Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09PARIS67
2009-01-16 17:26:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

GRANDE COMORE PRESIDENT CRITICIZES UNION PRESIDENT

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM PINR PTER CN IR FR 
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VZCZCXRO9242
RR RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHFR #0067/01 0161726
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 161726Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5262
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEHAN/AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO 1119
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1660
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000067 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM PINR PTER CN IR FR
SUBJECT: GRANDE COMORE PRESIDENT CRITICIZES UNION PRESIDENT
SAMBI

REF: A. 07 PARIS 3363

B. 08 ANTANANARIVO 759

Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew Young, 1.4 (b/d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000067

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM PINR PTER CN IR FR
SUBJECT: GRANDE COMORE PRESIDENT CRITICIZES UNION PRESIDENT
SAMBI

REF: A. 07 PARIS 3363

B. 08 ANTANANARIVO 759

Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew Young, 1.4 (b/d).


1. (U) This is an action message -- see para 9.


2. (C) SUMMARY: Grande Comore President Mohamed
Abdouloihabi strongly criticized Union of the Comoros
President Sambi during a January 15 meeting with
AF-assistant, stating that Sambi was trying to weaken the
political power of the islands for the benefit of the Union
President (i.e., for Sambi) and trying to manipulate the
electoral calendar to extend his time in office.
Abdouloihabi also expressed strong concern that Sambi was
trying to increase Shi'ia influence in the Comoros, and was
critical of France's involvement in the Comoros and its
handling of the Mayotte issue. Abdouloihabi favored
strengthening Comoran ties with the West rather than with the
Islamic world. Abdou Saadi, Grande Comore Minister for
Equipment, Energy, Transportation, and Housing, who
accompanied Abdouloihabi, requested assistance in developing
a "sister state" relationship between Grande Comore and an
American state, such as Hawaii. END SUMMARY.


3. (C) Embassy AF-assistant met on January 14 with Grande
Comore President Mohamed Abdouloihabi and Abdou Saadi, Grande
Comore Minister for Equipment, Energy, Transportation, and
Housing. The meeting took place at the request of Saadi, a
former expatriate Comoran living in France and working as a
local government functionary in the Paris area. Saadi had
originally made contact with us in 2007 and met sporadically
with us to discuss events in the Comoros. He informed us
several weeks ago that he had been named a minister for the
Grande Comore and wanted us to meet with Grande Comore
President Abdouloihabi during the latter's upcoming business
promotion trip to France. The January 14 meeting lasted
about two hours and allowed a discussion of events in the
Comoros since the operation to oust Colonel Bacar from
Anjouan.

Sambi Trying to Grab More Power?
--------------

4. (C) The message Abdouloihabi wanted to convey to the
U.S. centered on his concern for the way President Sambi was
becoming increasingly power-hungry. According to
Abdouloihabi, Sambi was taking several steps to weaken the
islands and strengthen the power of the Union President
(i.e., himself). For example, Abdouloihabi said that Sambi
was trying to change the title of each island's chief
executive from "President" to "Governor." Abdouloihabi said
that this was a minor issue that he could live with.
However, Sambi was also trying to strip each island's

legislature of its power to enact laws. The legislatures
would instead serve as "advisory councils" to the
"governors." Were all this to take place, the only real
legislative body would be the Union legislature. This would
completely violate the islands' autonomy, which was the basis
of the Union concept in the first place, Abdouloihabi argued.


5. (C) Abdouloihabi was also disturbed by a recent
development -- Sambi's efforts to promulgate laws without the
approval of the legislature or even in defiance of it.
Abdouloihabi said that Sambi had tried to force the enactment
of legislation that would make it easier to give Comoran
citizenship to even "potential" financial investors in the
Comoros. Abdouloihabi said that this was troubling because
it opened the door to possible abuses involving, for example,
the granting of citizenship to possibly shady characters
interested in hiding behind a new nationality. Abdouloihabi
said the legislature twice rejected this measure, whereupon
Sambi, according to Abdouloihabi, signed it into law anyway.


6. (C) Abdouloihabi also said that Sambi was trying to
manipulate the election system in ways that would result in
his staying in office. First, Sambi had proposed that the
Union President's term of office be extended from four to
five years, which is the term of office for legislators.
Then, Sambi thought that Anjouan's election calendar was out
of synch because of Bacar's coup. Sambi was proposing that
the Union Presidential election be postponed a year or two so
that a full five years would have run, thus giving the
Anjouan President a "full term," before holding national
elections. So that could mean that Sambi could stay in
office until 2013, far beyond his present mandate.
Abdouloihabi firmly opposed such a scheme.

Sambi's Support for Shi'ism
--------------

7. (C) Echoing many of the points in ref B, Abdouloihabi

PARIS 00000067 002 OF 002


was equally troubled by the possibility that Sambi would try
to increase Shi'ia influence in the Comoros, even though
Comorans were "98% Sunni." Abdouloihabi noted that Sambi had
studied in Iran. Thus, extending Sambi's time in office
would afford him more time to promote the Shi'ia cause.
Abdouloihabi and Saadi expressed serious concern that the
Comoros could become a more Shi'ia country and that its ties
with the West would weaken. They both believed this would be
an unfortunate development, especially if the Comoros grew
closer to Iran, and they urged countries such as the U.S. to
build ties with the Comoros in order to keep it on a more
Western orientation. One way to counter Shi'ia influence was
to increase study abroad opportunities for young Comorans,
whom Islamic operatives often targeted for recruitment.

France
--------------

8. (C) Abdouloihabi and Saadi criticized what they
described as continued French efforts to divide and weaken
the Comoros, and increase French influence, via their
foothold in Mayotte, France's "Departmental Collectivity"
that remained under French control as a result of
questionable referendums in 1974 and 1976. They noted a
number of recent antagonistic French actions, such as
switching Mayotte's international telephone code to match
that of French overseas department Reunion; Mayotte had
previously shared the same code as the other Comoran islands.
More significantly, France planned to hold a referendum in
March 2009 which would allow residents to vote on whether to
become a full French Overseas Department (a step up from its
status as a Departmental Collectivity). Abdouloihabi and
Saadi thought that Mayotte would vote in favor of such a
status, largely because of the prospect of significant new
French and EU economic development assistance. With that
accomplished, France would have achieved its long-term desire
of having a permanent, and possibly dominating, presence
among the Comoros islands.

Action Request
--------------

9. (C) Saadi expressed strong interest in having Grande
Comore establish a "sister state" relationship with an
American state, with Hawaii in mind because it too was an
island community. He said that he would be open to
partnering with an American city (or one of the Hawaiian
islands) if a partnership with a state were not feasible. He
requested our assistance on how to go about developing such a
relationship. ACTION REQUEST: We would appreciate any
information the Department could provide that we or Embassy
Antananarivo could provide to Saadi. END ACTION REQUEST.


STAPLETON

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