C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 000373

SIPDIS

THE HAGUE FOR CWC DEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2019
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC OPCW CBW
SUBJECT: BW/CW ALLIED CONSULTATIONS, PARIS, MARCH 4-5,
WRAP-UP

REF: STATE 019847

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathleen Allegrone
for reasons 1.4 b and d.

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Summary
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1. (SBU) The Close Allies (U.S., UK, France, Germany) met
in Paris on March 4-5 to discuss issues related to chemical
and biological weapons nonproliferation/arms control. The
meeting focused on priorities, strategy and tactics on
near-term issues, longer-term goals for the BWC and CWC,
including relevant nonproliferation objectives, as well as
to continue a more extended discussion on future OPCW
challenges. Allies previewed key issues that likely will
require further coordination and discussion prior to the
OPCW Executive Council (EC-56) meeting on April 20-24 and
held a smaller group meeting to begin discussions on the
political, technical and security concerns surrounding
chemical incapacitants. Although Allies discussed specific
near-term issues that will require close coordination, the
overall tone and common interest of the group remains
forward-looking, focusing on how to shape these regimes to
ensure their viability in the future.


2. (SBU) The U.S. was represented by State/ISN/CB Office
Director Robert Mikulak; the UK by Chris Rampling, Deputy
Head of the Counter-proliferation Department, FCO; Germany
by Alexander Olbrich, Director BW/CW Division, MFA; and the
French by Jacques Raharinaivo, newly-arrived Deputy
Director of Multilateral Affairs, Disarmament and
Conventional Arms Control, MFA. Germany will host the next
meeting of four in Berlin in late September 2009;
Washington is to host in Spring 2010.


3. (SBU) Dels agreed on the success of the BWC
intersessional process to date. Careful preparation is
required for 2009 in order to keep a balance between
showcasing assistance already being provided to States
Parties and the kind of assistance available, and steering
the NAM towards making their own presentations and offers
of assistance. U.S. Rep Mikulak urged using the World
Health Organization's International Health Regulations to
structure the di

scussions, inasmuch as IHR implementation
requirements dovetail with the 2009 topics. UK, France and
Germany are already thinking about the 2011 Review
Conference. All three pointed to the need to consider soon
how to handle the verification and compliance issue at that
time, noting that some in the EU hope for a shift in the
U.S. position. They have also recently been demarched by
Russia on resuming work on verification and compliance;
Russia apparently has demarched others as well. On BWC
confidence-building measures (CBMs), the four agreed to
begin an informal review of CBMs, including how to increase
participation. Germany will serve as a focal point and
plans to hold a CBM workshop in 2010. On universality, the
four agreed to redouble their efforts. Discussion on the
Bioterrorism Experts Group (BTEX) meeting centered on the
March 12-13 Tokyo workshop where lessons learned from
national exercises will be reviewed; the U.S. suggested the
need for regular policy-level oversight meetings and
longer-term planning to reinvigorate G-8 bio-discussions.
The U.S. and Germany briefed on their efforts to promote a
voluntary screening framework for commercial gene
synthesis.


4. (C) On CW-related topics, dels discussed selection of a
new OPCW Director-General (DG), with the UK and Germany
each indicating that it would have a candidate. All agreed
an early coordination process is necessary in order to put
forth a solid Western candidate. Dels also discussed
chemical weapons destruction progress, but finessed the
issue of how to handle those cases where a Party is unable
to meet the 2012 destruction deadline. The four also
talked through the possible scenarios that might unfold
around the submission of the Iraqi CWC declaration (e.g.,
Iran). At U.S. request, a smaller group initiated
discussion of policy regarding chemical incapacitants for
law enforcement purposes. As usual, U.S. and UK views on
CW-related issues were better developed, but overall the
four are clearly on the same sheet of music.

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BWC: Outcome of 2008 Meeting
--------------



5. (SBU) All agreed on the success of the 2008 meetings of
Experts and States Parties, although France warned that
what lies ahead will not be so "calm." The 2008
discussions demonstrated progress on the issues addressed
-- biosafety, biosecurity, and professional responsibility
-- since they were last considered, in 2003 and 2005
respectively. A common approach in line with WHO standards
and OECD recommendations on biosafety/biosecurity was
emerging. NGOs and outside groups have enriched the
process, U.S. Rep observed. German Expert Beck welcomed
agreement on acceptable standards for biosafety and
biosecurity, but cautioned that emergence of additional
standards, i.e. the CEN bio-risk standard, could
unnecessarily complicate implementing the WHO and OECD
standards. Some states might shy away from implementation,
claiming "it's too much for us." Mikulak averred that the
three sets of standards are compatible and all will be
used.

