Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09PARIS343
2009-03-10 16:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:
SUDAN/DARFUR: FRANCE REBUFFED IN LOBBYING FOR
VZCZCXRO6162 PP RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO DE RUEHFR #0343/01 0691600 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 101600Z MAR 09 FM AMEMBASSY PARIS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5713 INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 2537 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000343
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2019
TAGS: PREL PHUM EAID KJUS SU FR
SUBJECT: SUDAN/DARFUR: FRANCE REBUFFED IN LOBBYING FOR
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
PARIS 00000343 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Political Officer Gregory D'Elia, 1.4 (b/d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000343
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2019
TAGS: PREL PHUM EAID KJUS SU FR
SUBJECT: SUDAN/DARFUR: FRANCE REBUFFED IN LOBBYING FOR
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
PARIS 00000343 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Political Officer Gregory D'Elia, 1.4 (b/d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: A range of countries rebuffed a French
attempt to lobby support for new humanitarian assistance
programs in Sudan/Darfur following Khartoum's recent
expulsion of NGOs, MFA Sudan deskoff Frederic Bouvier said on
March 9. These included Libya, Russia, China, Ethiopia,
Egypt, Kenya, and Senegal, several of which gave an "I told
you so" response to the French, referring to what they viewed
as the logical consequence of the ICC's indictment of Sudan
President Bashir. Bouvier said that France was considering
possible next steps but would likely allow the heightened
post-indictment atmosphere to calm. He cautioned against an
aggressive "war of words" campaign against Sudan, whose
leaders seemed to be looking for any excuse to retaliate
against those supporting the ICC. Libya indicated it would
call on all African nations party to the ICC to reconsider
their position on the ICC, with the AU's Peace and Security
Council expressing a similar view. In the meantime, the
French hope that the Doha process keeps going, although the
JEM has indicated to the French a reluctance to maintain its
participation in those talks, and Egypt has suggested the
formation of an international conference on Sudan (something
Sudan has vehemently rejected). Abdulwahid el-Nur continues
to view himself as the solution to the Darfur crisis and the
man who should be running Sudan. END SUMMARY.
French Lobbying
--------------
2. (C) We met with MFA Sudan desk officer Frederic Bouvier
on March 9 to discuss French thinking in the wake of the
ICC's indictment of Sudan President Bashir. Bouvier
immediately described a demarche the French carried out in a
number of countries on March 6 and 7, including Libya,
Russia, China, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Senegal (and perhaps
others that he did not identify specifically). Bouvier
indicated that these countries had been chosen because they
represented both a geographic and ideological range of
nations critical of the ICC and hoping for an Article 16
deferral of the indictment.
3. (C) The purpose of the demarche was to encourage these
countries -- and countries that they could influence -- to
consider ways that the international community could
structure a new means of providing humanitarian assistance to
the people of Darfur, which would become an increasingly
urgent matter now that Khartoum had expelled many NGOs from
Darfur. The French argued that the humanitarian issue should
be considered separately from the ICC issue. In the same
vein, the French said that the ICC question should not be
allowed to disrupt work on other aspects of Sudan's problems,
such as the Doha process, outreach to rebel elements, and
North-South cooperation.
4. (C) Bouvier said, with a tone of resignation, that
France's demarche was "essentially rebuffed by everyone, all
of whom thought that the ICC issue overshadowed everything
else." Senegal gave the least hostile response, saying that
it would "consider France's points." Kenya said that it
supported the AU position, which meant that Kenya favored an
Article 16 deferral, which the AU had been advocating. Libya
gave the French a very blunt "we told you so response,"
noting that many in the international community had told
France and other Western countries that the ICC indictment
would lead only to a worsening of the situation. Bouvier did
not specify how the Russians, Chinese, and Ethiopians
responded but he suggested that they were similar to Libya's
"we told you so, you should have known this was coming"
retort.
5. (C) The French were disappointed at the degree of
cynicism these responses displayed, Bouvier said. The
countries France had approached, while paying lip service to
the plight of Darfurians, seemed to blame "the West" for any
worsening of the situation in Darfur, rather than blaming
Khartoum. While not outwardly sympathizing with Bashir, they
indicated that they could "understand Bashir's response,
considering what you are trying to do to him."
