(U) Secretary Clinton's November 9, 2009,

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARTO 112705 (Note: the unique message record number (MRN) has been modified. The original MRN was 09 PARTO 000005, which duplicates a previous PARTO telegram number.) E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2019 TAGS: OVIP CLINTON HILLARY SUBJECT: (U) Secretary Clinton's November 9, 2009, Meeting with German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle ¶1. (U) Classified by: Kin Moy, Deputy Executive Secretary, S/ES, Department of State. Reason 1.4.(d). ¶2. (SBU) November 9, 2009; 12:30 - 14:00; Berlin, Germany. ¶3. (SBU) Participants: U.S. The Secretary Ambassador Philip D. Murphy Assistant Secretary Philip Gordon, EUR Jeff Hovenier, NSC Huma Abedin, S Jake Sullivan Assistant Secretary P.J. Crowley, PA LTG Selva, JCS George Glass (Embassy Notetaker) Germany Guido Westerwelle, Foreign Minister Ambassador Wolf-Ruthart Born, State Secretary Heiko Thoms, Chief of Staff Peter Gottwald, Undersecretary for Security Affairs Eberhard Pohl, Political Director, Acting Beate Maeder-Metcalf, Director for North American Affairs Andreas Peschke, Press Officer Hildegard Bentele, Desk Officer for North America ¶4. (C) SUMMARY: During a November 9 meeting in Berlin to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, new German Foreign Minister Westerwelle acknowledged persistent problems of economic development in the eastern parts of Germany. Asked about Turkey in the EU, Westerwelle emphasized the importance of not closing the door to Turkish EU membership. He said that the EU needed to keep membership as an option in order to give Turkey motivation to modernize and keep facing the West. Westerwelle welcomed the Secretary's desire for a concrete outcome from Copenhagen, but he was concerned about costs, and about getting China and developing countries on board. The Secretary pressed Westerwelle on Guantanamo detainees. Westerwelle acknowledged German agreement to look at individual cases, but cautioned that acceptance would depend on foreign policy consequences. He noted that the Interior Ministry was also critical. The Secretary and A/S Gordon reviewed recent work on energy security for Europe. Westerwelle anticipated a vigorous debate this winter, and noted diversification as a key part of the new government's energy policy. The Secretary reviewed recent developments on Middle East peace and Afghanistan. END SUMMARY. -------------- -------------- Lack of Eastern German Development -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) The Secretary started the meeting by asking about German views 20 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Westerwelle said the polls were very positive. However, he noted that unemployment in eastern Germany was much higher than in the West. In addition, he noted there was a split between the industrial southern states of eastern German and the northern states, which were not very developed at all. He noted there were still lingering issues of discrimination, such as in the level of pensions paid in East and West. Westerwelle said the German government had programs to invest in the East and in new technologies, such as solar technology. He admitted there was a long way to go to equality. Most difficult, he added, was the migration of young Easterners to the cities or the West. Children were abandoning their parents, who now considered that they were losing both their children and the investment opportunities that went with them. However, MFA State Secretary Born noted that there were new immigrants to eastern Germany from Israel, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union. The Secretary observed that many New Yorkers had a strong nostalgia for Germany. ¶6. (C) Westerwelle pointed out that immigration brought its own new problems. It was a good message if the Jewish community in Germany was growing. The United States always attracted the best and most talented from all over the world. However, the Europeans have been more restrictive and separated on immigration. The Netherlands still had immigrant problems and Germany needed to integrate the Turks. Indeed, he noted that in one part of Berlin you could take a stroll and not know you were in Germany. The German integration model, he said, needed improvement. The Secretary acknowledged immigration challenges in France, the Netherlands, and even parts of the UK. She noted that over past decades, waves of immigrants felt like they were in a different country and worked to assimilate; now, however, they didn't always assimilate and were able to maintain constant contacts with original home countries. She asked why Germany feared having Turkey in the EU. -------------- Turkey in the EU -------------- ¶7. (C) Westerwelle said this was a difficult question for both the government and the parliament. If Germany had to decide now on Turkish access to the EU, the decision would be a clear no. He explained that the EU could not integrate such a large country. Turkey