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BWC: Preparing for 2009 Meetings
--------------


6. (SBU) While still developing their approaches to the
2009 meetings, all agreed demonstrating assistance already
provided or on offer was critical. UK Expert Miller said
the UK will address examples of UK initiatives to assist
developing countries in capacity-building projects across
the human, animal and plant arenas, as well as initiatives
by academia and possibly industry. They may present Global
Partnership initiatives in the bio area as well. U.S. Rep
prefaced his remarks with a disclaimer that while the new
administration has not yet reviewed existing policies, he
sensed high interest in bio issues. He drew on guidance to
outline U.S. thinking on the 2009 meetings, emphasizing
that the U.S. was looking to frame the discussion in the
context of the WHO International Health Regulations (IHR)
which have the 2009 Work Program topics as legally binding
WHO requirements. U.S. Deloff Gromoll observed that this
approach will contribute to a collective approach in
contrast to the more traditional North vs. South approach
of developing countries. She also outlined desirable
outcomes from the 2009 meetings and some ideas on
structuring the Experts Meeting. Beck said Germany will
focus on regional models of cooperation, including EU
networks, reporting mechanisms, and organizational
aspects. It will also address national approaches,
building on its 2004 presentations, highlight cooperation
and what Germany has to offer, and speak to the importance
of WHO and OECD lab networks. France's main goal will be
to ensure a real Western voice during the debates, having
in mind that the NAM will insist on assistance and
denigrate export controls. Listing offers for
international assistance is a good idea, French Rep said,
arguing for being concrete and consistent when discussing
assistance, and ensuring follow up. Finally, he noted,
assistance should look more technical and less political.

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BWC: 2011 RevCon and Russian Demarches
--------------


7. (SBU) UK and France have begun planning for the 2011
Review Conference (RevCon). UK priorities are
universality, national implementation, scientific
developments and how to address them, CBMs, the role of the
ISU, biosecurity, biosafety, and the process itself. Beck
said that issues raised at the 2006 RevCon that are not
part of the current intersessional process also need to be
addressed, such as CBMs and scientific and technological
developments. In addition, he reported there is increasing
pressure to return to compliance measures. France reported
on a Russian demarche on the future of the BWC, which
leaves them puzzled in part because of references to the
Group of Verification Experts (VEREX) (which met in
1992-1994). UK and Germany received nonpapers; France
received a verbal demarche. Demarche is focused
cryptically on VEREX, the Protocol, and verification and
compliance. German Rep Olbrich noted statements by others
in support of verification and compliance during 2008
meetings; there is continuing interest in the Bundestag.
The four should prepare to react and find common ground on
this issue, however, it is too early to start discussions
with the U.S. now. U.S. Deloff Gromoll reported that the
Russian demarches probably went to others as well but not
the U.S. The UK agreed that it was not the time to raise

these issues, but expressed concern that Russia may get
some "element of purchase" from those that don't fully
understand the U.S. position. Rampling also noted that
there is some pressure from within the UK Parliament to
discuss verification. In addition, in a recent EU meeting
some hoped that with a new Administration "maybe the U.S.
will shift" its views on BWC verification and the
Protocol. Germany suggested these issues be discussed
among the four at the next meeting; U.S. said that it was
focused on the 2009 meetings and had yet to start preparing
for 2011.

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BWC: Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs)
--------------


8. (SBU) Beck introduced papers cataloguing national and
NGO positions on CBMs. He summed up that about 1/3 of the
States Parties support review of CBMs, noting that this
group included the EU, some non-EU WEOG states, and a
number of Latin American states (not all proponents for
CBMs actually provide CBM declarations). Beck is prepared
to draft a strawman of agreed Close Allies approaches;
Germany intends to host a CBM Workshop in Berlin in 2010.
The 1991 CBM revisions were made to cast a broader net, and
go beyond bio-defense programs, but they hadn't succeeded.
As a way to increase returns, Dels agreed to identify
States that have submitted CBMs before, but not recently
and consider approaching them.

