MAURITANIA: FRENCH OFFICIALS RELIEVED POLITICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000909 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2019 TAGS: PREL KDEM PGOV MR FR SUBJECT: MAURITANIA: FRENCH OFFICIALS RELIEVED POLITICAL DEAL WAS STRUCK, WANT ELECTIONS ON JULY 18 Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew Young, 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Meeting with U.S. Ambassador to Mauritania Mark Boulware on June 30, French officials at the Presidency (Romain Serman) and MFA (Christine Fages) supported the political deal brokered over the June 26-28 weekend and underscored the need for elections to take place on July 18. They both expressed relief that the long political crisis appeared to be ending, hailed Senegalese President Wade's efforts, and thought that this opportunity should be exploited and not missed. Fages reiterated her concerns about the region's security and the possible spread of terrorism across the Sahel. She noted France's intention to hold talks on the Sahel with the USG during the September-October period. Notably, the French displayed almost no concern that the latest political accord could hit roadblocks that might make implementation problematic. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) U.S. Ambassador Mark Boulware, in transit to Nouakchott, on June 30 met separately with Romain Serman, Technical Counselor on Africa at the French Presidency, and with Christine Fages, MFA DAS-equivalent for West Africa. MEETING WITH SERMAN ¶3. (C) Presidential Advisor Serman said that Aziz, in agreeing to the power-sharing arrangement, was finally doing what Serman said he had advised Aziz to do in November 2008 -- open up the political process, seek consensus, and move toward credible elections. Aziz though he could do otherwise but came to find himself isolated. The Dakar process had provided opportunities but then foundered, Serman asserted, because of oral promises Senegal's President Wade had made to deposed President Abdallahi. Serman credited Wade with continuing his efforts until agreement was finally achieved. ¶4. (C) Serman believed it crucial to hold elections on July 18 as presently contemplated. He feared that allowing the date to be postponed could place the entire process on a dangerous and slippery slope, with Ramadan and the change of seasons looming. "Dakar could explode," if the July 18 date were not respected, he said. Serman acknowledged that July 18 left little time for campaigning and organizing, and he said that the three opposition candidates --Colonel Ely Ould Mohamed Vall, RFD leader Ould Daddah, and FNDD candidate Massaoud Ould Boulkheir -- favored a delay to improve their chances. Serman nonetheless said that holding the vote on July 18 was the best course of action. ¶5. (C) Serman said that international measures to support the elections seemed to be emerging. He said he understood that the U.S. was interested in supporting the organization of communications support for the elections, perhaps via an NGO. The International Francophonie Organization (OIF in its French acronym) planned to work with Mauritania's electoral commission. The OIF, AU, and France also were interested in sending election observers, with France having about USD 800,000 in funding for that purpose. Serman mentioned a possible 10 million Euro (about USD 14 million) from the EU. Serman thought Spain could be persuaded to help. Serman said that the GOF would seek French parliamentarians from across the political spectrum to observe the July 18 vote. ¶6. (C) Serman said that Aziz could win, but a single-round victory would be an immediate cause for concern. Vall would drain votes from Aziz, and Ould Daddah, who had won 47 percent of the vote in the last election, could do well. Serman indicated that France would accept an election victory by any of the candidates so long as the election was reasonably credible. He mentioned that France's current priority in Mauritania was security, both in national and regional terms. ¶7. (C) Ambassador Boulware said that there were no big differences between French and U.S. views. The international community appeared to be unified. He pointed out, however, that while the U.S. would welcome elections on July 18, it would be willing to support a "technical" delay if necessary, but not a delay for political reasons. He posited that the final agreement was a bit irregular and had been cobbled together, which suggested the need for some flexibility in its implementation, but underscored that the process needed to be fair and credible. Serman said that the opposition's agreement to participate in the electoral process gave credibility to the agreement. He repeated that a one-round victory by any candidate would be suspect. ¶8. (C) Serman found the recent killing of a private amcit in Nouakchott troubling. He noted the spate of recent hostage-takings in the region and the possibility that the Nouakchott killing had been a botched kidnapping for ransom. Ambassador Boulware provided an update on the situation and the lack of conclusive evidence that would explain the murder. MEETING WITH FAGES ¶9. (C) Mauritania Desk Officer Sophie Villette also attended with MFA DAS-equivalent for West Africa Christine PARIS 00000909 002 OF 002 Fages, who expressed concerns about the possible terrorist link to the murder of the amcit. Fages, who has often emphasized her concern over the spread of terrorism in the Sahel region, said it would be most unfortunate if AQIM now "had opened a front in Nouakchott." She said it was more imperative than ever for Mali and Mauritania to cooperate with each other on regional terrorism, and she suggested that France would seek to push both to work together on this issue of common concern. ¶10. (C) Fages said that "I don't care who wins the election" in Mauritania, provided that the process is acceptably free and fair. She thought, however, that Aziz was the probable winner. Like Serman, she believed that the current political accord provided an opportunity to deliver Mauritania from its political crisis and that this chance should not be wasted. She noted that, in the end, Abdallahi had played the spoiler role. ¶11. (C) Discussion shifted to ways the international community could support the elections process. Ambassador Boulware said the U.S. would do what it could and that international unity remained important. Villette and Fages noted French efforts to enlist French parliamentarians as observers. (NOTE: On July 2, Villette informed us that France was looking at a five-person parliamentary delegation to observe the elections, which was a smaller group than she and Fages had mentioned during the meeting with Ambassador Boulware. END NOTE.) Ensuring security for French and other outside observers could be a problem, Fages noted. ¶12. (C) Fages said that French planning for a U.S.-France meeting in Paris on the Sahel, regional terrorism, and other regional concerns, was moving forward, with a target date in the September-October period. She hoped that inter-agency delegations on both sides would discuss the region in depth. ¶13. (C) COMMENT: Most notably, neither Serman nor Fages at any point seemed to take into account that the political agreement, cobbled together as it was and with many potential points that could cause it to unravel, might not hold. To them, it was a done deal, with no going back and with the enticing prospect of elections on July 18 as the long-sought means of ending this political crisis of almost a year's duration. It was apparent that they would do their best to ensure such a result, with expediency a guiding principle. END COMMENT. ¶14. (U) Ambassador Boulware has cleared this message. PEKALA