6. (C) Bouvier said that it seemed increasingly clear that
the Western democracies were facing growing unity among
Africans, Moslem nations, the Third World generally, and
major powers China and Russia. Saying that he did not want
PARIS 00000343 002.2 OF 003
to generalize but doing so anyway, Bouvier observed that "all
the countries run by dictators or autocrats are against us
and for Bashir." Libya has indicated that it would call on
all African nations party to the ICC to reconsider their
position on the ICC, with the AU's Peace and Security Council
making similar noises, Bouvier said.
Pause to Consider
--------------
7. (C) Bouvier said that France would pause to assess the
situation, still rife with heightened tensions over the
relatively recent ICC decision. There would likely be some
calming. The humanitarian situation, on the other hand,
would only get worse. Bouvier speculated that Khartoum could
provide a minimum level of food assistance in Darfur but
could well end ancillary services such as medical care and
education. "They could do the minimum to ensure that our TVs
are not filled with images of walking skeletons," which would
allow the regime to avoid being criticized and to retain the
sympathy of its supporters.
8. (C) France planned to avoid escalating the rhetoric and
engaging in a war of words with Khartoum, Bouvier said. The
Khartoum regime was spoiling for a fight and would use any
excuse to take a harder, more aggressive line. Bouvier said
that, in contrast to the USG's "condemnation" of the
expulsion of NGOs, the GOF had asked that the Sudanese
reverse their decision on expulsion. Bouvier quickly said
that he was not criticizing the USG choice of words, "which
had their place," but rather underscoring France's decision
to try to push gently rather than aggressively, since an
aggressive approach would likely only increase Khartoum's
ire. Bouvier said that the GOF did not rule out new hostile
acts by the Khartoum regime, such as PNG-ing diplomats,
making life more difficult for UNAMID, and becoming more
disagreeable across the board.
Regime Dynamics
--------------
9. (C) Bouvier observed in passing that Bashir seemed to be
doing all the heavy lifting in terms of stoking Sudanese
resentment of the ICC and the West on an emotional level,
with VP Taha serving as the calmer, more reasoned public
advocate of Sudanese policy. Bouvier found this interesting
because there had been speculation about how close Taha was
to Bashir. His recent out-front role as one of the regime's
lead spokesmen settled that issue, Bouvier observed. Other
GOS figures, such as intelligence chief Ghosh, had assumed a
low profile.
Doha and Egypt
--------------
10. (C) Bouvier said that France very much wanted to keep
the Doha process alive and had told the countries it had
demarched that, irrespective of the ICC issue, Sudan had many
other problems that needed to be addressed and that the Doha
process should be used. It was not clear, however, whether
Doha would continue. Egypt, in part in response to the
French demarche, had suggested the creation of a big
international conference that would take up all of Sudan's
problems, in a "package deal" approach. Bouvier said that
Sudan had vehemently opposed this idea, not wanting an
"internationalization" of its problems, the international
community having intruded enough in Sudan, in Khartoum's
view. Bouvier said that the GOF was skeptical that the
Egyptian scheme would go anywhere.
JEM and Abdulwahid el-Nur
--------------
11. (C) Bouvier said that JEM representatives had consulted
with the GOF in recent days, with the French encouraging JEM
to remain engaged in the Doha process. Bouvier reported that
JEM was wary of dealing with Khartoum -- "Now that Bashir is
indicted, he has no legitimacy, so why should we deal with
him?" the JEM members asked of the French. Bouvier said that
the Arab League was thinking of holding some sort of summit
in Qatar and might invite Bashir. Having heard this, the JEM
representative said there was no way JEM would continue with
the Doha process if Bashir were invited to Qatar and allowed
to go there.
12. (C) Bouvier said that Abdulwahid el-Nur continued to
remain uninvolved with Doha, still on his personal crusade,
PARIS 00000343 003.2 OF 003
which now featured his call for installing his SLM faction
into a leadership position in Sudan. Rolling his eyes,
Bouvier said that Abdulwahid evidently continued to view
himself as Sudan's savior, to the exclusion of all others.
