FRANCE-GERMANY RELATIONS: THE VIEW FROM PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000938

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2019
TAGS: PREL GM FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE-GERMANY RELATIONS: THE VIEW FROM PARIS

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathy Allegrone for Reasons
1.4(b),(d).


1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: The status of the relationship between
France and Germany, a post-war success story and the
traditional workhorse of European integration, has once again
been the subject of a flurry of French press reporting during
the campaign for the June 7 European Parliament elections and
in the run-up to the German federal elections in September.
Most of these reports have focused on the personal
relationship - or lack thereof - between President Sarkozy
and Chancellor Merkel. While the personal relationship
between the President and the Chancellor is not unimportant,
diplomatic sources in Paris emphasize that the unprecedented
institutionalization of the bilateral relationship provides
long term stability. Nevertheless, ever greater
centralization of decision-making power at the Elysee
contrasts with a lack of flexibility in the German coalition
government, contributing to a relative lack of dynamism in
the current stage of France-German relations. Change may be
in the air, however, as near- and middle-term developments,
including the potential ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, a
possible Conservative electoral victory in the UK, and the
outcome of the September German elections could either
re-ignite the France-Germany spark or further hobble their
ability to lead on joint policies. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) Post notes that while some discussion of German and
British politics and institutions is necessary to address
this topic, we defer to Embassies Berlin and London for
authoritative viewpoints.

Personality Isn't Everything
--------------


3. (C/NF) French officials from the office of the President
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) regularly tell us
that while Sarkozy and Merkel have different personalities,
the focus given to this aspect by press reports hides the
less headline-making institutional realities. Most recently,
MFA Germany Desk Officer Marianne Carre said in a June 19
meeting that both countries have worked hard for decades to
institutionalize consultation procedures. This includes not
only regular ministerial-level meetings on a variety of
topics, but also the exchange of civil servants between the
two countries in every ministry, and regular liaisons between
civil society groups and political parties, ensuring
consultation from the political to the working levels.
German Political Counselor in Paris Christina Beinhoff echoed
this view, saying the German Ambassador expressed his
annoyance at even positive news coverage of the personal
atmospherics between Sarkozy and Merkel during the
Chancellor's June 11 visit to France, arguing that such
stories perpetuate a hot-cold image that does not reflect the
stable reality of bilateral relations. British Political
Officer Olivier Evans added that, although both Germany and
France have tried at times to court the UK as an alternative
partner, they have learned from their lack of success that
their best bet is to focus on their own coordination, a
conclusion that has fueled an existing preference to meet
together before key European or global meetings to hammer out
compromise positions bilaterally and then present a solidly
united front.

Challenges to Consultation
--------------


4. (C/NF) However, changes in the political landscape in both
France and Germany have strained the network of institutional
ties. Thomas Klau, Editorial Director of the European
Council on Foreign Relations, said the 2008 constitutional
amendment changing the French presidential term from seven to
five years to correspond with the parliamentary electoral
calendar makes another "cohabitation" - in which the
president and prime minister are from different parties -
extremely unlikely. This frees up French presidents to take
an even more energetic lead on key policy initiatives because
they do not face the same midterm electoral pressures. This
freedom in turn reinforces Sarkozy's existing tendency to
centralize decision-making authority on important issues in
the Elysee even more so than other French presidents, often
keeping the MFA and other ministries out of the loop.


5. (C/NF) Klau contrasted this French executive dynamism with
the German system, both institutionally, given Germany's
federal structure, and culturally, where long-term planning
and inter- and intra-party negotiation are part and parcel of
the political process, even more so under Chancellor Merkel.
Beinhoff said the view was much the same from the German
embassy, which feels hampered in its ability to manage
bilateral relations by a sense that there are really only a
handful of French interlocutors who matter. This is

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exacerbated by the German government coalition, under which
German diplomats, headed by Merkel's premier political rival,
feel uncertain that they are getting the information they
need. The MFA's Marianne Carre added that the politics of
decision making in Germany's grand coalition seemed to be
slowing down the already ponderous institutional consultation
process.

Divorce Not An Option
--------------


6. (C/NF) The end result, according to Klau, is that France
and Germany are going through one of the "less productive"
periods of their relationship. When there is a strong
convergence of interests, as in the case of the G20 in
London, the two sides can still work in unison to bring a
considerable combined weight to bear, but in general the
relationship is less vigorous than in years past. This is
most visible within the EU, where the "France-Germany axis"
which traditionally provided the political impetus to deepen
and shape the evolving union seems to be relegated to a more
reactive role. Klau claimed France and Germany still have
the power to block initiatives they both disagree with, but
in an enlarged EU of 27 members, and given the recent
divergences in political culture, they no longer are the same
productive policy FORCE they once were. But, comparing
France and Germany to an old married couple, Klau said there
is little alternative to continuing to work together, as
"divorce would result in their isolation." Evans said the UK
remained unlikely to form the sort of strong alliance within
the EU with France or Germany that would allow either country
to abandon the other.

Forces for Change: Lisbon, UK Tory Victory, German Elections
-------------- --------------


7. (C/NF) Klau enumerated three medium-term events that could
affect the France-Germany relationship: possible
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, a possible Tory victory in
UK elections, and the German elections in September. In
providing more streamlined decision-making mechanisms and
strengthening the EU bureaucracy, the Lisbon Treaty is likely
in the long term to further undermine the relevance of the
France-Germany relationship within the EU. In the short
term, however, much will depend on how much political clout
the EU's new leaders and institutions (such as the "external
service") can bring to the table. A victory by the
Conservative Party in the next UK elections could have the
opposite effect, however, as the party's ingrained
Euroskepticism could either provide greater space in the EU
for France-Germany initiatives or crystallize French-German
opposition to UK policies. Most importantly, the German
federal elections in September will either reinforce the same
patterns described above if there is another CDU/SPD
coalition, or give the Chancellor greater flexibility (but
not necessarily an overriding desire) to coordinate with
grand French policy initiatives if a CDU/FDP coalition
results.


8. (C/NF) On the question of German elections, Beinhoff
agreed with Klau's view, adding that Sarkozy should
nevertheless be careful about trying to use summitry to
involve himself in the CDU's campaign, since his image among
German voters as an unpredictable partner may actually be
more of a burden than a boon to Merkel. Marianne Carre was
more cautious about the German elections, saying the results
would have no significant effect on France-Germany relations
due to their underlying institutional stability.


9. (C/NF) COMMENT: While the emphasis our interlocutors have
put on various aspects of the France-Germany relationship
varies (the French government in particular stressing the
importance of ingrained bilateral consultation mechanisms),
the message is similar. Sarkozy and Merkel may have
different political personalities, but France and Germany
have worked hard to ensure that their states cooperate in a
way that can accommodate such differences. As the long
memories of the WWII generation of Mitterand and Kohl faded
with Chirac and Schroeder, a lack of strongly shared
political values between French and German leaders has in
fact become the rule. However, Sarkozy's tight control of
key decisions and a French political system that increasingly
encourages this trend and, conversely, an already
consensus-focused German political culture further burdened
by a grand coalition represent real divergences, just as
Sarkozy's total mastery of the French political scene
contrasts with Merkel's pre-election temerity. Thus, it is
not personality but current political realities that are
making the painstakingly created institutional bilateral
consultation less relevant at present. END COMMENT.
PEKALA