GENERAL PETRAEUS DISCUSSES AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 PARIS 000276 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2019 TAGS: MOPS PREL PGOV NATO KPAL AF IR IS IZ PK FR SUBJECT: GENERAL PETRAEUS DISCUSSES AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN WITH FRENCH OFFICIALS Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR KATHLEEN H. ALLEGRONE FOR R EASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) Summary: In meetings with PM Fillon, NSA Levitte, FM Kouchner, MinDef Morin and military chief Georgelin February 9 and 10, CENTCOM Commander General Petraeus discussed the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan, noting the administration's strategic review now underway and emphasizing the need for a regional approach to the issue as evidenced by the work of Special Representative Holbrooke. Petraeus, who avoided specific discussion of what more allies can do, was careful to remind interlocutors that he is the U.S. commander, not the NATO one. He referred interlocutors frequently to Vice President Biden's speech, and his own, in Munich. He emphasized that in Afghanistan, the Afghan people are the decisive "terrain" and that it is necessary to serve, secure, and respect the people; we must not risk appearing as conquerors. As for Pakistan, he stressed that it will be essential for Pakistan's civilian and military leaders to recognize that the existential threat to Pakistan comes from internal extremists, not from India. French officials affirmed that France remains committed to Afghanistan and indicated a willingness to do more, particularly in training Afghan police forces using gendarmes and "right sizing" their battalions with an additional company, more enablers, and a brigade-level headquarters, but cautioned strongly against public discussion until after the domestic debate over French full participation in NATO is concluded. (Note: This will likely occur after the NATO Summit in April.) President Sarkozy, in fact, will travel to Afghanistan and Pakistan in May. French National Assembly members and Senators manifested growing domestic concern about full NATO participation for France and wariness of increased engagement in Afghanistan. End Summary. -------------- IRAQ -------------- ¶2. (C) Most interlocutors asked Petraeus for his views on developments in Iraq and how lessons learned there can be applied or modified in dealing with Afghanistan. In describing Iraq and the progress that has been made, Petraeus reminded interlocutors that the situation had been extremely violent and complex. A number of factors had combined to alter the situation, including a completely different approach to the security situation through the employment of counter-insurgency concepts, made more possible by the increase in forces during the surge. Despite improvements, he noted, the situation in Iraq remains fragile and will continue to see some violence. He spoke positively of the recent elections (and PM Maliki's apparent victory and the setback to the religious parties associated with Iran) and welcomed President Sarkozy's visit to Baghdad. In answer to PM Fillon's question, he noted that the U.S. drawdown may be completed sooner than is called for in the security agreement. However, even then, there is likely to be a residual U.S. troop presence, if the Iraqis want it, for training, etc. -------------- -------------- AFGHANISTAN: WE'LL HELP, BUT PLEASE LET US GET PAST THE NATO DEBATE FIRST -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Petraeus emphasized that the administration is conducting a strategic review of policy toward Afghanistan and the region, looking at ways to prevent Afghanistan from again becoming a sanctuary for transnational extremism. As part of this effort, the administration is looking not only at the security issues, but also issues of training, development of local civilian services, and good governance. He offered that, based on earlier reviews, the outline of the military requirements to set the conditions for secure elections in 2009 is already known, and the President is prepared to take some decisions while the strategic review is underway. In the short term, the focus must be on enhancing security and accelerating training of the Afghan Security Forces, the army, and especially the police. When more U.S. troops are sent, it will be important that they be seen as partners and friends of the Afghan people, not as conquerors or occupiers. He cautioned that additional military and security forces are necessary but, in and of themselves, are not sufficient to enable progress against all lines of PARIS 00000276 002 OF 005 operation; it is also necessary to serve, secure, and respect the Afghan people (using the "whole of government" approach). In addition, he emphasized that the Afghan government needs to be seen as legitimate in the eyes of the Afghan people; Afghanistan cannot again become a sanctuary for transnational extremists. ¶4. (C) As the U.S. conducts its strategic policy review, Petraeus urged partners to consider the steps necessary to deploy additional forces in advance of the August 20 elections. He noted that this discussion is already going on in NATO channels. Petraeus stressed that in order for troops to be ready to