MAURITANIA/FRANCE: WORRIES OVER AQIM TRUMP SEARCH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000483 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2019 TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV PINS KDEM FR MR SUBJECT: MAURITANIA/FRANCE: WORRIES OVER AQIM TRUMP SEARCH FOR A PERFECT DEMOCRACY REF: NOUAKCHOTT 202 Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor William Jordan, 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: MFA DAS-equivalent Christine Fages on April 1 said that options had dwindled with respect to Mauritania and that the best course would be to ensure free and fair elections in June within a framework that would allow participation by RFD opposition leader Ahmed Ould Daddah. Stressing her opposition to the coup, Fages said that it was nonetheless unlikely that President Abdallahi would return to office, even if only to oversee the transition from the coup to a new elected leadership. Fages expressed extreme concern about the spread of al-Qaida in the Maghreb's (AQIM's) influence across the Sahel region, which would only grow if Mauritania remained unstable or if coup leader Aziz continued to control an increasingly isolated Mauritania. She said that settling for a less-than-perfect democracy was far better than allowing AQIM to gain further influence in the region. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) French MFA AF/W DAS-equivalent Christine Fages provided an update on Mauritania on April 1. We especially sought clarification of GOF policy in the wake of FM Kouchner's recent "Jeune Afrique" interview, in which he suggested that if junta leaders resigned 45 days prior to elections scheduled for June they could run for office and that President Abdallahi could return to power to supervise the elections and a transition process before stepping down. Soon after Kouchner's interview, President Sarkozy on March 27 commented during a press conference in Niger to the effect that there had been no serious parliamentary opposition to the August 2008 coup. Given these statements, we asked Fages if France now viewed the coup as a fait accompli that we should accept and try to move beyond. ¶3. (C) Fages downplayed the significance of what Kouchner and Sarkozy said, although she did not parse their statements and offer a word-for-word analysis. She said that Kouchner was speculating about one possible scenario and that observers had exaggerated the significance of Sarkozy's statement. ¶4. (C) Mincing few words, as is her style, Fages continued that the international community had to move on from the position that Abdallahi be returned to power. "This is never going to happen, in any way," she said. "Besides, no one wants him to return," referring to his lack of popularity and the perception that he was not an effective leader. While saying that she completely opposed the coup and did not want to "blame the victim," Fages said that Abdallahi had helped provoke the coup and had since done nothing to help his case by remaining aloof, expressing no interest in compromise, and expecting that everyone else would effectuate a return to the status quo ante with him back in power. While Libyan leader Qadhafi's visit to Nouakchott (reftel) had not been helpful, neither was Abdallahi's refusal to talk to him. Qadhafi had meanwhile complicated matters by potentially breaking AU unity on Mauritania. ¶5. (C) Fages said that "options were dwindling." No one liked the coup, she repeated, but given Abdallahi's intransigence and the slim chance that he would return to power, even for a short time to oversee elections and a transition, we needed to make the most of a bad situation. In her view, the best course of action would be to try to ensure that elections in June were free and transparent, within a framework "good enough so that Ahmed Ould Daddah would agree to run." She said that there had to be candidates other than junta leader Aziz for the elections to have any semblance of credibility. ¶6. (C) Revealing her true concerns, Fages said that more worrisome than the political situation in Mauritania was al-Qaida in the Maghreb (AQIM) and its continually expanding influence across the Sahel region. She said that AQIM was an extremely serious French concern, with the French worrying that the unstable situation in Mauritania would only help AQIM strengthen its presence there. If Aziz continued in power as the result of an unfree, unfair electoral process that resulted in Mauritania becoming increasingly isolated internationally, Mauritania could find itself even more vulnerable to AQIM. That was why it was important to push Aziz into holding reasonably free and fair elections that would permit Mauritania to return to stability and some sense of international acceptability. ¶7. (C) COMMENT: Throughout the meeting, Fages repeated that France, like the U.S., did not like the coup, did not PARIS 00000483 002 OF 002 like Aziz, and wanted a return to constitutional rule. She said that the threat of sanctions was useful and needed to be maintained in order to keep the pressure on Aziz. However, on the European side, Spain, Portugal, and Germany still seemed disinclined to press for sanctions. All that said, Fages seemed to believe that every passing day made it less and less likely that there would be a return to the pre-coup situation or any return to power on Abdallahi's part. With that in mind, Fages was offering for our consideration what she considered a pragmatic scenario for moving forward. We hope to discuss her point of view with the French Presidency in the days ahead, to see whether her views reflect overall GOF thinking in this fluid moment. END COMMENT. ¶8. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. PEKALA