DARFUR: JUNE 23/25 MEETINGS WITH JEM AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000864

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2019
TAGS: PREL PHUM PINS PINR SU FR
SUBJECT: DARFUR: JUNE 23/25 MEETINGS WITH JEM AND
ABDULWAHID EL-NUR

Classified By: Acting Political Minister-Counselor Andrew Young, 1.4 (b
/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Darfur Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)
representatives said on June 23 that JEM was absorbing other
Darfur rebel elements and was becoming the strongest Darfur
group best able to represent Darfur's interests. JEM was
continuing to seek Khartoum's implementation of the February
17, 2009, Declaration of Intentions, which could lead to a
cessation of hostilities, further peace talks, and a cease
fire; Khartoum was not showing any inclination to take these
steps. The ICC issue and resulting expulsion of NGOs from
Darfur had made things worse in Darfur JEM leader Khalil
Ibrahim is considering travel to the U.S. soon. In a
separate June 25 meeting, Abdulwahid el-Nur was critical of
SE Gration's statements on Sudan and genocide. He reiterated
that he would not participate in peace talks until the people
of Darfur were secure and no longer subject to violence. He
believed that Qatar was incapable of serving as an honest
broker because of what he considered Qatar's long-standing
pro-Khartoum stance. END SUMMARY.

MEETING WITH JEM


2. (C) A six-person delegation of JEM members met with
acting AF-watcher on June 23. The group consisted of Ahmed
Adam Bakhiet (JEM Deputy Leader),Abubaker Hamid (JEM
Administrative and Organizational Affairs),Haroun
Abdulhameed (JEM Political Advisor),Khattab Adam Widah (JEM
Media Advisor),Sief El Dawla (Secretary of External
Offices),and El Sadig Yousif (JEM Representative in France).
Abubaker Hamid did most of the talking although the others
contributed as well.


3. (C) The JEM delegation claimed that JEM was becoming
stronger and was continuing to absorb other Darfur rebel
groups, including 16 recent groups that had either joined JEM
or were in the process of doing so. These were: SLM Peace
Wing (moving away from SLM-Minnawi); SLM-Nur (North Darfur
Sector); Revolutionary Forces Front; SLM-Field Leadership of
Adam Ali Shogar; SLM-Field Leadership of Dafalla Albakheit;
SLM-Unity Sulaiman Jamous; SLM-Unity Abdel Rahman Ibrahim
Banat; SLM-Main Line Mansour Arbab; Numour Al-Sudan Movement
Bahr Aldin Adam Karama; Revolutionary Forces Front Farah
Al-Amin Rizgalla; Reform and Development Front Iddal Fursan;
Kordofan Association for Development; Movement of the
Aggrieved Soldier Al-Doush; Support of Truth Tulus; Movement
of Ribat National Army Bilbil; and Darfur Rasd and Mutabaa
Movement Mohamed Rudi Adam and Ahmet Hajja.


4. (C) The JEM members said that JEM was clearly becoming
the dominant Darfur movement, and that JEM should be viewed
as the "lead voice" on Darfur, which would put to rest
Khartoum's claim that the Darfur factions were too numerous
and disunited, making it hard for Khartoum to know with whom
it should talk. "It is clear that they will have to talk to
JEM," the JEM group said. They said that there were a number
of other Darfur "leaders" but that they represented few
Darfuris and were weak. They notably focused on Abdulwahid
el-Nur, claiming that he had become a media darling but
commanded only a small, ineffectual following in Darfur, with
many previously senior associates abandoning him and joining
JEM.


5. (C) The JEM representatives spent considerable time
condemning Khartoum and its failure to improve conditions in
Darfur and elsewhere throughout Sudan, live up to prior
commitments (including the CPA),cooperate with the
international community, or do anything else other than
concentrate on its exclusive retention of power in Sudan.
The JEM members said that JEM wanted Khartoum to implement
the February 17, 2009, Declaration of Intentions both sides
had signed. Instead, Khartoum wanted a cease fire to take
place first. JEM wanted implementation of the Declaration,
followed by a cessation of hostilities, further talks on
ironing out details, and then a cease fire, but only to
conclude rather than initiate the process. On the prisoner
exchange issue, the JEM members said that JEM had released,
in two batches, some 80 prisoners, but that Khartoum, in an
act of bad faith, did not release real fighters but instead
civilians "who they rounded up and who they tried to make us
believe were fighters."


6. (C) Instead of offering cooperation, Khartoum was
obsessed with the ICC issue and was hardening its positions
on all fronts, which included the expulsion of the NGOs.
Conditions in Darfur were worsening, the JEM leaders said.
They accused Khartoum of playing a perverse psychological

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game -- "They want to make conditions in Darfur so bad that
the people of Darfur will beg the international community to
call off the ICC indictments so that life there can improve."
The JEM leaders said that the Bashir regime had no friends
in Sudan and would face Darfur-like problems in all parts of
the country, with the South being the most obvious example.
"You have a minority group trying to exert exclusive control
over a country made of many different peoples. Khartoum
doesn't care about them and will do whatever it has to do to
keep power in the hands of this small minority."


7. (C) Throughout the meeting, the JEM members expressed
appreciation for the U.S. engagement in Sudan and did not
raise the recent debate over "genocide and Sudan." They
mentioned that JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim was considering a
visit to the U.S. soon, but did not elaborate and did not ask
our help in facilitating his travel. We will scan and e-mail
a paper the JEM group left with us.

ABDULWAHID EL-NUR


8. (C) Abdulwahid el-Nur (AW) offered a distinctly
different view when we met with him on June 25 to convey SE
Gration's letter thanking him for meeting during the SE's May
visit to Paris. AW forcefully expressed his "strong
disappointment" with SE Gration and his recent comments about
Sudan and genocide. We noted that the USG had clarified the
USG position on genocide in Sudan, but AW brushed that aside,
saying that the damage had already been done, with Khartoum
clearly feeling that the USG's position had softened and
might even be viewed as supportive of the regime. AW said
that this would only embolden Khartoum and lead it to treat
its critics and those it was oppressing with even more
disdain and disregard. He asked repeatedly that we "tell
Washington exactly what I think about this."


9. (C) Concerning participation in the peace process, AW
repeated what he has told us several times before -- that he
would not participate so long as there was no security for
the people of Darfur, which included disarming the Janjaweed
and allowing refugees and IDPs to return to their homes
safely and with no conditions attached. Unless this
happened, he said, "how could anyone expect that I would go
talk to these murderers and rapists? They have to stop
first." AW said that he did not believe that Qatar could
serve as an honest broker in hosting the Doha talks. "They
have never agreed to anything critical of Khartoum and they
were among the group of African and Arab countries that
called for suspending the ICC indictments right after they
were issued. How can you expect them to have as a priority
the interests of the people of Sudan? They are only
interested in finding an easy way out for Bashir and his
people." AW said several times that "I'm not taking the
positions I'm taking because I'm looking for some kind of job
down the road, but rather because I want to see my people end
their suffering."

BERRY