MFA AFRICA DIRECTOR'S JULY 21 DISCUSSION OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000997 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2019 TAGS: PREL PINS PGOV KDEM NG MA MR IV FR SUBJECT: MFA AFRICA DIRECTOR'S JULY 21 DISCUSSION OF MADAGASCAR, MAURITANIA, NIGER, COTE D'IVOIRE Classified By: Kathleen Allegrone, Political Minister-Counselor, 1.4 (b /d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: MFA AF A/S-equivalent Stephane Gompertz on July 21 expressed frustration with the political impasse in Madagascar; relief that elections had transpired relatively well in Mauritania, offering a possible conclusion to the long political crisis there; exasperation with Niger President Tandja's efforts to retain power, about which President Sarkozy "is furious;" and, unlike most GOF officials, optimism that elections will take place in Cote d'Ivoire on November 29 as planned. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) PolMinCouns and acting AF-watcher met with MFA Africa Director (A/S) Stephane Gompertz for a review of current issues. Discussion focused on Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger and Cote d'Ivoire. We have reported separately by e-mail Gompertz's comments on Somalia. Madagascar -------------- ¶3. (C) Gompertz delivered his remarks on Madagascar with a clear tone of frustration that the political impasse and lack of consensus on a way forward to elections continued to prevail. He said there was no apparent easy way to resolve the crisis. Presidential Deputy Diplomatic Advisor Bruno Joubert had met on July 20 with newly appointed SADC mediator Joaquim Chissano. Gompertz was disappointed that Chissano told the French that he would go slowly and take a deliberate approach. In Gompertz's opinion, Chissano, as well as the Malgache generally, were not operating with a sense of urgency. The GOF would welcome clear signs that all parties wanted to settle the crisis as soon as possible. Instead, neither Chissano nor the other parties seemed in a hurry. Gompertz noted the weakening of Madagascar's economy and the deteriorating security climate. ¶4. (C) Chissano apparently wanted the four principals (Ravalomanana, Rajoelina, Ratsiraka, and Zafy) to meet in Angola, which Ravalomanana and Ratsiraka were willing to do. Rajoelina, however refused. Gompertz, who was preparing to go to Addis Ababa (with Presidential AF Advisor Remi Marechaux) for the July 22 Contact Group meeting, said that Rajoelina was "committing a grave error" by not being present in Addis Ababa himself, especially since Gompertz understood that Ravalomanana and Ratsiraka would either be present or would be well represented. Rajoelina's refusal to go to Addis Ababa seemed to puzzle Gompertz, who noted Rajoelina's recent visit to Brussels. Gompertz surmised that Rajoelina was receiving bad advice from, among others, Franco-Malgache businessman Patrick Leloup, "who is always pursuing his own business interests first." ¶5. (C) Gompertz said that Rajoelina seemed to believe that he could force his way to elections on his own terms, much as Aziz had thought in Mauritania until he learned that a compromise solution was the best way forward. Rajoelina had not come to that conclusion, despite French entreaties that he seek a broad-based consensus. Could Chissano achieve what Wade had achieved in Mauritania? -- Gompertz said he was "not optimistic." Ravalomanana was not helping either -- Gompertz repeated what French Presidency officials had told us earlier -- that Ravalomanana was recruiting mercenaries in France (and in South Africa) in an effort to create a para-military force that could help him seize power. ¶6. (C) There were, however, encouraging signs. SADC had moderated its position and was now more in line with the international community, having abandoned an earlier call for military action against Rajoelina in order to re-install Ravalomanana. Gompertz lauded South African president Zuma's very positive role in shifting SADC's position. When asked whether elections could take place in 2010, Gompertz stressed the need for an accord. He said that it would be better if legislative elections preceded the presidential contest, if only to have a legislature in place rather than a post-presidential legislative election that a newly-installed president could manipulate. An even better scenario would involve not having any of the principals (Ravalomanana, Rajoelina Ratsiraka, and Zafy) run, but Gompertz conceded that such a scenario was impossible. Mauritania -------------- ¶7. (C) In contrast, Gompertz was considerably more upbeat (and relieved) about Mauritania -- "so far so good" were his first words when asked. He said that France became relatively comfortable as soon as the Wade-brokered deal took form. He noted that France was at first very strongly anti-coup but then moderated its position because of the need to cooperate with Mauritania over regional anti-terrorism, a PARIS 00000997 002 OF 002 policy shift that involved President Sarkozy. Aziz seemed committed to cooperate with France on terrorism issues. Gompertz praised Wade ("we didn't think he could do it") and also AU Peace and Security Commissioner Lamamra for their roles in hammering out the accord. Gompertz indicated he had no problem with the international community's taking its time before resuming normal treatment of Mauritania. ¶8. (C) On regional terrorism and AQIM, Gompertz repeated that Aziz would be helpful. The international community needed to help Mauritania as well as Mali and Niger. Gompertz descried Mali as the most serious problem, noting that a Malian military unit had recently been attacked and taken heavy casualties. The Tuareg feared AQIM as well, but needed to be handled carefully. Some Tuareg seemed willing to take a more active role in countering regional terrorism, but Gompertz cautioned that such a role would have to be carefully arranged, in order to avoid potential Tuareg-Arab conflict. Niger -------------- ¶9. (C) Gompertz's mood soured when we asked about Niger President Tandja's quest for a third term. His first response was to note that "Sarkozy is furious. When he went there a few months ago, he came away thinking that Tandja would not seek a third term." Gompertz said that "France cannot support a third term." He recited Tandja's several unconstitutional and irregular acts -- dissolving the constitutional court, invoking Article 53 of the constitution to give himself extraordinary powers, and seeking a referendum that would validate his seeking a third term. Gompertz noted the serious harm Tandja had already done to Niger's democracy and its institutions; he did not rule out public unrest or even a coup. Gompertz was aware of ECOWAS, UN, and AU efforts to pressure Tandja but he thought the only actor Tandja would respect was Nigeria. However, he suspected that Nigeria would not take decisive action. ¶10. (C) After the August 4 referendum, which Gompertz believed Tandja would win, the EU would have to examine the scheduled legislative elections. They seemed to be flawed even at this stage -- the GON had already published a list of 26 individuals who would be banned from seeking office. Asked why Tandja was behaving this way, Gompertz said he was receiving bad advice from his Minister of Security. There was also the problem of a presumed successor's being imprisoned and Tandja's need to scramble until the succession issue is settled. Gompertz also did not rule out the possibility that Tandja was following the path taken by innumerable dictators over the years -- he may perceive himself as the savior of his people, on some sort of divine mission. Cote d'Ivoire -------------- ¶11. (C) Gompertz, exuding a slight air of whimsy, said that he stood virtually alone within the GOF in believing that the November 29 elections in Cote d'Ivoire would take place as scheduled. He admitted that colleagues considered him naive. He stated, however, that there was progress on several fronts. Voter registration seemed to be moving forward. The government had restructured its financing (at a lower price) with French firm SAGEM for its information and communications management support. SRSG Choi was "pessimistic" but Gompertz thought that President Gbagbo now believed he could win, and such a belief could allow the elections to take place as scheduled. Gompertz observed that the security situation seemed to be improving as well. PEKALA