When asked about Abdulwahid's residency status in France,
Bouvier said that his next visa renewal would come up at the
beginning of April. "He knows we'll renew it. What choice
do we have? We can't send him back to the land of the
indicted war criminals, can we?," Bouvier said with a tight
smile delivered with a sigh and a shrug.
PEKALA
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2019
TAGS: PREL PHUM EAID KJUS SU FR
SUBJECT: SUDAN/DARFUR: FRANCE REBUFFED IN LOBBYING FOR
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
PARIS 00000343 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Political Officer Gregory D'Elia, 1.4 (b/d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: A range of countries rebuffed a French
attempt to lobby support for new humanitarian assistance
programs in Sudan/Darfur following Khartoum's recent
expulsion of NGOs, MFA Sudan deskoff Frederic Bouvier said on
March 9. These included Libya, Russia, China, Ethiopia,
Egypt, Kenya, and Senegal, several of which gave an "I told
you so" response to the French, referring to what they viewed
as the logical consequence of the ICC's indictment of Sudan
President Bashir. Bouvier said that France was considering
possible next steps but would likely allow the heightened
post-indictment atmosphere to calm. He cautioned against an
aggressive "war of words" campaign against Sudan, whose
leaders seemed to be looking for any excuse to retaliate
against those supporting the ICC. Libya indicated it would
call on all African nations party to the ICC to reconsider
their position on the ICC, with the AU's Peace and Security
Council expressing a similar view. In the meantime, the
French hope that the Doha process keeps going, although the
JEM has indicated to the French a reluctance to maintain its
participation in those talks, and Egypt has suggested the
formation of an international conference on Sudan (something
Sudan has vehemently rejected). Abdulwahid el-Nur continues
to view himself as the solution to the Darfur crisis and the
man who should be running Sudan. END SUMMARY.
French Lobbying
--------------
2. (C) We met with MFA Sudan desk officer Frederic Bouvier
on March 9 to discuss French thinking in the wake of the
ICC's indictment of Sudan President Bashir. Bouvier
immediately described a demarche the French carried out in a
number of countries on March 6 and 7, including Libya,
Russia, China, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Senegal (and perhaps
others that he did not identify specifically). Bouvier
indicated that these countries had been chosen because they
represented both a geographic and ideological range of
nations critical of the ICC and hoping for an Article 16
deferral of the indictment.
3. (C) The purpose of the demarche was to encourage these
countries -- and countries that they could influence -- to
consider ways that the international community could
structure a new means of providing humanitarian assistance to
the people of Darfur, which would become an increasingly
urgent matter now that Khartoum had expelled many NGOs from
Darfur. The French argued that the humanitarian issue should
be considered separately from the ICC issue. In the same
vein, the French said that the ICC question should not be
allowed to disrupt work on other aspects of Sudan's problems,
such as the Doha process, outreach to rebel elements, and
North-South cooperation.
4. (C) Bouvier said, with a tone of resignation, that
France's demarche was "essentially rebuffed by everyone, all
of whom thought that the ICC issue overshadowed everything
else." Senegal gave the least hostile response, saying that
it would "consider France's points." Kenya said that it
supported the AU position, which meant that Kenya favored an
Article 16 deferral, which the AU had been advocating. Libya
gave the French a very blunt "we told you so response,"
noting that many in the international community had told
France and other Western countries that the ICC indictment
would lead only to a worsening of the situation. Bouvier did
not specify how the Russians, Chinese, and Ethiopians
responded but he suggested that they were similar to Libya's
"we told you so, you should have known this was coming"
retort.
5. (C) The French were disappointed at the degree of
cynicism these responses displayed, Bouvier said. The
countries France had approached, while paying lip service to
the plight of Darfurians, seemed to blame "the West" for any
worsening of the situation in Darfur, rather than blaming
Khartoum. While not outwardly sympathizing with Bashir, they
indicated that they could "understand Bashir's response,
considering what you are trying to do to him."
