SUDAN/DARFUR: FRANCE REBUFFED IN LOBBYING FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000343 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2019 TAGS: PREL PHUM EAID KJUS SU FR SUBJECT: SUDAN/DARFUR: FRANCE REBUFFED IN LOBBYING FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PARIS 00000343 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Political Officer Gregory D'Elia, 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: A range of countries rebuffed a French attempt to lobby support for new humanitarian assistance programs in Sudan/Darfur following Khartoum's recent expulsion of NGOs, MFA Sudan deskoff Frederic Bouvier said on March 9. These included Libya, Russia, China, Ethiopia, Egypt, Kenya, and Senegal, several of which gave an "I told you so" response to the French, referring to what they viewed as the logical consequence of the ICC's indictment of Sudan President Bashir. Bouvier said that France was considering possible next steps but would likely allow the heightened post-indictment atmosphere to calm. He cautioned against an aggressive "war of words" campaign against Sudan, whose leaders seemed to be looking for any excuse to retaliate against those supporting the ICC. Libya indicated it would call on all African nations party to the ICC to reconsider their position on the ICC, with the AU's Peace and Security Council expressing a similar view. In the meantime, the French hope that the Doha process keeps going, although the JEM has indicated to the French a reluctance to maintain its participation in those talks, and Egypt has suggested the formation of an international conference on Sudan (something Sudan has vehemently rejected). Abdulwahid el-Nur continues to view himself as the solution to the Darfur crisis and the man who should be running Sudan. END SUMMARY. French Lobbying -------------- ¶2. (C) We met with MFA Sudan desk officer Frederic Bouvier on March 9 to discuss French thinking in the wake of the ICC's indictment of Sudan President Bashir. Bouvier immediately described a demarche the French carried out in a number of countries on March 6 and 7, including Libya, Russia, China, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Senegal (and perhaps others that he did not identify specifically). Bouvier indicated that these countries had been chosen because they represented both a geographic and ideological range of nations critical of the ICC and hoping for an Article 16 deferral of the indictment. ¶3. (C) The purpose of the demarche was to encourage these countries -- and countries that they could influence -- to consider ways that the international community could structure a new means of providing humanitarian assistance to the people of Darfur, which would become an increasingly urgent matter now that Khartoum had expelled many NGOs from Darfur. The French argued that the humanitarian issue should be considered separately from the ICC issue. In the same vein, the French said that the ICC question should not be allowed to disrupt work on other aspects of Sudan's problems, such as the Doha process, outreach to rebel elements, and North-South cooperation. ¶4. (C) Bouvier said, with a tone of resignation, that France's demarche was "essentially rebuffed by everyone, all of whom thought that the ICC issue overshadowed everything else." Senegal gave the least hostile response, saying that it would "consider France's points." Kenya said that it supported the AU position, which meant that Kenya favored an Article 16 deferral, which the AU had been advocating. Libya gave the French a very blunt "we told you so response," noting that many in the international community had told France and other Western countries that the ICC indictment would lead only to a worsening of the situation. Bouvier did not specify how the Russians, Chinese, and Ethiopians responded but he suggested that they were similar to Libya's "we told you so, you should have known this was coming" retort. ¶5. (C) The French were disappointed at the degree of cynicism these responses displayed, Bouvier said. The countries France had approached, while paying lip service to the plight of Darfurians, seemed to blame "the West" for any worsening of the situation in Darfur, rather than blaming Khartoum. While not outwardly sympathizing with Bashir, they indicated that they could "understand Bashir's response, considering what you are trying to do to him." ¶6. (C) Bouvier said that it seemed increasingly clear that the Western democracies were facing growing unity among Africans, Moslem nations, the Third World generally, and major powers China and Russia. Saying that he did not want PARIS 00000343 002.2 OF 003 to generalize but doing so anyway, Bouvier observed that "all the countries run by dictators or autocrats are against us and for Bashir." Libya has indicated that it would call on all African nations party to the ICC to reconsider their position on the ICC, with the AU's Peace and Security Council making similar noises, Bouvier said. Pause to Consider -------------- ¶7. (C) Bouvier said that France would pause to assess the situation, still rife with heightened tensions over the relatively recent ICC decision. There would likely be some calming. The humanitarian situation, on the other hand, would only get worse. Bouvier speculated that Khartoum could provide a minimum level of food assistance in Darfur but could well end ancillary services such as medical care and education. "They could do the minimum to ensure that our TVs are not filled with images of walking skeletons," which would allow the regime to avoid being criticized and to retain the sympathy of its supporters. ¶8. (C) France planned to avoid escalating the rhetoric and engaging in a war of words with Khartoum, Bouvier said. The Khartoum regime was spoiling for a fight and would use any excuse to take a harder, more aggressive line. Bouvier said that, in contrast to the USG's "condemnation" of the expulsion of NGOs, the GOF had asked that the Sudanese reverse their decision on expulsion. Bouvier quickly said that he was not criticizing the USG choice of words, "which had their place," but rather underscoring France's decision to try to push gently rather than aggressively, since an aggressive approach would likely only increase Khartoum's ire. Bouvier said that the GOF did not rule out new hostile acts by the Khartoum regime, such as PNG-ing diplomats, making life more difficult for UNAMID, and becoming more disagreeable across the board. Regime Dynamics -------------- ¶9. (C) Bouvier observed in passing that Bashir seemed to be doing all the heavy lifting in terms of stoking Sudanese resentment of the ICC and the West on an emotional level, with VP Taha serving as the calmer, more reasoned public advocate of Sudanese policy. Bouvier found this interesting because there had been speculation about how close Taha was to Bashir. His recent out-front role as one of the regime's lead spokesmen settled that issue, Bouvier observed. Other GOS figures, such as intelligence chief Ghosh, had assumed a low profile. Doha and Egypt -------------- ¶10. (C) Bouvier said that France very much wanted to keep the Doha process alive and had told the countries it had demarched that, irrespective of the ICC issue, Sudan had many other problems that needed to be addressed and that the Doha process should be used. It was not clear, however, whether Doha would continue. Egypt, in part in response to the French demarche, had suggested the creation of a big international conference that would take up all of Sudan's problems, in a "package deal" approach. Bouvier said that Sudan had vehemently opposed this idea, not wanting an "internationalization" of its problems, the international community having intruded enough in Sudan, in Khartoum's view. Bouvier said that the GOF was skeptical that the Egyptian scheme would go anywhere. JEM and Abdulwahid el-Nur -------------- ¶11. (C) Bouvier said that JEM representatives had consulted with the GOF in recent days, with the French encouraging JEM to remain engaged in the Doha process. Bouvier reported that JEM was wary of dealing with Khartoum -- "Now that Bashir is indicted, he has no legitimacy, so why should we deal with him?" the JEM members asked of the French. Bouvier said that the Arab League was thinking of holding some sort of summit in Qatar and might invite Bashir. Having heard this, the JEM representative said there was no way JEM would continue with the Doha process if Bashir were invited to Qatar and allowed to go there. ¶12. (C) Bouvier said that Abdulwahid el-Nur continued to remain uninvolved with Doha, still on his personal crusade, PARIS 00000343 003.2 OF 003 which now featured his call for installing his SLM faction into a leadership position in Sudan. Rolling his eyes, Bouvier said that Abdulwahid evidently continued to view himself as Sudan's savior, to the exclusion of all others. When asked about Abdulwahid's residency status in France, Bouvier said that his next visa renewal would come up at the beginning of April. "He knows we'll renew it. What choice do we have? We can't send him back to the land of the indicted war criminals, can we?," Bouvier said with a tight smile delivered with a sigh and a shrug. PEKALA