was not modern enough to enter the EU. However, Westerwelle pointed out that his Free Democratic Party (FDP) had made clear to the Chancellor's Christian Democratic Union (CDU) that a decision on Turkey was not required this year, but rather in five or six years. Therefore, the FDP believed that it was important to keep the door open until that time, so that Turkey had good reason to work for better structures. Otherwise, he explained, if Germany slammed the door shut now, this would affect the entire internal situation in Turkey. He suggested the day might come when the EU would actually invite Turkey in, but Turkey would decline. Westerwelle continued noting that Turkey at present faced West, but it could change to face East. This was important, he said, for both NATO and the EU. -------------- Climate Change -------------- ¶8. (C) The Secretary recalled that Chancellor Merkel had spoken about climate change earlier. She asked Westerwelle what he thought would happen in Copenhagen and what the goal should be. Westerwelle said the Eastern European countries had a different perspective, since they were poorer. He said it was important to get a result from Copenhagen. He commented that the G-20 Finance Ministerial a few days prior had found little success on this issue due to high costs. If we wanted success in Copenhagen, he said we needed to ask if we were willing to spend money. ¶9. (C) The Secretary agreed with trying to get a result and then asked for Westerwelle's views on the Danish proposal for Copenhagen. ¶10. (C) Westerwelle said the EU Council had a common position, but that many tough iQs had been put aside until the recent U.S.-EU summit. It was important to get developing countries to do their part. But in the end, the question was how much money we were willing to spend. The Secretary said there had to be some determination that we would present some proposal. Even if the proposal was less than ideal, we needed to be as unified as possible. We needed to find a way to pull in China and the developing countries, but in a way that we could also hold them accountable. The Secretary recounted that the Chinese FM had told her he needed lots of money from the developed world. She had said ok, but asked him what he was willing to commit to. He replied that it was difficult to commit to anything. The Secretary then shot back that it was also difficult to obtain money. The Secretary went on to acknowledge that there were skeptics in the EU that the United States could not do much at Copenhagen, and that U.S. legislation would not be completed. However, it was important to remember the United States just finished eight years of denial and was now doing a lot. ¶11. (C) Born said expectations were growing that we might best focus on a political agreement in Copenhagen. The Secretary replied that it would need teeth. She noted that Australia had ideas, and the ROK had some ideas. However, if everyone eventually arrived at the Danish political proposal, it couldn't just be aspirational. There had to be, she said, in every country some internal mechanism to help meet goals. For example, if India were to pledge to spend a certain amount on reforestation, there needed to be some mechanism to hold them to it. The same held, she said, with U.S. car emissions; there must be accountability measures. Westerwelle asked if there was sufficient support in the United States for such an agreement. He said that when Merkel spoke to the U.S. Congress, the Germans noticed the lack of Republican support for climate change. The Secretary replied that the Republicans didn't like anything the Administration did. However, she projected that some Republicans might go along on climate change. She did not anticipate robust Congressional opposition. She said that if the Administration got Congressional approval for Cap and Trade, it might also possibly consider building more nuclear power plants to get some Republican support. This kind of trade off was being discussed by some Democratic and Republican senators. -------------- Guantanamo Detainees -------------- ¶12. (C) The Secretary said that she had been hopeful that Germany could take some Guantanamo detainees. She acknowledged that this issue was not raised during the busy election campaign and formation of a new government, but she would like to reopen the dialogue in the hope that Germany could accept one or two detainees. She explained that the detainees were divided into three categories: (1) people like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who were the most difficult of cases; (2) detainees the USG has evidence against and planned to try; and (3) those who were safe enough to discharge to other countries. She noted that some Uighurs had been discharged to Palau and Bermuda, where they were very happy. She said the largest remaining group were Yemenis. ¶13. (C) Westerwelle said he welcomed the Administration's decision to close Guantanamo. He said that some might argue that the United States was responsible for the