6. (C) Bouvier said that it seemed increasingly clear that
the Western democracies were facing growing unity among
Africans, Moslem nations, the Third World generally, and
major powers China and Russia. Saying that he did not want
PARIS 00000343 002.2 OF 003
to generalize but doing so anyway, Bouvier observed that "all
the countries run by dictators or autocrats are against us
and for Bashir." Libya has indicated that it would call on
all African nations party to the ICC to reconsider their
position on the ICC, with the AU's Peace and Security Council
making similar noises, Bouvier said.
Pause to Consider
--------------
7. (C) Bouvier said that France would pause to assess the
situation, still rife with heightened tensions over the
relatively recent ICC decision. There would likely be some
calming. The humanitarian situation, on the other hand,
would only get worse. Bouvier speculated that Khartoum could
provide a minimum level of food assistance in Darfur but
could well end ancillary services such as medical care and
education. "They could do the minimum to ensure that our TVs
are not filled with images of walking skeletons," which would
allow the regime to avoid being criticized and to retain the
sympathy of its supporters.
8. (C) France planned to avoid escalating the rhetoric and
engaging in a war of words with Khartoum, Bouvier said. The
Khartoum regime was spoiling for a fight and would use any
excuse to take a harder, more aggressive line. Bouvier said
that, in contrast to the USG's "condemnation" of the
expulsion of NGOs, the GOF had asked that the Sudanese
reverse their decision on expulsion. Bouvier quickly said
that he was not criticizing the USG choice of words, "which
had their place," but rather underscoring France's decision
to try to push gently rather than aggressively, since an
aggressive approach would likely only increase Khartoum's
ire. Bouvier said that the GOF did not rule out new hostile
acts by the Khartoum regime, such as PNG-ing diplomats,
making life more difficult for UNAMID, and becoming more
disagreeable across the board.
Regime Dynamics
--------------
9. (C) Bouvier observed in passing that Bashir seemed to be
doing all the heavy lifting in terms of stoking Sudanese
resentment of the ICC and the West on an emotional level,
with VP Taha serving as the calmer, more reasoned public
advocate of Sudanese policy. Bouvier found this interesting
because there had been speculation about how close Taha was
to Bashir. His recent out-front role as one of the regime's
lead spokesmen settled that issue, Bouvier observed. Other
GOS figures, such as intelligence chief Ghosh, had assumed a
low profile.
Doha and Egypt
--------------
10. (C) Bouvier said that France very much wanted to keep
the Doha process alive and had told the countries it had
demarched that, irrespective of the ICC issue, Sudan had many
other problems that needed to be addressed and that the Doha
process should be used. It was not clear, however, whether
Doha would continue. Egypt, in part in response to the
French demarche, had suggested the creation of a big
international conference that would take up all of Sudan's
problems, in a "package deal" approach. Bouvier said that
Sudan had vehemently opposed this idea, not wanting an
"internationalization" of its problems, the international
community having intruded enough in Sudan, in Khartoum's
view. Bouvier said that the GOF was skeptical that the
Egyptian scheme would go anywhere.
JEM and Abdulwahid el-Nur
--------------
11. (C) Bouvier said that JEM representatives had consulted
with the GOF in recent days, with the French encouraging JEM
to remain engaged in the Doha process. Bouvier reported that
JEM was wary of dealing with Khartoum -- "Now that Bashir is
indicted, he has no legitimacy, so why should we deal with
him?" the JEM members asked of the French. Bouvier said that
the Arab League was thinking of holding some sort of summit
in Qatar and might invite Bashir. Having heard this, the JEM
representative said there was no way JEM would continue with
the Doha process if Bashir were invited to Qatar and allowed
to go there.
12. (C) Bouvier said that Abdulwahid el-Nur continued to
remain uninvolved with Doha, still on his personal crusade,
PARIS 00000343 003.2 OF 003
which now featured his call for installing his SLM faction
into a leadership position in Sudan. Rolling his eyes,
Bouvier said that Abdulwahid evidently continued to view
himself as Sudan's savior, to the exclusion of all others.
When asked about Abdulwahid's residency status in France,
Bouvier said that his next visa renewal would come up at the
beginning of April. "He knows we'll renew it. What choice
do we have? We can't send him back to the land of the
indicted war criminals, can we?," Bouvier said with a tight
smile delivered with a sigh and a shrug.
PEKALA