FRANCE-GERMANY RELATIONS: THE VIEW FROM PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000938 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2019 TAGS: PREL GM FR SUBJECT: FRANCE-GERMANY RELATIONS: THE VIEW FROM PARIS Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathy Allegrone for Reasons 1.4(b),(d). ¶1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: The status of the relationship between France and Germany, a post-war success story and the traditional workhorse of European integration, has once again been the subject of a flurry of French press reporting during the campaign for the June 7 European Parliament elections and in the run-up to the German federal elections in September. Most of these reports have focused on the personal relationship - or lack thereof - between President Sarkozy and Chancellor Merkel. While the personal relationship between the President and the Chancellor is not unimportant, diplomatic sources in Paris emphasize that the unprecedented institutionalization of the bilateral relationship provides long term stability. Nevertheless, ever greater centralization of decision-making power at the Elysee contrasts with a lack of flexibility in the German coalition government, contributing to a relative lack of dynamism in the current stage of France-German relations. Change may be in the air, however, as near- and middle-term developments, including the potential ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, a possible Conservative electoral victory in the UK, and the outcome of the September German elections could either re-ignite the France-Germany spark or further hobble their ability to lead on joint policies. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) Post notes that while some discussion of German and British politics and institutions is necessary to address this topic, we defer to Embassies Berlin and London for authoritative viewpoints. Personality Isn't Everything -------------- ¶3. (C/NF) French officials from the office of the President to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) regularly tell us that while Sarkozy and Merkel have different personalities, the focus given to this aspect by press reports hides the less headline-making institutional realities. Most recently, MFA Germany Desk Officer Marianne Carre said in a June 19 meeting that both countries have worked hard for decades to institutionalize consultation procedures. This includes not only regular ministerial-level meetings on a variety of topics, but also the exchange of civil servants between the two countries in every ministry, and regular liaisons between civil society groups and political parties, ensuring 
consultation from the political to the working levels. German Political Counselor in Paris Christina Beinhoff echoed this view, saying the German Ambassador expressed his annoyance at even positive news coverage of the personal atmospherics between Sarkozy and Merkel during the Chancellor's June 11 visit to France, arguing that such stories perpetuate a hot-cold image that does not reflect the stable reality of bilateral relations. British Political Officer Olivier Evans added that, although both Germany and France have tried at times to court the UK as an alternative partner, they have learned from their lack of success that their best bet is to focus on their own coordination, a conclusion that has fueled an existing preference to meet together before key European or global meetings to hammer out compromise positions bilaterally and then present a solidly united front. Challenges to Consultation -------------- ¶4. (C/NF) However, changes in the political landscape in both France and Germany have strained the network of institutional ties. Thomas Klau, Editorial Director of the European Council on Foreign Relations, said the 2008 constitutional amendment changing the French presidential term from seven to five years to correspond with the parliamentary electoral calendar makes another "cohabitation" - in which the president and prime minister are from different parties - extremely unlikely. This frees up French presidents to take an even more energetic lead on key policy initiatives because they do not face the same midterm electoral pressures. This freedom in turn reinforces Sarkozy's existing tendency to centralize decision-making authority on important issues in the Elysee even more so than other French presidents, often keeping the MFA and other ministries out of the loop. ¶5. (C/NF) Klau contrasted this French executive dynamism with the German system, both institutionally, given Germany's federal structure, and culturally, where long-term planning and inter- and intra-party negotiation are part and parcel of the political process, even more so under Chancellor Merkel. Beinhoff said the view was much the same from the German embassy, which feels hampered in its ability to manage bilateral relations by a sense that there are really only a handful of French interlocutors who matter. This is PARIS 00000938 002 OF 002 exacerbated by the German government coalition, under which German diplomats, headed by Merkel's premier political rival, feel uncertain that they are getting the information they need. The MFA's Marianne Carre added that the politics of decision making in Germany's grand coalition seemed to be slowing down the already ponderous institutional consultation process. Divorce Not An Option -------------- ¶6. (C/NF) The end result, according to Klau, is that France and Germany are going through one of the "less productive" periods of their relationship. When there is a strong convergence of interests, as in the case of the G20 in London, the two sides can still work in unison to bring a considerable combined weight to bear, but in general the relationship is less vigorous than in years past. This is most visible within the EU, where the "France-Germany axis" which traditionally provided the political impetus to deepen and shape the evolving union seems to be relegated to a more reactive role. Klau claimed France and Germany still have the power to block initiatives they both disagree with, but in an enlarged EU of 27 members, and given the recent divergences in political culture, they no longer are the same productive policy force they once were. But, comparing France and Germany to an old married couple, Klau said there is little alternative to continuing to work together, as "divorce would result in their isolation." Evans said the UK remained unlikely to form the sort of strong alliance within the EU with France or Germany that would allow either country to abandon the other. Forces for Change: Lisbon, UK Tory Victory, German Elections -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C/NF) Klau enumerated three medium-term events that could affect the France-Germany relationship: possible ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, a possible Tory victory in UK elections, and the German elections in September. In providing more streamlined decision-making mechanisms and strengthening the EU bureaucracy, the Lisbon Treaty is likely in the long term to further undermine the relevance of the France-Germany relationship within the EU. In the short term, however, much will depend on how much political clout the EU's new leaders and institutions (such as the "external service") can bring to the table. A victory by the Conservative Party in the next UK elections could have the opposite effect, however, as the party's ingrained Euroskepticism could either provide greater space in the EU for France-Germany initiatives or crystallize French-German opposition to UK policies. Most importantly, the German federal elections in September will either reinforce the same patterns described above if there is another CDU/SPD coalition, or give the Chancellor greater flexibility (but not necessarily an overriding desire) to coordinate with grand French policy initiatives if a CDU/FDP coalition results. ¶8. (C/NF) On the question of German elections, Beinhoff agreed with Klau's view, adding that Sarkozy should nevertheless be careful about trying to use summitry to involve himself in the CDU's campaign, since his image among German voters as an unpredictable partner may actually be more of a burden than a boon to Merkel. Marianne Carre was more cautious about the German elections, saying the results would have no significant effect on France-Germany relations due to their underlying institutional stability. ¶9. (C/NF) COMMENT: While the emphasis our interlocutors have put on various aspects of the France-Germany relationship varies (the French government in particular stressing the importance of ingrained bilateral consultation mechanisms), the message is similar. Sarkozy and Merkel may have different political personalities, but France and Germany have worked hard to ensure that their states cooperate in a way that can accommodate such differences. As the long memories of the WWII generation of Mitterand and Kohl faded with Chirac and Schroeder, a lack of strongly shared political values between French and German leaders has in fact become the rule. However, Sarkozy's tight control of key decisions and a French political system that increasingly encourages this trend and, conversely, an already consensus-focused German political culture further burdened by a grand coalition represent real divergences, just as Sarkozy's total mastery of the French political scene contrasts with Merkel's pre-election temerity. Thus, it is not personality but current political realities that are making the painstakingly created institutional bilateral consultation less relevant at present. END COMMENT. PEKALA