(U) Secretary Clinton's July 22, 2009

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARTO 000012 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2019 TAGS: OVIP CLINTON HILLARY PREL JA KN CH SUBJECT: (U) Secretary Clinton's July 22, 2009 Conversation with Japanese Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone ¶1. (U) Classified by: Paul Wohlers, Deputy Executive Secretary, S/ES, Department of State. Reason 1.4.(d) ¶2. (U) July 22, 2009; 3:10 PM Phuket, Thailand ¶3. (U) Participants: U.S. The Secretary EAP Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell NSC Senior Director Jeff Bader Deputy Chief of Staff Jacob Sullivan Ambassador Sung Kim Lieutenant General Paul Selva Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense Robert Scher Nejdat Mulla(Embassy Notetaker) JAPAN Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone Deputy Vice-Minister Bessho Koro Press Secretary Kodama Kazua Director General Saiki Akitaka Director General Umemoto Kazuyoshi Director General Inomata Hiroshi Director Yoshida Tomoyuki Private Secretary to Foreign Minister Takizaki Shigeki ¶4. (C)In a bilateral meeting on July 22 at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Phuket, Thailand, the Secretary and Japanese Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone discussed a broad range of issues relating to the U.S. { Japan bilateral security relationship. The Secretary told FM Nakasone that U.S. security commitments to Japan were unwavering and that the United States was committed to working closely with Japan on the range of global security issues, and particularly on the irreversible denuclearization of North Korea. Nakasone echoed the affirmation of the security relationship; both sides agreed to continuing close multilateral cooperation on North Korea. Nakasone said recently passed United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874 should be given time to have an effect on the DPRK, and expressed concern about recent North Korean overtures for Ambassador Bosworth to travel there. He requested the United States consult with Japan and South Korea about North Korean issues before approaching China and Russia. On other issues, Nakasone said Japan was concerned about the opaque nature of China's military spending, and stood ready to assist with establishing a dialogue between the United States and Burma or Iran. END SUMMARY. Bilateral Commitment Unwavering -------------- ¶5. (C) The Secretary told FM Nakasone that U.S. security commitments to Japan were unwavering and that the United States is committed to working closely with Japan on a range of global security issues, and particularly the irreversible denuclearization of North Korea. Nakasone said Japan looked forward to continuing our strong alliance "in a multilateral fashion" and appreciated the proposal for a presidential visit. -------------- -------------- -- North Korea: Continued Cooperation and Close Consultation -------------- -------------- -- ¶6. (C) The Secretary expressed appreciation for Japan's response in the United Nations to North Korea's missile launch, and support for UNSCR 1874. She underscored the importance of working closely to respond to North Korean provocations, and said the United States would not be provoked. She urged Japan to continue to work with China towards a concrete strategy for a denuclearized North Korea. ¶7. (C)FM Nakasone advocated putting real pressure on the DPRK regime, while allowing UNSCR 1874 time to have an effect. He expressed concern regarding a North Korean invitation to Ambassador Bosworth to travel to North Korea and said such a visit would be premature before 1874 sanctions had some effect. It was important to proceed cautiously and consult with Japan and South Korea before moving forward on any decision about engaging North Korea bilaterally. Such a visit would undercut the collective will to allow the sanctions to put real pressure on the regime. External cooperation must be visible to dissuade North Korea from taking escalatory steps; the United States, Japan, and South Korea must work together to set the pace for reengagement. Although Five Party consultations are one way to move forward, they must be conducted in a way that would be conducive to re-starting Six Party talks. ¶8. (C)FM Nakasone said the Six Party talks needed a new approach. Japan would no longer make "double payments" nor let North Korea use "salami tactics" to slice-up proposals and incentives. Any new approach must convince North Korea of the necessity of taking verifiable, irreversible action to denuclearize. Japan wanted close coordination between the United States, Japan, and South Korea prior to consultations with China or Russia. He also underscored, however, the important role China can play in modifying North Korean behavior. Japan would like to have regular bilateral discussions on China's role in this issue. He had spoken earlier to Chinese FM Yang regarding the future of the Six Party talks and the need to be cautious with China's military engagement with North Korea. Nakasone said he was concerned that Thailand's move to introduce North Korean language for the Chair's statement would undermine a robust ARF message. ¶9. (C) The Secretary emphasized we must do all we can to enforce UNSC 1874 and find specific ways to impose consequences; the United States had established a specific unit to coordinate our efforts. The United States intended to continue close consultations with Japan, South Korea, China, and Russia and avoid double payments or "salami tactics." China's role was critical, and five party talks were relevant to get North Korea back to Six Party talks about permanent, irreversible denuclearization. The Secretary praised Japan's work on contingency planning for North Korea. -------------- Engaging Burma -------------- ¶10. (C) The Secretary expressed appreciation for Japan's assistance and support on Burma. The United States was primarily concerned with the state of democratic reform in the country and its growing relationship with North Korea. The Junta continued to pursue advanced and offensive weapons; the possibility that North Korea might transfer nuclear technology to Burma was real. It was critical for the regime to release Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK),as such a move would open up real opportunities for engagement with the United States, including investment. ¶11. (C) FM Nakasone said Japan was disturbed by the legal action against ASSK. Japan had placed a high value on the visit by UNSYG Ban to Burma and was dismayed when the regime would not allow him to meet ASSK. Nakasone had told his Burmese counterpart that he should seriously consider the U.S. offer for dialogue. -------------- China: Need for More Transparency -------------- ¶12. (C) Japan was concerned with China's military opaqueness and apparent interest in expanding its influence eastward to the sea, and China's nuclear disclosures, Nakasone stressed. The Secretary agreed on the need for more transparency in China's defense spending and planning. The United States hoped to move forward with a U.S.-Japan-Chinese trilateral at the policy planning level; we must continue to include China in a multilateral dialogue to ensure its peaceful rise, but we need to see more transparency as well. -------------- Iran -------------- ¶13. (C) Iran's continued violation of international nuclear obligations concerned the United States. The Secretary asked FM Nakasone to convey to Iran that it had an opportunity it could not miss, and raised Japanese export credits. The FM replied that while the post- election situation in Iran was deplorable, Japan planned to make the most of its unique position by maintaining a high level dialogue with the regime while taking into account U.S. and EU initiatives and concerns on the nuclear issue. Iran must take measures to address uranium enrichment activities. Nakasone had encouraged Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to engage the United States. Japan was prepared to assist in laying down the foundations for a dialogue. Nakasone asserted that Japanese export credits were decreasing and were not larger than those issued by European countries. -------------- Other Issues: India and Russia -------------- ¶14. (C) Nakasone said the United States and Japan needed to continue strengthening relationships with India. Japan held a strategic dialogue with India earlier in July. Japan also would like to hold a conference for intellectuals from Japan, Russia, and the United States on security in the Asia Pacific region; he requested U.S. support for the conference, as well as for Japan's efforts to deal with its territorial dispute with Russia. CLINTON