THE FRENCH ON PALESTINIAN RECONCILIATION:

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000463 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2024 TAGS: PREL PTER KPAL KWBG EUN FR IS SUBJECT: THE FRENCH ON PALESTINIAN RECONCILIATION: PRIORITIES AND PRAGMATISM REF: STATE 27330 Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathleen H. Allegrone, reas ons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Key points: -- President Sarkozy and FM Kouchner see no alternative to Palestinian reconciliation. France will likely find a way to engage with a Palestinian unity government even if that means breaking consensus within the EU; -- In the French view, demanding that Hamas formally accept the Quartet Principles has not worked in the past and will not work in the future. The French believe the status quo hurts Fatah and Palestinian moderates more than it hurts Hamas; -- Consequently, the French see a need to: 1) Set priorities among the Quartet Principles and 2) be pragmatic. They believe it is more important to get Hamas to abstain from violence in practice than to abandon violence in principle. End key points. We Make Our Case -------------- ¶2. (C) In numerous conversations with French MFA officials, Emboffs have advocated the U.S. position on a Palestinian national unity government as per reftel. French interlocutors such as Christophe Bigot (FM Kouchner's Middle East advisor),Boris Boillon (President Sarkozy's Middle East advisor),Ludovic Pouille (DAS-equivalent for the Levant) and Alexis Le Cour Grandmaison (MFA policy planner for the Middle East) understand and respect the U.S. position but remain unpersuaded of its wisdom. Noting that the international community's refusal to engage with the last Palestinian unity government convinced many in the Arab world that the Western approach to Palestinian democracy was hypocritical, they fear that boycotting a new unity government would strengthen that impression and further erode Western influence. This is not to say that France would rush to immediately engage directly with Hamas if a unity government were announced. "We are trying to find a middle way between normal outreach (i.e., treating a Palestinian unity government like any other government) and the current boycott," one mid-level MFA contact explained. Nonetheless, the French remain strongly predisposed to work with any government that PA President Abbas deems acceptable, just as they continue to favor the creation of another unity government in Lebanon. An Emphasis on Ending Violence -------------- ¶3. (C) From President Sarkozy and FM Kouchner straight down to the desk officer level, the French maintain that there is no realistic alternative to Palestinian reconciliation. Perpetuation of the status quo will only further cement Hamas' control over Gaza, thereby making the prospect of a two-state solution increasingly remote. They believe the way forward must involve setting priorities -- with an initial focus on ending Hamas violence -- followed by a new sense of pragmatism in defining Hamas' acceptance of the Quartet Principles. In the GOF's view, the emphasis should be on what Hamas does and not what it says. As Le Cour Grandmaison and Boillon put it, insisting that Hamas publicly and unambiguously accept the Quartet Principles is "a formula for deadlock." ¶4. (C) By the same token, officials in the MFA's Middle East Directorate feel it is more important to persuade Hamas to abstain from violence in practice than to abandon the principle of violent resistance. In the short term, they see a possibility of Hamas solidifying the shaky cease-fire in Gaza (in exchange for the release of Hamas prisoners and a re-opening of border crossings),and in the longer term, they point to hints from Hamas politburo leader Khalid Mishal that Hamas would not stand in the way of an Arab-Israeli peace agreement formulated on the basis of the Arab Peace Initiative. ¶5. (C) On the other hand, neither Pouille nor his colleagues believe that a formal renunciation of violence by Hamas is in the cards. First of all, they see broad Palestinian support for Hamas, which continues to grow in popularity at Fatah's expense. Indeed, the French suspect that if Palestinian elections were held tomorrow, Hamas would not only pick up more seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council, but it PARIS 00000463 002 OF 002 would likely win the PA presidency as well. Second, they believe the Hamas leadership appears convinced that years of negotiations with Israel gave the Palestinian Authority nothing, whereas armed resistance eventually drove Israel out of southern Lebanon and Gaza. Hamas thus views a categorical rejection of violence as tantamount to surrender rather than as a necessary trust building measure. Third, the French see Hamas as having emerged from the recent Gaza conflict as the victors in terms of Arab and world public opinion. Is it realistic, they ask, to expect Hamas to make major concessions at a moment when it appears to be winning? For all of these reasons, the French see little prospect of Hamas formally abandoning its most important card -- its capacity for violence -- in exchange for a vague prospect of international engagement and the resumption of a peace process that many see as a dead end. ¶6. (C) The French believe that once a lasting cease-fire agreement were put in place, it would be relatively easy for Hamas to demonstrate its de facto acceptance of the other two Quartet Principles. They see bringing Hamas into the PLO as a way to associate Hamas with prior PLO commitments and believe that Hamas would -- in the context of a unity government -- allow President Abbas to continue peace talks with Israel and would honor any agreement he reached, so long as the agreement was endorsed by the other Arab states. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) Although the French have reluctantly concluded that they cannot build a consensus within the EU on welcoming a unity government, they will undoubtedly find a way to engage bilaterally with such a government -- even if it means breaking ranks with other EU states and the Quartet. Although the GOF would possibly refrain from dealing directly with self-declared members of Hamas, it would likely not hesitate to engage with "technocrats" acknowledged to be sympathetic to the movement. In any event, the French argue that fellow Quartet member Russia continues to talk to Hamas and that even the Government of Israel negotiates with Hamas via the flimsy cut-out of Egyptian intermediaries. "Why should we be more Israeli than the Israelis?" several of our French interlocutors have asked. PEKALA