problem. It was important, he said, to fix the problem. He said that at some point Germany had said it would look at individual cases. Westerwelle said he believed German acceptance of detainees would depend on each individual in question. The Secretary said she was asking him to consider carefully selected dossiers. She said it was his decision, but the United States appreciated help trying to close Guantanamo. Several European countries, she noted, had already agreed to accept detainees. She said that the USG was prepared to brief details. She suggested it would be a good time for Special Envoy Dan Fried to visit. Westerwelle observed that both MFA and Interior were involved in any decision. He said he also had to consider consequences of any decisions with other countries, such as China. Westerwelle said who Germany might accept would depend on the foreign policy consequences. -------------- Energy Security -------------- ¶14. (C) The Secretary mentioned energy security, observing that the EU was trying to get more pipeline and gas routes so as to reduce sole source reliance. She noted that Richard Morningstar was the U.S. envoy working this critical issue. ¶15. (C) The Secretary said the great tragedy of Ukraine was that Ukraine had energy supplies. If properly structured, Ukraine could get close to energy independence. She noted that every month Ukraine was presently asking the IMF and United States for energy assistance. However, Russia did not want Ukraine to close deals or develop reserves. The Secretary warned that if we did not provide competition to Russian energy sources, we would all be at their mercy. She suggested Germany look seriously into this area. ¶16. (C) Westerwelle said there was a virulent discussion in Germany last winter, and this would be repeated this winter. He projected there would be a new orientation of German energy policy: First, Germany would focus on its own production, including nuclear, wind, etc. Secondly, Germany would look at renewable sources. Finally, Germany would seek independence through diversification. He mentioned the NordStream project as part of this. He acknowledged that Germany would not achieve energy independence quickly, but he agreed it was vital. ¶17. (C) Westerwelle asked about the Middle East road map and settlements. The Secretary said the United States was just trying to get negotiations started. She recalled that since President Obama was inaugurated, there had been the fallout from the Gaza war, then Israeli elections, during which time it was hard to get much dialogue before May. ¶18. (C) Turning to Israel, the Secretary said that when one negotiated one normally came in with maximum positions at the start. When the United States said it wanted a stop to all settlements, Israel had replied that under Israeli law it could not stop ongoing construction that already had permits. However, the Israelis agreed to stop new activity. She said that the United States might decide to take that commitment forward; it would be a big step if Israel stopped new settlements. It would be the first time Israel would stop something it considered a legitimate activity. At a minimum, such a commitment would freeze the situation on the ground. ¶19. (C) Westerwelle asked about Afghanistan. The Secretary said she planned to attend the Karzai inauguration. She said that foreign ministers would need to emphasize that Karzai must have new relations with young people and with the United States. The centerpiece of the new effort in Afghanistan would be more training for the army and police. She said Germany's help monitoring and securing the North would be important. Stabilizing population centers was needed, especially for Kandahar. However, stabilization work was needed in the North and West. The Secretary said the United States would be ready to announce changes at the time of the inauguration, but we couldn't do without Germany's help. ¶20. (C) Westerwelle said it was his understanding the inauguration might be the 19th. However, he considered it important to come back with Afghan commitments. He said that Afghanistan developments had been disappointing. He had traveled there. Issues of good governance, he said, should not just be limited to speeches. He recalled that we were investing large military and financial resources in Afghanistan. The Secretary said we could not allow Karzai to continue as he has up to now. Too many governments had taken him at his word. He was very charming. However, a year later people saw that nothing had changed. The Secretary said that all our governments had enabled him to get away with changing nothing. She recalled that President Bush had spoken every week with Karzai whether something was happening or not. Afghanistan could not, she emphasized, be a case of nation-building. There has been some positive progress. People did not want the Taliban back. However, she emphasized that the people felt abandoned and left alone. She concluded that we could not allow the Taliban to gain momentum. CLINTON