SE GRATION AND FRENCH REVIEW SUDAN STATE OF PLAY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000738

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2019
TAGS: PREL SU FR
SUBJECT: SE GRATION AND FRENCH REVIEW SUDAN STATE OF PLAY

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Greg D'Elia, 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) Summary: Special Envoy Gration's exchanges with
senior French officials on May 30 focused on next steps on
the Doha peace process, principally whether Paris-based SLM
leader Abdulwahid el-Nur (AW) would relax his opposition and
take part. Gration and the French agreed on the possible
value of complementary tracks to Doha, featuring smaller
meetings in alternate, neutral venues, as an inducement to
AW's participation. Gration deflected a French suggestion
for Geneva meetings, stating he had floated to AW the
possibility of a meeting in Canada but Addis Ababa, as the
seat of the African Union, would be the more advantageous
choice. Gration warned of Doha fatigue and the flagging
enthusiasm of AU-UN Mediator Bassole. End Summary.


2. (C) MFA Spokesperson Eric Chevallier hosted SE Gration at
a Saturday May 30 breakfast for an exchange of views
featuring Presidential Africa Advisor Romain Serman, A/S
AF-Equivalent Stephane Gompertz, Kouchner Africa Counselor
Charlotte Montel, and AF DAS-Equivalent Helene Le Gal, with
Charge Mark Pekala, AF/SE Cameron Hudson, and Africa Watcher
(notetaker) also attending. Conversation immediately focused
on SE Gration's first face-to-face encounter with AW the
previous night (septel). Gration related that AW, while in
the presence of several of his commanders, stuck to script,
showing no indication he would relent in his refusal to
engage with Khartoum, demanding absolute justice and peace
along with outside military intervention; at the meeting's
close, however, AW sought a one-on-one in which he changed
tack completely, praising Gration as his "elder," beseeching
his help as an American, and indicating a kind of desperation
at how to proceed. Chevallier intervened that AW appeared
"lost" to which Gration replied that AW had backed himself
into a corner though sterile rhetoric and that his failure in
recent weeks to create space for maneuver was proof of a lack
of political acumen. Gration said he had admonished AW that
there would be no further engagement with the Fur leader
unless talks or phone calls led to AW's participation at
Doha. "Unless you get Doha in your vocabulary, you're out,"
Gration said he had warned AW. Judging that AW had reached a
pivotal pass, Gration said he thought it feasible AW would
change tack, under pressure from within the Fur. Gration
noted the self-confidence and assurance demonstrated by Fur
commanders he had met in the field; the contrast between AW
and the macho and charismatic Kitura was striking, with the
latter exuding command and inspiring loyalty. If AW were a
real leader, he would see his responsibilities to his people
and head to Doha, Gration stated.


3. (C) To ease AW into the Doha process, Gration said he had
offered the Fur leader the option of a meeting in Canada with
mediators, a scenario cleared in advance with Qatari Minister
of State for Foreign Affairs Ahmed al-Mahmoud. Other venues
were possible, apart from the United States, he suggested,
before pushing back on a suggestion from Serman and
Chevallier to revive side-talks in Geneva. Gration favored
Addis Ababa, in order to keep the patronage of the African
Union, which he saw as key. Such talks should be
complementary to Doha, not an alternative or rival process,
all parties agreed. The term "Doha" now had associated
baggage and it might be better to find a new moniker. Doha
may fail, Gration said, and it was time to start thinking
through alternatives. The UN-AU Envoy Bassole, whom AW
rejected as a so-called Qatari puppet, might refuse to
prolong his mandate. Plus, Qatar itself was losing patience.
The Qatari PM would allow the process two more months,
Gration said. The emirate's diplomatic eye was roving and
there was interest in deploying al-Mahmoud on other crises,
for instance Somali piracy or Hamas. Losing Qatari
sponsorship would be a challenge, nonetheless, including
financially, and it was important to start putting
complementary efforts in place. Gration suggested former
South African President Mbeki would be a good successor to
Bassole, prompting Chevallier to flag that Mbeki resented
France and had been outright unhelpful with respect to the
Cote d'Ivoire crisis.


4. (C) Presidential Advisor Serman asked what role Egypt
should play on Sudan, apart from involvement in the South.
Gration agreed that the Egyptian relationship with Qatar was
problematic, with FM Abul Gheit evincing a visceral hatred
and actively seeking to be a spoiler on Doha. Gartion
admitted to Serman that Intelligence Chief Suleiman was more
constructive and knew the issues thoroughly. Suleiman
moreover had a potentially useful relationship with Sudanese
Intelligence Chief Ghosh. The challenge would be to enlarge
Suleiman's role while simultaneously restricting Abul Gheit's
noxious influence.


5. (C) Gompertz raised the tentative 2011 referendum on
southern secession according to CPA terms, causing Gration to

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regret that Khartoum had made no effort to promote unity.
Secession however would have unforeseen consequences and
would likely unleash South-south violence. The south lacked
the needed infrastructure for sovereignty and was without the
human capacity to govern itself effectively. Gration advised
a wiser outcome might be akin to Kenya's interim period of
southern self-rule in the early 60s, a pause that would allow
cooler spirits to recognize the wisdom of continued unity.
Ironically, enmity for Khartoum was the only mortar now
holding southern Sudan together.


6. (C) Asked by Chevallier for any update on USG thinking
with regard to a suspension of ICC investigations under
Article 16, Gration replied succinctly that the USG supports
accountability.


7. (U) SE Gration's office has cleared this cable.



PEKALA