SE GRATION AND FRENCH REVIEW SUDAN STATE OF PLAY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000738 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2019 TAGS: PREL SU FR SUBJECT: SE GRATION AND FRENCH REVIEW SUDAN STATE OF PLAY Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Greg D'Elia, 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Special Envoy Gration's exchanges with senior French officials on May 30 focused on next steps on the Doha peace process, principally whether Paris-based SLM leader Abdulwahid el-Nur (AW) would relax his opposition and take part. Gration and the French agreed on the possible value of complementary tracks to Doha, featuring smaller meetings in alternate, neutral venues, as an inducement to AW's participation. Gration deflected a French suggestion for Geneva meetings, stating he had floated to AW the possibility of a meeting in Canada but Addis Ababa, as the seat of the African Union, would be the more advantageous choice. Gration warned of Doha fatigue and the flagging enthusiasm of AU-UN Mediator Bassole. End Summary. ¶2. (C) MFA Spokesperson Eric Chevallier hosted SE Gration at a Saturday May 30 breakfast for an exchange of views featuring Presidential Africa Advisor Romain Serman, A/S AF-Equivalent Stephane Gompertz, Kouchner Africa Counselor Charlotte Montel, and AF DAS-Equivalent Helene Le Gal, with Charge Mark Pekala, AF/SE Cameron Hudson, and Africa Watcher (notetaker) also attending. Conversation immediately focused on SE Gration's first face-to-face encounter with AW the previous night (septel). Gration related that AW, while in the presence of several of his commanders, stuck to script, showing no indication he would relent in his refusal to engage with Khartoum, demanding absolute justice and peace along with outside military intervention; at the meeting's close, however, AW sought a one-on-one in which he changed tack completely, praising Gration as his "elder," beseeching his help as an American, and indicating a kind of desperation at how to proceed. Chevallier intervened that AW appeared "lost" to which Gration replied that AW had backed himself into a corner though sterile rhetoric and that his failure in recent weeks to create space for maneuver was proof of a lack of political acumen. Gration said he had admonished AW that there would be no further engagement with the Fur leader unless talks or phone calls led to AW's participation at Doha. "Unless you get Doha in your vocabulary, you're out," Gration said he had warned AW. Judging that AW had reached a pivotal pass, Gration said he thought it feasible AW would change tack, under pressure from within the Fur. Gration �00A;noted the self-confidence and assurance demonstrated by Fur commanders he had met in the field; the contrast between AW and the macho and charismatic Kitura was striking, with the latter exuding command and inspiring loyalty. If AW were a real leader, he would see his responsibilities to his people and head to Doha, Gration stated. ¶3. (C) To ease AW into the Doha process, Gration said he had offered the Fur leader the option of a meeting in Canada with mediators, a scenario cleared in advance with Qatari Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Ahmed al-Mahmoud. Other venues were possible, apart from the United States, he suggested, before pushing back on a suggestion from Serman and Chevallier to revive side-talks in Geneva. Gration favored Addis Ababa, in order to keep the patronage of the African Union, which he saw as key. Such talks should be complementary to Doha, not an alternative or rival process, all parties agreed. The term "Doha" now had associated baggage and it might be better to find a new moniker. Doha may fail, Gration said, and it was time to start thinking through alternatives. The UN-AU Envoy Bassole, whom AW rejected as a so-called Qatari puppet, might refuse to prolong his mandate. Plus, QATAR itself was losing patience. The Qatari PM would allow the process two more months, Gration said. The emirate's diplomatic eye was roving and there was interest in deploying al-Mahmoud on other crises, for instance Somali piracy or Hamas. Losing Qatari sponsorship would be a challenge, nonetheless, including financially, and it was important to start putting complementary efforts in place. Gration suggested former South African President Mbeki would be a good successor to Bassole, prompting Chevallier to flag that Mbeki resented France and had been outright unhelpful with respect to the Cote d'Ivoire crisis. ¶4. (C) Presidential Advisor Serman asked what role Egypt should play on Sudan, apart from involvement in the South. Gration agreed that the Egyptian relationship with QATAR was problematic, with FM Abul Gheit evincing a visceral hatred and actively seeking to be a spoiler on Doha. Gartion admitted to Serman that Intelligence Chief Suleiman was more constructive and knew the issues thoroughly. Suleiman moreover had a potentially useful relationship with Sudanese Intelligence Chief Ghosh. The challenge would be to enlarge Suleiman's role while simultaneously restricting Abul Gheit's noxious influence. ¶5. (C) Gompertz raised the tentative 2011 referendum on southern secession according to CPA terms, causing Gration to PARIS 00000738 002 OF 002 regret that Khartoum had made no effort to promote unity. Secession however would have unforeseen consequences and would likely unleash South-south violence. The south lacked the needed infrastructure for sovereignty and was without the human capacity to govern itself effectively. Gration advised a wiser outcome might be akin to Kenya's interim period of southern self-rule in the early 60s, a pause that would allow cooler spirits to recognize the wisdom of continued unity. Ironically, enmity for Khartoum was the only mortar now holding southern Sudan together. ¶6. (C) Asked by Chevallier for any update on USG thinking with regard to a suspension of ICC investigations under Article 16, Gration replied succinctly that the USG supports accountability. ¶7. (U) SE Gration's office has cleared this cable. PEKALA