assist with the elections, decisions will need to be made as soon as possible to provide for training, infrastructure, and deployment. Morin asked for better intelligence-sharing in Afghanistan between French forces and Regional Command-East, noting that they had hoped to have an intelligence officer in the RC-East who had full access. Petraeus agreed that it was necessary and said "we need to figure out how to do this." (Note: A strategic review is already underway by USD(I) to improve French access to intelligence now shared by "4 eyes" partners via an exchange known as STONE GHOST. The exchange is complicated by the fact that our Commonwealth partners are reluctant to open this exchange to the French. End Note.) While Fillon, Levitte, and Kouchner indicated that France will augment its participation in Afghanistan, each of them cautioned that this not be conflated with the current French domestic debate about full participation in NATO. Levitte, who spoke of thelikely transfer of French forces from Kabul to the Kapisa Province (RC-E),said France recognizes it will be necessary to reinforce its two battalions when that happens; they will need to augment their troops and provide protection for their new configuration. Levitte expressed confidence that General Georgelin will be able to make that clear to Sarkozy and expects a decision in June. But for now, he emphasized, France is not talking about any augmentation; the focus is to get a positive decision on fully reintegrating into NATO. Fillon, who has to work with an increasingly recalcitrant parliament, stressed that over the next three months France's focus will be on realizing the full reintegration into NATO. It will be important to demonstrate to French public opinion that this coincides with a change of strategic views regarding the role of Europe and European defense. Vice President Biden's comments at Munich were very helpful in this regard; President Bush's comments at the Bucharest Summit had been very comforting for the French, and Fillon hopes that President Obama will be able to make positive comments. The political concern, he stressed, is that there needs to be a comprehensive review of NATO, not just the reintegration of France in order to ensure that the domestic debate is healthy and positive. Putting it succinctly, Fillon said: "please give us three months." ¶5. (C) Kouchner and Levitte agreed it is necessary to help with training the Afghan police so that they can help address security issues locally. As Petraeus explained to Fillon, police training hasn't gone as well as the training of the Afghan National Army, and he noted that individual police, rather than units, are always more susceptible to intimidation and corruption. Kouchner recounted that the Afghan Interior Minister had made a similar plea a few days earlier and promised to help secure French training for police. He cautioned, however, that French gendarmes have recently been put under the French Ministry of Interior, a ministry that is reluctant to see them deployed and engaged in more foreign training. Levitte provided additional information, saying that France, Spain, Portugal, and Italy were considering joint training of the Afghan police, despite some reluctance from Afghan President Karzai. Levitte acknowledged that France is unlikely to develop PRTs, but he was intrigued by Petraeus' request that they consider providing a CIMIC for Afghanistan. Both agreed that it will be important for the OMLTs and other elements to work together with all Afghan Security Forces in province, including the local police, to enhance their capabilities and build confidence. ¶6. (C) Kouchner also agreed that it will be important to intervene in specific areas, such as the Pashtun tribal zones. He cautioned, however, that even when assistance is targeted and designed to work for and with the local people, success is not assured. He recalled his months of work with Doctors without Borders in Wardak province some years ago. PARIS 00000276 003 OF 005 They had dug the foundations for a hospital and gotten it running; the local population had confidence in them, but now, Wardak province has slipped back under the control of Taliban. The ruling family in Kouchner's time included the tribal chief, who now sells carpets in Paris, as well as his brother who became a member of the Taliban government. Kouchner also pointed to the success of the French hospital in Kabul, which is led and staffed predominantly by Afghans and whose patients include people affiliated with the Taliban. ¶7. (C) Kouchner and Levitte agreed with Petraeus that the only plausible candidate for the August election, other than Karzai, might be the former Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani, who is both articulate and a Pashtun. Petraeus also mentioned Atmar as a possible candidate, but agreed it is too late for him to enter the race. None of the French interlocutors felt that the most recent Finance Minister, who has just resigned, had the credentials or charisma to win. Security will be critical to ensuring access to the election sites and Petraeus noted that he was encouraged that Karzai had given Atmar a blank check to help ensure this, recounting how he praises Karzai for this decision every time he seems him as