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BWC: Universality Efforts Needed
--------------


9. (SBU) Universality will be a priority for Chairman
Grinius in 2009. Dels agreed of the 31 countries outside
the BWC, the 18 African States should be the current
priority. The U.S. continues to push Israel, Egypt and
Syria to join; Mauritania, Haiti and Liberia remain
difficult.

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Laboratory Biosecurity
--------------


10. (SBU) U.S. Rep outlined the January 9 Executive Order
"Strengthening Laboratory Biosecurity in the U.S" and noted
that recommendations to the President are due in early
July. This could also impact U.S.-funded research in
Europe. French Expert Daoust-Maleval noted the importance
of following ISO standards and for staff to have security
clearances; those working with especially dangerous
pathogens in France do have such clearances. Beck shared
that the Head of the Robert Koch Institute is the project
manager for an EU Joint Action (with the WHO) to engage a
country (either Oman or Iran) on WHO biosafety and
biosecurity standards; this same approach will soon be used
in South Asia. He also noted that policy follow-up to the
2006 EU "Green Paper" was nearing public release. There
will be three papers emerging from this work, one on public
health and law enforcement, another (an Action Plan) on
policy and bridging the security and health gaps and the
last on personnel reliability. There is consideration
about having security clearances for certain transport
workers. This is being drafted by European Commission
staff and will need to be debated within EC security and
health channels. Miller noted that Foot and Mouth Disease
(FMD) outbreaks have led to a change in their legislation,
a modification of the Terrorism Act, which now also covers
animals and plants.

--------------
Bioterrorism Experts Group (BTEX)
--------------


11. (SBU) Dels exchanged information on plans for a March
12-13 expert session in Tokyo to share information on
national exercises. French Rep from the PM's office will
present information on a recent exercise held by France on
smallpox. Three EU workshops have been held, according to
Beck, containing various scenarios; it is now being turned
into an EU White Paper entitled "Bridging Public Health and
Law Enforcement." Mikulak, intent on understanding the
root causes creating an ineffective BTEX process, urged
Allied consultations on the future of BTEX. The recent
forensic epidemiology exercise in Berlin gave the process
some vitality, however, we need to focus on how best to

attract more interest from the Italian, Japanese and
Russian governments. He recommended returning to
regularized policy meetings, possibly twice a year and on
the margins of the Non-proliferation Directors Group (NPDG)
meetings. It would be useful if BTEX covered a broader
range of topics to include lab biosecurity and forensic
epidemiology. Rampling agreed that regular policy meetings
are a good idea but cautioned that they need to be
well-prepared to avoid a stalemate that could bring any
technical work to a halt. Mikulak suggested several
possible goals for the policy discussion could usefully
do: develop common objectives for G-8 Summit Statements;
plan topics for the next years discussion and for the
workshops; coordinate more effectively between the health
and security communities; and/or share best practices on
lab security and personnel reliability. French and German
dels did not react to the U.S. ideas.

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Commercial DNA Synthesis
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12. (SBU) Mikulak informed others of emerging U.S. policy
on voluntary screening of commercial orders for gene
synthesis. Modern technology has enabled chemical
synthesis of gene-length DNA sequences. This industry
ships assembled double-stranded DNA based on sequence
information that is uploaded via an online web site. Both
government and industry are concerned about the risk of
processing orders for harmful DNA sequences. Industry
supports screening orders as part of good business
practices. While the risks that denovo synthesis
techniques will be used to successfully develop a potential
bioweapon are currently small, the capability is present
and will only become more available as time progresses.
Uniform screening criteria and a database of sequences to
screen against is necessary. However, many related
questions arise: who establishes one, who pays for it, who
ensures accuracy, what constitutes a good match; what
agents will be contained in the database (Australia Group
or U.S. Select Agent lists). Industry is very competitive
and anything that slows down the process might be
unwelcome.


13. (SBU) Beck noted that a consortium of German companies
advocates voluntary screening. U.S. companies follow
similar voluntary practices. A consistent approach is
needed across the board. In Germany, 40 percent of short
DNA sequences ("Oligos") are not naturally-occurring
sequences; 8 percent of the longer sequences are not
naturally-occurring. Beck expressed concern that no one
can predict what the security consequences might be of
novel DNA sequences. Overseeing this growing industry
might be something the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) should look into.
Mikulak noted interest in getting away from a list-based
approach to regulating pathogens, however, the science
isn't far enough along yet to predict risks directly from
sequences.


