MADAGASCAR: FRANCE SEES NEED TO MOVE FORWARD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000530 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2019 TAGS: AORC EAID PGOV SZ NO MA FR SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: FRANCE SEES NEED TO MOVE FORWARD REF: A. STATE 35809 ¶B. PARIS 505 Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathleen Allegrone, 1.4 (b/ d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: France's priority in Madagascar is to encourage a consensus among the Malagasy parties on a political solution, involving early and credible elections, that will permit the country to end the current crisis and enable a return to constitutional governance, MFA DAS-equivalent Francois Barateau explained on April 15. Barateau said that France's pragmatic approach was based on France's unique presence, with about 20,000 citizens in Madagascar and significant business ties, and on the need to avoid a prolonged political paralysis that would risk a serious political, economic, and social collapse. Barateau said that it was unrealistic to expect a return to the pre-coup status quo and that our efforts should look to the future rather than to dwell on the past. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) MFA DAS-equivalent Francois Barateau discussed ref A demarche on April 15. He acknowledged possible differences in the French and U.S. approaches but he emphasized that France shared the same goal as the U.S. -- a return to constitutional governance in Madagascar that would end the current crisis and political impasse and allow Madagascar to function again. To this end, Barateau said that France was working to encourage all parties to take a consensus-based approach and agree on a roadmap that would include elections "before the end of 2009, which they are capable of doing, with the international community's help." Echoing earlier GOF comments (e.g., ref B),Barateau said that France supported the notion that those intending to run for office should not organize the elections and that those organizing the elections should not also run for office. Barateau said that France had been pushing this idea with Rajoelina, although it was not clear, according to Barateau, that he had bought into it. ¶3. (C) Barateau said that France's "more pragmatic" approach very much took into account France's unique status in Madagascar. Not only did France share a long history with Madagascar, but about 20,000 French citizens also resided there. Business and investment ties were close. It was in the interest of the French community in Madagascar, and for all Malagasy, that the political crisis end peacefully and that some semblance of normalcy return as quickly as possible. ¶4. (C) The GOF understood that, for some countries, foreign aid programs could be suspended following a coup and that such suspensions might well be legally required. These suspensions often sent a useful message, Barateau acknowledged. However, in Madagascar's case, he hoped that suspensions would be short and that agreement among the Malagasy on an elections roadmap be viewed by donors as sufficiently progressive to allow for an end to suspensions. He noted that Madagascar's economic situation was dire ("which is more Ravalomanana's fault than Rajoelina's"), further exacerbated by the global economic downturn. He cautioned that in June 2009, Madagascar might start running out of money and become unable to pay government workers, including the military. "The military is already in a delicate position regarding the political situation. Do we want to risk further alienating the military by increasing the possibility that the government won't be able to pay them?," he asked. ¶5. (C) Barateau said that prolonged use of economic leverage via aid suspensions or sanctions could worsen the overall situation, increase the sense of confrontation, and not lead to a roll-back to the pre-coup status quo. Barateau said that SADC's position was unrealistic and he doubted that there was a mechanism that would allow Ravalomanana to return to office as though the last few months had not happened. He agreed with Sarkozy's Deputy Diplomatic Advisor Bruno Joubert's view that Ravalomanana's fall and Rajoelina's rise constituted a "coup," but one that also contained elements of "social revolution" (ref B, para 5). "The people of Madagascar have been sending many different signals in recent months. The best way to sort it out is to have elections. France can accept whoever wins a free and fair election. That is the path we should encourage them to take, rather than try to punish them for their past mistakes." ¶6. (C) Barateau concluded by saying that France was trying to look forward and to move forward. He hoped that other PARIS 00000530 002 OF 002 interested parties would do the same. He encouraged continued cooperation between the U.S. and France, both between our Embassies in Madagascar and between Paris and Washington. He understood that Joubert and MFA A/S-equivalent Stephane Gompertz were in Washington April 14-15 and he hoped that both sides benefited from the discussions of Madagascar that had taken place. PEKALA