MADAGASCAR: FRANCE SEES NEED TO MOVE FORWARD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000530

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2019
TAGS: AORC EAID PGOV SZ NO MA FR
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: FRANCE SEES NEED TO MOVE FORWARD

REF: A. STATE 35809

B. PARIS 505

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathleen Allegrone, 1.4 (b/
d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: France's priority in Madagascar is to
encourage a consensus among the Malagasy parties on a
political solution, involving early and credible elections,
that will permit the country to end the current crisis and
enable a return to constitutional governance, MFA
DAS-equivalent Francois Barateau explained on April 15.
Barateau said that France's pragmatic approach was based on
France's unique presence, with about 20,000 citizens in
Madagascar and significant business ties, and on the need to
avoid a prolonged political paralysis that would risk a
serious political, economic, and social collapse. Barateau
said that it was unrealistic to expect a return to the
pre-coup status quo and that our efforts should look to the
future rather than to dwell on the past. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) MFA DAS-equivalent Francois Barateau discussed ref A
demarche on April 15. He acknowledged possible differences
in the French and U.S. approaches but he emphasized that
France shared the same goal as the U.S. -- a return to
constitutional governance in Madagascar that would end the
current crisis and political impasse and allow Madagascar to
function again. To this end, Barateau said that France was
working to encourage all parties to take a consensus-based
approach and agree on a roadmap that would include elections
"before the end of 2009, which they are capable of doing,
with the international community's help." Echoing earlier
GOF comments (e.g., ref B),Barateau said that France
supported the notion that those intending to run for office
should not organize the elections and that those organizing
the elections should not also run for office. Barateau said
that France had been pushing this idea with Rajoelina,
although it was not clear, according to Barateau, that he had
bought into it.


3. (C) Barateau said that France's "more pragmatic"
approach very much took into account France's unique status
in Madagascar. Not only did France share a long history with
Madagascar, but about 20,000 French citizens also resided
there. Business and investment ties were close. It was in
the interest of the French community in Madagascar, and for
all Malagasy, that the political crisis end peacefully and
that some semblance of normalcy return as quickly as possible.


4. (C) The GOF understood that, for some countries, foreign
aid programs could be suspended following a coup and that
such suspensions might well be legally required. These
suspensions often sent a useful message, Barateau
acknowledged. However, in Madagascar's case, he hoped that
suspensions would be short and that agreement among the
Malagasy on an elections roadmap be viewed by donors as
sufficiently progressive to allow for an end to suspensions.
He noted that Madagascar's economic situation was dire
("which is more Ravalomanana's fault than Rajoelina's"),
further exacerbated by the global economic downturn. He
cautioned that in June 2009, Madagascar might start running
out of money and become unable to pay government workers,
including the military. "The military is already in a
delicate position regarding the political situation. Do we
want to risk further alienating the military by increasing
the possibility that the government won't be able to pay
them?," he asked.


5. (C) Barateau said that prolonged use of economic
leverage via aid suspensions or sanctions could worsen the
overall situation, increase the sense of confrontation, and
not lead to a roll-back to the pre-coup status quo. Barateau
said that SADC's position was unrealistic and he doubted that
there was a mechanism that would allow Ravalomanana to return
to office as though the last few months had not happened. He
agreed with Sarkozy's Deputy Diplomatic Advisor Bruno
Joubert's view that Ravalomanana's fall and Rajoelina's rise
constituted a "coup," but one that also contained elements of
"social revolution" (ref B, para 5). "The people of
Madagascar have been sending many different signals in recent
months. The best way to sort it out is to have elections.
France can accept whoever wins a free and fair election.
That is the path we should encourage them to take, rather
than try to punish them for their past mistakes."


6. (C) Barateau concluded by saying that France was trying
to look forward and to move forward. He hoped that other

PARIS 00000530 002 OF 002


interested parties would do the same. He encouraged
continued cooperation between the U.S. and France, both
between our Embassies in Madagascar and between Paris and
Washington. He understood that Joubert and MFA
A/S-equivalent Stephane Gompertz were in Washington April
14-15 and he hoped that both sides benefited from the
discussions of Madagascar that had taken place.


PEKALA