14. (SBU) UK experts said they were working to identify
relevant companies. A UK company is thinking of using the
benefits of screening as a marketing tool to show they have
exceeded industry standards. UK Commerce Rep Rodrigues
said that critical mass was needed for this to work --
either all need to use screening methods or none would.

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Australia Group
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15. (SBU) Raharinaivo noted the limited participation in
the October 2008 intersessional meeting, and although
France had no strong views on the subject, he asked whether
such meetings should continue. Rampling agreed with the
general utility of the October meeting and noted that there
will be a follow-up technical meeting in London in April
2009, hosted by the Australian Embassy. Olbrich had no
strong views but agreed such meetings have value, and
suggested holding technical meetings on the margins of the
Plenary. Mikulak expressed satisfaction with the October
meeting and welcomed the planned April meeting. He noted
that technical meetings of experts work quite well in other
regimes and suggested considering a continuation of such
meetings.


16. (SBU) On AG outreach activities, Olbrich favored talks

with the Russians at the technical level regarding export
controls, but not discussions on the political level.
Mikulak agreed and further noted that the reasons for not
supporting Russian membership are clear and haven't
changed, but the U.S. would welcome a discussion with
Russia on their export control system. Raharinaivo stated
that in addition to Russia, there were other countries that
have expressed an interest in joining the AG, noting that
there is not a systematic outreach approach by current AG
members to solicit new members. Mikulak said that outreach
to China, Taiwan and India are important, and possibly
Chile and South Africa. French Rep agreed that they also
view outreach to China as essential.


17. (SBU) Raharinaivo announced that the 2009 AG Plenary
meeting will be held 21-25 September in Paris, however, the
exact location has yet to be determined. He noted that
France is considering presenting lessons learned from
screening of visa applications for proliferation concerns.
France is reviewing its screening procedures of graduate
research students and would welcome any sharing of
experience by others. The UK Rep said the UK is working to
figure out how to keep up with what subjects are considered
sensitive when screening graduate research students. All
four delegations agreed that sharing each country's visa
screening experiences would be useful. Olbrich also
foreshadowed an initiative on end use controls similar to
the initiative introduced and adopted by consensus for the
Missile Technology Control Regime. He also noted that
there is not a streamlined approach within the European
Union.

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CW Destruction
--------------


18. (SBU) French OPCW Deputy Representative Mari opened the
discussion by asking the group which arguments are likely
to arise in the coming months from NGOs, parliaments, and
other interested parties, and what we can and cannot say on
the subject of CW destruction. Mikulak distributed a
recent press article quoting Valery Kapashin (Russian
Federal Department for the Safe Storage and Disposal of CW)
that Russia will likely see a 3 to 15 percent budget cut
for chemical demilitarization due to internal issues and
the global financial crisis. If Russia does not meet its
45 percent destruction deadline later this year, this could
impact overarching destruction deadline discussions in the
Executive Council. UK Deloffs noted Russian statements in
The Hague have moved from firm assurances that the
deadlines will be met to statements about financial and
economic issues that will impact destruction efforts. UK
Experts briefly went over the status of specific sites in
Russia, and the possibility that Russia will not meet the
already extended 45% deadline. UK experts further added
that there has been no recent visibility into India's
progress and whether or not India will meet or slightly
miss their April 29, 2009 completion deadline. He further
noted that he doubts swift progress by Libya and mentioned
the many unknowns surrounding Iraq's destruction timeline.
Mikulak added that Japan likely will not complete
destruction of its abandoned chemical weapons (ACW) in
China by the 2012 deadline.


19. (C) Meeting participants agreed that if other countries
miss destruction deadlines, regardless of by how much,
States Parties may find it difficult to continue the
current hard line on meeting the 2012 destruction deadline
and may need to explore alternative ways to move forward.
Mikulak said that discussion of how to address the 2012
destruction question is premature and should be avoided.
Olbrich stated that if the U.S. was the only country to
miss the deadline, Iran might take the issue to the UN
Security Council, however as Russia and others will also
miss the deadline, the playing field is changed. U.S. OPCW
Deputy Representative added that discussions on Iraq's
destruction timeline will likely shift the dialogue to a
broader view of destruction since Iraq will be the first
country that most likely will not be bound to complete
destruction by the 2012 deadline. She added that a country
should not be condemned for missing a deadline by a few
weeks, but rather States Parties should keep in mind the
bigger picture that possessor states are committed to
meeting CWC obligations.


