FRANCE-UAE DEFENSE AGREEMENT: NOT A NUCLEAR

S E C R E T PARIS 000832

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2019
TAGS: MARR MCAP MNUC PINS PREL FR AE
SUBJECT: FRANCE-UAE DEFENSE AGREEMENT: NOT A NUCLEAR
UMBRELLA BUT A STRATEGIC SHIFT

REF: A. PARIS POINTS - MAY 29

B. IIR 6 832 0883 09

Classified By: Acting Minister Counselor for Political Affairs Andrew Y
oung for Reasons 1.4(b),(d).


1. (S) SUMMARY: France's defense agreement with the UAE,
signed during President Sarkozy's May 25-26 visit, is one of
the first major efforts to operationalize a strategy set out
in the Defense White Paper of 2008. This strategy called for
a focus on the Gulf region and for defense agreements
designed to face new strategic threats. However, despite
press reports to the contrary, the agreement creates neither
binding mutual defense obligations nor a "nuclear umbrella"
for the UAE. The agreement does seem, however, to be
designed in part to help counter the threat posed by Iran.
END SUMMARY.


2. (S) Poloffs met June 19 with MFA UAE Desk Officer
Guillaume Henry, who stressed that a June 16 Le Figaro
article describing the agreement as a tripwire to trigger
French involvement in any UAE military confrontation with
Iran both misrepresented and misinterpreted the facts. Henry
said the security guarantee embodied in the France-UAE
military accord is less binding for France than France's
commitments under Article V of the NATO treaty; in the event
of the UAE's involvement in hostilities, France has agreed to
conduct bilateral consultations to determine what actions it
might take in defense of the UAE, but it has not committed
itself to any specific actions. Henry also stressed the
agreement did not contain any mention of using French nuclear
weapons to protect the UAE.


3. (C) In contrast to the previous France-UAE defense
agreement from 1995 that the new accord is designed to
replace,Henry said French law now requires defense agreements
to be made public and to be ratified by Parliament. He said
Parliament will begin what he expects to be a very vigorous
debate on the agreement in a few months, with final
ratification coming perhaps in spring of 2010.


4. (C) The French have already established a presence for
army, navy, and air force personnel, according to Henry. He
noted, though, that protection of French soldiers from UAE
legal jurisdiction - a French red line during negotiations,
due to the UAE's application of the death penalty - will not
be guaranteed until after the agreement is ratified.


5. (S) More broadly, Henry said that the Gulf is becoming an
increasingly significant strategic focus for France, for
three main reasons: to help meet France's energy needs, to
establish a military presence in the Gulf through accords
like this one with the UAE, and to facilitate sales of French
weaponry (although Henry would not divulge details of ongoing
negotiations for the UAE to replace their fleet of Mirage
2000 fighters with Rafales). Henry added the new focus on
the Gulf comes in part as the result of recommendations in
the White Paper, which called for France to move military
resources from Africa to the "Arc of Crisis" running from the
Maghreb to Indonesia, with the Gulf playing a central role.
Henry was less clear on the extent to which considerations
about the Iranian threat played into the new agreement,
saying only that the UAE probably had Iran in mind during the
negotiations.


6. (S/NF) COMMENT: The defense agreement indicates France is
serious about the strategic priority of the Gulf, though
competition with the United States for trade and arms deals
likely played a role in French calculations. While the exact
degree of obligation to defend the UAE taken on by France may
be formally limited, Elysee and French general staff sources
(see reftels) have separately - and clearly - indicated that
this agreement was designed to counter the Iranian threat.
BERRY