty and unemployment here." While GGIP's Shah claims that the taliban will take quick profits but destroy the emerald mines, a press report claims that a taliban soldier at Gujar Kalay said that the militants had issued orders to "lessen the amount of destruction." One Consulate contact said that the Mines Department and Forest Department were "pretty corrupt as well, and the taliban just picked up from where the government left off." TIMBER -------------- ¶6. (C) Revenue from the unlicensed production of emeralds by the Swat taliban parallels profits from illegal sales of timber in Swat, which have been going on for over a year. Local contacts report that militants took control of over 80 percent of Swat's forests after the Forest Department abandoned its posts in September 2007. Militants have invited locals to join them in running the illegal timber business. Commonly referred to as the timber mafia, militants collaborate with drug peddlers, drug addicts, unemployed youth and other fugitives, permitting them to fell trees in areas under their control. Because security checkposts have been disbanded, transport of illegal timber is easy. Illegal timber is being used in the construction and furniture businesses. For example, one contact told Post that in August 2008 he was offered a truckload of Diyar wood from Swat, usually sold at 2,000 ($25) rupees per cubic foot, discounted to 1,200 rupees ($15) per cubic foot. Despite the reduced black-market prices, many have observed wood prices rapidly increasing in 2009 due to deforestation. Estimates say Swat's illegal timber trade was worth from $5 million to $10 million a year. Militants also cut trees and sold fruit from some orchards in Swat. EXTORTION -------------- ¶7. (C) Consulate contacts state that militants have generated most indigenous funding for the insurgency in Pakistan from three sources: charging fees at checkposts; kidnapping for ransom; and stealing, which includes robbing banks. As militants have done elsewhere throughout the NWFP and FATA, the Swat taliban established checkposts on many roads in the district, collecting between 5 and 100 rupees from car drivers as a "road tax." Even taxi and bus passengers must pay this tax. Militants also have collected hundreds of rupees each from truck drivers, in addition to pilfering their goods. According to the Khyber Political Agent (PA),the taliban may have earned more than $50 million per year by collecting fees at checkposts throughout the region; checkpoints in Swat district, however, would have generated relatively little of this due to its distance from major trucking routes. (Comment: While we have no means to verify the Khyber PA's estimate of militant earnings, the Khyber Pass route with its high volume of commercial traffic provides ample opportunity to shake down transporters. The Khyber PA position is one of the most coveted because of its lucrative "side-earnings.") ¶8. (C) Kidnapping for ransom has also been a major source of PESHAWAR 00000105 003 OF 004 revenue for militants in the NWFP in FATA, though Swat's contribution to the overall total has likely been relatively low. According to local contacts and interviews with released abductees, ransoms range from $5,000 to $100,000 per person. With over 500 kidnappings in the Peshawar area over the last year, kidnappers may have earned up to $20 million in this burgeoning business. Besides strong-arms, militants are rumored to hire advance men, similar to accountants, who study a potential victim's value before the kidnapping. ¶9. (C) Militants have systematically stolen and looted property in NWFP and FATA, including in Swat. Tacitly acknowledging the public relations backlash, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) released a statement on January 26 admonishing its followers not to commit crimes. According to the NWFP Minister for Home and Tribal Affairs and several security officials in the area, the TTP statement shows that Pakistan's purported "militant leaders" do not have a firm grip on the insurgency. From November 2007, militants in Swat systematically looted homes and offices, dismantling home fixtures and carrying away millions of dollars worth of furniture, appliances, electronic goods and office equipment; the pace of this looting accelerated in the time period around the collapse of the Swat peace deal in early May (reftels). Militants also intermittently robbed banks in Swat during the last eighteen months, again accelerating this activity in early May. LONG-TERM ECONOMIC EFFECTS -------------- ¶10. (C) According to Sharafat Ali Mubarak, president of Sarhad Chamber of Commerce and Industry (SCCI),"the taliban have driven the NWFP economy into the ground" by violence, threats, stealing, looting, and kidnapping for ransom. A group of prominent businessmen and political leaders told Post in early April that over the last four years militants have forced hundreds of businesses to close, caused up to 100,000 people to lose their jobs, and decreased the trucking business by 50 percent and regional tourism by 75 percent (septel). ¶11. (C) Widespread press coverage in August and September 2008 reported that the taliban allowed fruit in Swat to rot on the vines during the summer harvest, costing locals over $40 million. Approximately 30 percent of Swat Valley consists of fruit orchards with a short shelf-life. In the past, agriculture in Swat provided employment for 70 percent of its residents, with a typical fruit orchard employing 1,000 laborers who earned income by spraying and pruning fruit trees, and picking, packing, and transporting the fruit. During a normal summer harvest, 500 to 600 trucks carrying fruit leave Swat each day. But during the summer 2008 harvest, half of Swat's laborers were out of work, 80 percent of the fruit rotted, and vegetable production decreased 50 percent. Prior to the collapse of the Swat peace deal, some Consulate contacts predicted that militants in Swat would enlist locals for the 2009 fruit and vegetable harvest and take a share of these huge agricultural profits. ¶12. (C) According to widespread press accounts, and confirmed by Consulate contacts, the taliban have systematically destroyed Swat's tourism industry, burning down sites such as Pakistan's only ski resort at Malam Jabba. Over 75 percent of Swat valley's 900 hotels and restaurants have closed and the rest have almost no guests, causing over 20,000 people associated with tourism to lose their jobs. PESHAWAR 00000105 004 OF 004 WILL THE TALIBAN DEVELOP AN ECONOMIC STRATEGY? -------------- - ¶13. (C) While business and economic contacts painted a picture of the taliban as opportunists and scavengers undermining the economy in NWFP and FATA, other contacts, including several local officials in the NWFP, worried that, as the taliban gain ground, they are also developing an economic dimension to the insurgency. Profits from illegal trade in emeralds and timber and extortion activities assisted by miitants' on-the-ground control enhanced the Swat taliban's ability to fund the insurgency and helped create widespread poverty, which then them in conscripting desperate locals with promises of jobs and economic justice. Many contacts in the NWFP, including the governor, the chief minister, and the police chief, have continually cited a militant's salary of over 10,000 rupees ($125) per month as the main incentive drawing young men to their ranks. COMMENT -------------- (C) Prior to the renewal of military operations in May 2009, taliban commanders seemed to have made themselves the new landlords in large parts of Swat, seizing property, providing income to locals and taking a share of the profits. Militants did not mine emeralds or cut down trees; locals did. The taliban's level of effective control over parts of Swat allowed it to raise revenue indigenously, if at considerable cost to Swat's overall economic health. The resulting economic desperation of locals almost certainly enlarged the pool of potential recruits to the Swat taliban. The last eighteen months in Swat provide a case study in the long-term political and economic costs to the Pakistani government of effectively ceding territory to the militants. TRACY