20. (SBU) Mikulak said that the United States has made no
secret of its inability to make the 2012 destruction

deadline, and noted the upcoming EC visits to Umatilla,
Oregon and Pueblo, Colorado. EC visit participants will
see firsthand the construction progress made at Pueblo, one
of the two facilities that will be operating after 2012,
and the continued progress of the incineration sites by the
visit to Umatilla. The U.S. is hopeful that 90 percent of
the U.S. stockpile will be completed by the 2012 deadline.
The remaining 10 percent is at the two non-incineration
sites, Pueblo and Blue Grass. It was for this reason that
Pueblo was chosen as one of the two sites for the EC
visit. He further added that the U.S. has increased the
funding for these two sites substantially to accelerate
destruction efforts.


21. (SBU) French Deputy OPCW Rep Mari asked if countries
should begin looking at legal solutions for missing the
deadline, but the U.S. Rep quickly noted that discussions
are premature. Rampling suggested that Close Allies begin
thinking about the implications of missing the 2012
deadline for efficacy of the regime. The aim would be to
allow the OPCW to continue without a great disruption when
the deadlines are missed. He urged participants to be in
lockstep regarding future nonproliferation objectives to
move the OPCW past a focus on destruction. Raharinaivo
added that Iran will need to be fended off to avoid an
imbalance in destruction conversations. He added that the
worst case scenario would be for Iran to convince more
countries that missing the deadlines equates to a lack of
commitment to the Convention by possessor states. UK OPCW
PermRep Parker observed that there will be destruction
after 2012, and there will be later deadlines for Iraq and
any other new member states possessing CW. That reality
and missed deadlines will make it "less easy for
absolutists."

--------------
IRAQ
--------------


22. (SBU) Olbrich noted that after Iraq submits its initial
declaration there would be questions of the appropriate
deadline and assistance. Mikulak stated that UNSCOM had an
extensive inventory of the historical program, and had
destroyed Iraq's weapons and production facilities but not
to OPCW standards. He noted the U.S. has encouraged Iraq
to make a presentation at the upcoming destruction
informals in April, but said there appear to be significant
gaps between the experts in Baghdad and both the Foreign
Ministry and the Iraqi Embassy in The Hague. He raised the
question of inspections and the Technical Secretariat's
preparations to be ready to inspect sites when it is safe
to do so. UK OPCW Rep Parker added that the TS would rely
on the UN rules and procedures on security. The U.S. and
UK noted that they would be making brief presentations
during the destruction informals about their supplementary
declarations regarding the disposition of chemical weapons
found in Iraq up until entry into force (EIF) of the
Convention for Iraq (February 12, 2009).


23. (SBU) German Expert Beck inquired whether any
destruction of chemical weapons would have to be done in
the open air, and whether there would be one or two
destruction sites. That level of detail is not yet known,
replied the experts, as a detailed destruction plan will
require considerable further analysis. On Iraq's deadline,
the U.S. Rep pointed to Article IV, paragraph 8 as the
relevant one for states entering after the original
destruction deadline. The group agreed that, while under
that paragraph the deadline is set by the Executive
Council, it would be advisable to have the decision taken
before the 2009 Conference of States Parties (November
30-December 4).


24. (SBU) Mikulak stated that while the discussion on Iraq
has tended to focus on the past, it is important to look
forward. He said the U.S. plans (see reftel, para 23) to
encourage the DG to develop a "program for Iraq," including
how the TS and States Parties can assist Iraq in
implementation of the Convention and deriving the benefits
of OPCW's assistance and training. Rampling stated that
this was a good idea; the Iraqis appear inexperienced,
posing both risks and opportunities. The more positive
encouragement and guidance the Iraqis receive, the better,
he said. French Dep Rep Mari noted Iran's warm welcome to
Iraq at the last EC, with specific reference to the victims
issue. UK Deloff Harrison asked about prospects for Iraq
to become a member of the Executive Council. U.S. OPCW Dep

Rep Beik noted that the Iraqi Ambassador had inquired about
EC membership and how the regional groups worked; he
appeared quite interested in pursuing an EC seat as soon as
possible (2010).

