MAURITANIA/NIGER/COTE D'IVOIRE/TOGO: MFA DAS

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 000785

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PINS XY MR NG IV TO FR
SUBJECT: MAURITANIA/NIGER/COTE D'IVOIRE/TOGO: MFA DAS
DISCUSSES KEY ISSUES

REF: A. NOUAKCHOTT 387

B. JUNE 12 KANEDA-DEPARTMENT E-MAILS

C. JUNE 8 PARIS POINTS

Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew Young, 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: MFA DAS Christine Fages on June 12 urged
the U.S. to pressure deposed Mauritanian President Abdallahi
to sign and work to implement the recently brokered political
accord, an issue that Senegal's FM Gadio would likely raise
during his June 12 meetings in Washington. Fages responded
"no comment" when asked if junta leader Aziz was visiting or
planning to visit Paris. Fages said the French were not
comfortable with Nigerien President Tandja's attempt to
secure a thir term but were limited in their ability to
criticize him publicly. Fages believed it possible that Cote
d'Ivoire's President Gbagbo could postpone the November 29
elections. If the elections are postponed, Fages said she
would push for a complete withdrawal of France's Operation
Licorne. On Togo, Fages said that President Faure needed to
allow, if not encourage, the opposition's participation in
the upcoming presidential election and that opposition leader
Gilchrist Olympio needed to engage actively in the process
rather than find a pretext for remaining aloof, as has been
his habit. Fages said the GOF would soon invite Department
and DOD officials, along with other experts, to Paris for
talks on the Sahel during the September-October period. END
SUMMARY.

MAURITANIA


2. (C) MFA West Africa DAS-equivalent Christine Fages on
June 12 discussed current key issues, beginning with
Mauritania. She said that France supported the recent
political agreement the Senegalese had helped broker in
Dakar. Implementing the accord as effectively and as soon as
possible was of high importance -- "it has taken months to
get here and we can't afford a setback or being forced to
start over again." In this regard, she said it was
imperative to secure deposed President Abdallahi's agreement
and cooperation. Referring to matters discussed in Ref A,
she said that by raising new conditions outside the framework
of the accord, Abdallahi risked undoing it.


3. (C) As reported Ref B, Fages said that FM Gadio of
Senegal was now visiting Washington and that he would likely
raise with USG officials Abdallahi's refusal to sign the
accord or assist in its implementation. Fages hoped that the
U.S. would express its understanding and support to Gadio and
that the U.S. would then communicate to Abdallahi the need
for him to get on board. "The U.S. has been the most
supportive of everybody regarding Abdallahi, so he's likely
to listen to you," Fages observed. "We hope that Secretary
Clinton gets involved and conveys this message herself to
Abdallahi. There is no alternative to the Dakar-brokered
accord, and we must implement it."


4. (C) We asked Fages about rumors that junta leader Aziz
was or would soon be in Paris. She offered an abrupt "no
comment." She went on to say, "yes, I have heard those
rumors too. There is nothing I can say about them. Sorry."
(COMMENT: If Aziz were not here or planning to come here,
she would likely have said "no." Her "no comment" therefore
means that he is or will soon be here. If so, her tone and
body language indicated that she opposed such a visit. END
COMMENT.)

NIGER


5. (C) As had officials at the French Presidency (Ref C),
Fages expressed frustration with Nigerien President Tandja's
attempts to ensure a third term in office. She said that
France was a bit limited in how strongly it could comment
publicly -- "There have been other cases -- Biya, Campaore --
where constitutions were changed to allow leaders to stay in
power. We and others didn't say too much then, so how can we
get vocal about Niger?" Fages said that French comment had
so far been limited to a call for respecting the
constitution. "But their constitutional court has already
said, in effect, that the constitution can't be amended,
which is absurd. So that doesn't really go anywhere. Now
the court will rule on the referendum Tandja wants to hold.
In any case, the message we are trying to send to the
populace is that, if there is a referendum, people unhappy
with Tandja should go vote and not riot."


6. (C) Instability stemming from Tandja's maneuvers would
be most unfortunate, Fages said, both for Niger and the
region. It would likely increase AQIM's regional influence
as well as exacerbate the Touareg problem in the north.
Fages said that AQIM was probably becoming more of a danger
because of the influx of cash it had received as a result of
the ransoms paid in response to the kidnappings.

COTE D'IVOIRE


7. (C) We mentioned to Fages the comment offered by Romain
Serman at the French Presidency (Ref C) that President
Sarkozy's Secretary-General, Claude Gueant, had canceled a
visit to the Cote d'Ivoire because there were indications
that President Gbagbo did not intend to hold elections on
November 29, as had been recently announced. Fages confirmed
that Gueant would not go there. Without providing specifics,
Fages said that the November 29 elections could be canceled
or postponed. "He's not going to hold elections if he's not
sure he'll win," she said, in reference to Gbagbo.


8. (C) For Fages, the key issue would be Operation
Licorne's fate if the elections did not take place as
scheduled. She said that she would advocate a full
withdrawal of French forces, although this would have to be
coordinated with the UN so that UNOCI would not be left in
the lurch. "If there are even three French soldiers there,
and if there is civil disorder or violence, the Ivoirians
will go after our soldiers and French citizens. We don't
want our soldiers to be an issue or a part of a conflict.
Granted, if they are withdrawn and there is violence, we
might have to send them back in as a rescue or security
force. But I don't think they should be there should the
Ivoirians start fighting amongst themselves over canceled
elections."


9. (C) Fages said that Licorne had already drawn down to
about 800 troops. A drawdown to 400 would be possible but a
force of that size would not have much fighting power as
there would be a higher proportion of support rather than
combat elements. Fages noted that the only French forces in
Cote d'Ivoire were those deployed in Operation Licorne. The
former permanent French military presence no longer existed,
with the French military in the process of closing shop
pursuant to the restructuring of the bilateral defense and
military cooperation agreements now taking place.

TOGO


10. (C) Fages said that Togo was another problem area.
There was the still-unsettled business arising from President
Faure's sacking of his brother Kpatcha and the question of
whether Kpatcha or his hard-line supporters in the military
would try to retaliate against Faure. The other problem was
the upcoming presidential election. Fages said that Faure
was mistaken in thinking that he was somehow in the clear
politically simply by virtue of having held successful
legislative elections. The presidential election would be a
completely different issue. She said that Faure needed to
understand that, for the presidential election to be accepted
by the international community, there had to be meaningful
participation by the opposition, i.e., Gilchrist Olympio.
Faure needed to take an accommodating stance towards the
elections and Olympio's participation.


11. (C) But, Fages continued, Olympio was often part of the
problem. He always found reasons not to engage or to remain
aloof. Fages said that Olympio had to become more realistic
and to participate at some point -- time was not on his side.
Rather than accepting compromise that would allow him to
participate, he always held out for a bit more and left empty
handed when "more" did not come his way. Fages said that it
sometimes seemed that Olympio did not really want to be
president and instead wanted only to see the fall and
destruction of the House of Gnassingbe. This was
understandable given the two families' backgrounds but not
helpful in terms of resolving Togo's problems.

SAHEL TALKS WITH THE U.S.


12. (C) Fages said that the GOF wanted to invite the USG to
Paris for talks on the Sahel during the September-October
period. These talks would include representatives from the
Department, DOD, and the intelligence community, and could
include as well experts on terrorism, narcotics,
money-laundering, and related topics. Per one of our Ref B
messages, we noted that Fages said that formal invitations
would be extended once the French were informed that Vicki
Huddleston had officially become DASD for Africa, succeeding
DASD Whelan. Fages mentioned that the talks on the Sahel
could be expanded at a later stage to include the UK.


PEKALA