--------------
IRAN
--------------


25. (SBU) Raharinaivo cited the growing obstructionism of
Iran at the OPCW and asked what could be done to mitigate
it. German OPCW Perm Rep Burkart stated that during the
last EC, Iran's behavior was less problematic, perhaps due
to the clash at the Conference of the States Parties (CSP)
in December. The NAM had also let Iran know that it had
gone too far. U.S. and UK Del Reps agreed that while Iran
had been more cooperative in EC-55, it was likely an
exception to the general trend; the Iranian delegate who
had caused the impasse in December was due to transfer, but
uncertainty remains on who might replace him. UK Dep Rep
suggested Close Allies encourage others to emphasize that
consensus means compromise and not a veto for Iran. French
Dep Rep noted that the Iranians could become difficult on
procedures for the Director-General selection process, but
that they will not attack Russia over potential deadline
delays in the same way as they do the U.S.


26. (SBU) Mikulak relayed that questions on Iran's chemical
weapons programs had been raised with the Government of
Iran in the past, but not recently. He suggested that
Close Allies might consider pursuing such questions
bilaterally. Rampling replied that the UK also had such a
dialogue, but also had not pursued it in recent years. He
added that the broader context needs to be maintained --
the nuclear dialogue need not be brought into the CW
dialogue in The Hague; all agreed.


27. (C) During a sidebar discussion, Mikulak and Rampling
discussed working jointly on an approach and questions to
raise about CWC concerns with Iran. The UK could possibly
deliver such questions in what used to be a
nonproliferation forum where such issues were discussed.
Separately, UK MOD Rep Harrison recommended that the four
meet in advance of the April destruction informals to
discuss our recovered chemical weapons activities in Iraq.
Based on the German questions on 122mm rockets and the
locations of Iraqi CW, Harrison believes that a short
presentation would answer questions and help minimize
discussion during the actual informals. Both the U.S. and
the UK agreed that such a presentation should not discuss
the legal rationale for the recovery operations, but rather
an overview of what was recovered and how destruction took
place.

--------------
Election of OPCW Director General
--------------


28. (SBU) French Rep Raharinaivo stressed the importance of
choosing a Director-General based on merit, and achieving
consensus. Allies agreed, with the German Rep Olbrich
adding that the Preparatory Commission's agreement that the
top position should alternate between the developed and the
developing world should be respected. He announced Germany
will have a candidate; the name has not yet been approved
by the Chancellor. UK OPCW Perm Rep Parker (who came to
Paris for only a few hours for this part of the meeting)
noted that the UK would also sponsor a candidate. On the
PrepCom understanding, Parker noted that other States
Parties may not regard the agreement as binding. Mikulak
stated that the U.S. supported the PrepCom agreement, and
while not popular, it might prove a useful bargaining chip
later. He noted that it is useful to have more than one
Western candidate to avoid North-South polarization in the
early stages. However, by late summer, WEOG and
like-minded states would need to coalesce around the
strongest candidate, with hope that the others would bow
out gracefully to avoid splitting Western support. Parker
said the key question, in his view, was how to manage a
number of candidates, and the need at some point to narrow
the list of Western candidates. He suggested a
privately-agreed deadline among like-minded states for
nominating candidates (perhaps early June) to allow for
reviewing the prospects of the various Western candidates
before the Executive Council session in July. Raharinaivo
agreed that the smooth withdrawal of weaker candidates
would be important.



29. (SBU) On procedures for vetting the candidates, Parker
told the group that he had advised EC Chairperson Tomova to
consult only on procedures leading up to candidates
presenting themselves at the July EC, and not be dragged
into efforts to predetermine the later stages. He warned
that some countries want to shift the weight of the
decision to the Conference, where the Non-Aligned Movement
may have greater numbers for a vote. U.S. Dep Rep noted
that Mexican Ambassador Lomonaco, the new EC Chair in May,
plans to pursue extensive bilateral consultations and to
bring the EC to consensus in October. Rampling noted for
the EU members present that the "Brussels dimension" would
need to be managed, and added that there would not be an EU
candidate, given several states' interest in the position,
reportedly including Romania and Italy. The group agreed
that discussions amongst Close Allies in The Hague would be
useful before the April and July Executive Council
meetings. Burkart offered to host such a meeting in April;
France offered the same for late June.

--------------
Future Evolution of the OPCW
--------------


30. (SBU) Rampling said the UK wanted to follow up on the
discussion from last June regarding the future of the
OPCW, noting that its recent paper looks forward to 2020.
The UK believes the Chemical Weapons Convention will look
significantly different in the future. He suggested that
the Close Allies should share at the September meeting in
Berlin what each wants to get out of the Executive
Council meetings over the next two to three years in
order to formulate goals for the 2011 Review Conference.
Olbrich agreed this is a good idea and that there is a
need to eventually shift the discussion from destruction
to proliferation. Mikulak agreed, noting the need to
consider broader evolutionary issues for the OPCW.
Raharinaivo agreed and noted the importance of thinking
in terms of nonproliferation and how verification can be
improved.


31. (SBU) Rampling said the main issue for consideration
is how the CWC will continue to be considered relevant in
a post-destruction era. Mikulak agreed and offered that
not only will nonproliferation be an important issue to
consider but also what are the security needs and
interests of other States Parties related to the subject
matter if the Convention. He suggested that in addition
to nonproliferation, safety and security of chemical
enterprises will be important. He mentioned recent U.S.
discussions with the Algerians where they expressed
interest in these concepts and the prospect that Algeria
may host a conference mid-year. He also noted the NAM
statement at the Executive Council Meeting in February
2009 mentioned preventing terrorists from acquiring CW
and this may be a demonstration of the evolution of NAM
thinking.


32. (SBU) German Expert Beck stated that biology and
chemistry are beginning to converge; knowledge about bio-
targets for humans, plants and animals would be used to
develop new chemical agents, and possibly lead to changes
in what is on the CWC schedules and which chemicals are
of concern. French Dep Rep Mari suggested this might be
useful for the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) to
consider. She noted the utility of including the
scientific community, NGOs and academics in the meetings
of the BWC and this approach may be useful in CWC fora as
well.


33. (SBU) Mari stated there is a need to consider what to
do about Article XI (Economic and Technological
Development) without impacting the Australia Group. In
her capacity as facilitator of the Open-Ended Working
Group on Terrorism she noted the trend of safety and
security under Article X (Assistance and Protection
against Chemical Weapons) but reminded that the mandate
is very broad and welcomed ideas for the Working Group.


34. (SBU) Raharinaivo noted the importance of CWC
universality despite the fact that there are now 186
Parties. The French recently demarched Angola and the
Dominican Republic and will contact The Bahamas soon.
Angola responded that accession is not currently a
priority; Dominican Republic answered that this is an
"ongoing" process. Mikulak informed that The Bahamas

recently had two workshops and it seems they will accede
in the near future. He also noted that the Dominican
Republic has passed accession paperwork through their
Parliament but a demarche may be helpful to push it
through their Executive Branch. He reiterated that Egypt
and Israel have agreed to "technical goodwill visits,"
which are intended to be a forum to discuss in practical
measures how the Convention works. Mari noted the OPCW
DG's concern about lack of responses from Egypt, Israel
and Syria for the planned workshop in Turkey in mid-
April; the EU is considering a demarche to the three
targeted non-member states (Egypt, Syria and Israel) to
emphasize the need for their political-level involvement.
Rampling emphasized how imperative it is to keep chemical
and biological issues on the Middle East security agenda;
these issues "nedd to be tackled strategically."

--------------
Chemical Incapacitants
--------------


35. (C) In a separate smaller session, the Allies began
discussing political, technical and security concerns
with the potential use of chemical incapacitants,
including the implications within the CWC and other broad
national interests. Mikulak noted Allies' desire to
address this issue before the Second Review Conference,
but stressed the need to properly prepare the groundwork
first before such a sensitive issue could be brought
forward; such a discussion would have been
counterproductive and potentially problematic as it would
have caused a distraction from the work already underway.
He also highlighted the need to be careful with
terminology. Many critics of the U.S. have conflated the
incapacitant and riot control agent issues with the term
"non-lethal," which is problematic because it commingles
two issues with very different policy contexts. The use
of fentanyls by Russia in 2002 brings in another dynamic,
further necessitating the need for making clear where we
have legitimate concerns.


36. (C) The UK introduced a nonpaper on "Law Enforcement
Chemicals and The Chemical Weapons Convention" and
provided a brief outline of its main points. Rampling
agreed with the U.S. that the Second RevCon was not the
right forum to begin discussing incapacitants and that
"non-lethals" encompasses items outside of the scope of
the issue. He distinguished RCAs from incapacitants by
stating that RCAs have short-term disabling effects,
whereas incapacitant often require a medical antidote to
end the effects. He went on to state that no country has
come out and called the 2002 use of fentanyls by the
Russians a violation of the CWC. He raised several
issues: States Parties may covertly develop
incapacitating chemicals (or "other law enforcement
chemicals" (LEC) as preferred by the UK) under the guise
of law enforcement; there has been no discussion to date
on what falls under law enforcement; we do not know what
countries think about the issue and if countries have
positions on what the next steps are; and we do not know
how states may use these incapacitants nationally or
internationally. He also offered a few options for the
group's consideration: 1) voluntary reporting could be
considered; 2) storage limits could be established; 3)
prohibitions on the use with certain projectiles or
munitions could be established; and the Scientific
Advisory Board (SAB) could explore the technical issues
associated with these agents.


37. (C) Olbrich welcomed this first discussion and will
relay the discussions to his MOD colleagues. He noted
with satisfaction that with the exception of the Swiss
proposal, incapacitants did not enter the RevCon debate
nor did they appear in the final report text. He
referenced a Canadian paper that was tabled in the WEOG
before the RevCon, but pulled shortly thereafter.
Olbrich said he did not know if Canada still supported
its previous proposal. He asked participants what their
positions are on the Swiss proposals. His opinion was
that the terms are good but the conclusions may not be
supported by all. During the February SAB meeting, the
German Rep said that one of the drafters of the Swiss
proposal is still interested in moving forward with
discussions on the proposal. France said that it has not
done any research into the incapacitant issue to date,
but would begin an internal dialogue and review existing
documents on the subject.



38. (C) Mikulak reiterated that DoD is not developing or
using chemical incapacitants and further that the U.S.
holds that incapacitants are covered under the General
Purpose Criterion in the CWC. UK MOD Deloff Harrison
stated that the UK has begun engaging the NGO community
on this subject to educate them on what the issues are
from a government perspective. They believe the NGO
community is more sympathetic to the associated issues
than they were before the RevCon when several questions
came in through parliament on the subject.


39. (C) Germany stated that we should look at what our
knowledge is on the subject and what our internal legal
analyses are. Olbrich offered a half-day follow-on
session after the next Allied meeting to provide national
assessments. Mikulak added that the quad allies need to
understand the underlying security issues as well as
political issues. He suggested that the four look at
foreign activities on incapacitants and provide a threat
assessment in September; others agreed.

--------------
Participants
--------------


40. (U) French Delegation: Jacques Raharinaivo, Deputy
Director for Multilateral Affairs, Disarmament and
Conventional Arms Control, MFA; Marie-Gaelle Robles, MFA
BWC Desk Officer; Annie Mari, Deputy Perm Rep to OPCW;
Frank Tecourt, MFA CWC Desk Officer, Isabelle Daoust-
Maleval and Stephanie de la Peschardiere, MOD Department
for Strategic Affairs; Stephanie Dare-Doyen,
Radioprotection and Nuclear Safety Institute; and Mathieu
Pampin, Health Safety and Security Agency.

German Delegation: Werner Burkart, PermRep to OPCW;
Alexander Olbrich, Director, BW/CW Division, MFA; Holger
Ruthe, Deputy Director, BW/CW Division; Volker Beck, BW
Expert, MFA; and Juliane Thummel, BW/CW Division, MFA.

UK Delegation: Chris Rampling, Deputy Head (WMD),
Counter-Proliferation Deparment, FCO; Amb. Lyn Parker,
PermRep to OPCW; Steve Crossman, Head of CBW Section,
MFA; Karen Wolstenholme, Deputy PermRep to OPCW; James
Harrison, Deputy Head, Counter Proliferation and Security
Cooperation, MoD; Lorna Miller, Senior Biological
Adviser, MoD; Clive Rowland, Chemical Arms Control, MoD;
John Foggo, Head, CWC National Authority, Dept. of Energy
and Climate Change; and Karl Rodrigues, CWC National
Authority.

U.S. Delegation: Dr. Robert Mikulak, Director, Office of
Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat Reduction, State;
Janet Beik, Deputy PermRep to OPCW; Jennie Gromoll,
Deputy Director, Office of Chemical and Biological
Weapons Threat Reduction, State; Katharine Crittenberger,
Deputy Director, Biological Weapons, Bureau of Verification,
Compliance, and Implementation; Stephanie Mirabello, Biological
Weapons, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation;
Johnathan Beckett, Deputy Director, Chemical Affairs, Bureau of
Verification, Compliance, and Implementation; and Sarah Rodjom,
Office of the Secretary of Defense.


41. (SBU) This cable was drafted by the U.S. Delegation and has
been cleared by U.S. Representative Robert Mikulak.


PEKALA