a way to keep him supporting Atmar. The Afghans have now taken responsibility for sixty percent of Kabul and security incidents are down, which should allow French troops to move out of Kabul and into RC-East. ¶8. (C) Asked about reconciliation, Petraeus told Kouchner, Levitte and Fillon that he doesn't put much stock in the talks going on in Saudi Arabia with relatively high-level Taliban. He doubted that Karzai could wrest much from Mullah Omar, given Karzai's relatively weak position. Negotiations, he observed, were best done from a position of strength, and right now the Taliban assessed that they were winning. Petraeus said you have to consider carefully who is irreconcilable and ensure they cannot be part of the new Afghanistan. Kouchner agreed, but also suggested that sometimes you have to accept some of the "bad" guys, even as you keep the "worst" at arm's length. Petraeus agreed in part, recounting the success he had had in Iraq but noting that it took time to get a feel for the people, that you must work from the bottom up as well as the top down. Kouchner agreed that one viable approach is to make a difference in local areas, so that the people can see, compare, and better appreciate their relatively good situation. -------------- ANOTHER "NEIGHBORS'" MEETING? -------------- ¶9. (C) Kouchner referred to his December meeting of "Afghanistan's neighbors" and noted that he had proposed organizing a second round with Secretary Clinton, perhaps in Tajikistan this time. He recalled that Iran had not participated in the meeting in December, but that Larijani had promised Kouchner at Munich that Iran would attend a second session. Similarly, Pakistani leader Zardari also agreed to attend. Kouchner was aware of the Italian initiative to host an Afghan-centered meeting as part of their G8 stewardship, but believed he could convince FM Frattini to stand down on the proposal. -------------- TIMING FOR AN ISAF MEETING? -------------- ¶10. (C) Levitte raised the need for an ISAF partners meeting prior to the April 3-4 NATO Summit in Strasbourg. This has been under discussion since before Obama's inauguration. Levitte said agreement seems to be coalescing around a ministerial meeting in Brussels on the eve of the London G-20 meeting (April 1-2). Participation, and whether both FMs and MinDefs will attend, is still under discussion. The late March timeframe not only eases the demands on transatlantic travel, but also allows adequate time for the U.S. policy review to conclude, he said. -------------- PAKISTAN -------------- ¶11. (C) Petraeus emphasized that the U.S. is looking at the Afghan issue through a regional lens and referred to the PARIS 00000276 004 OF 005 appointment of Special Representative Holbrooke as a clear indication of our approach. In Petraeus' view, it will be critical to get Pakistan and its leaders to understand that the threat to their stability is domestic extremists; it is not the threat of conventional or nuclear attack from India. Calling this the "big idea," he acknowledged the difficulty for civilian and military leaders to reorient their thinking and change their doctrine, organizations, and systems. He likened it to the overhaul of U.S. military doctrine in 2005 when we turned our focus, training, and education to counter-insurgency. He noted that the task is more difficult for Pakistan, whose traditional and conventional opponent, India, is still on its borders and did not go away like the Warsaw Pact did. He nonetheless pointed to positive developments, including the work of Pakistani President Zardari, incremental improvements in the intelligence agency (ISI),and compliance with IMF standards in 2008 as hopeful signs. ¶12. (C) Levitte and Kouchner both agreed on the positive impact Zardari has had on Pakistan's policy, at least before the events in Mumbai. They fully agreed that there can be no solution to the Afghan problem without also addressing Pakistani issues. Asked by Levitte, Petraeus stressed that Special Representative Holbrooke will not try to broker any deal over Kashmir. Levitte informed Petraeus that Sarkozy plans to visit Afghanistan and Pakistan in May, but he will not go to India on this trip. -------------- GAZA -------------- ¶13. (C) Turning briefly to Gaza and the Palestinian issue, Kouchner referred to the importance of France's decision to reach out to Syria. It is possible, he said, that the Syrians were helpful in influencing Hamas leader Khalid Mishal to agree to a ceasefire. Moreover, reaching out to Syria is important to try to open up some space between them and Iran. Kouchner did not think that Syria could be split away from Iran but assessed that it was so important that it had to be tried. Kouchner portrayed Palestinian Authority President Abu Mazen as "completely pathetic" and isolated. The Arabs are divided and in need of their own peace conference, he quipped. Petraeus and Kouchner discussed ways of helping the Palestinian Authority. Petraeus noted the importance of the West Bank being seen as better off than Gaza under Hamas. Fillon reiterated that France is doing all it can to help the PA financially and that France remains open to do more, whether by providing military observers or in other ways. Fillon also commented on the apparent fatigue of PA leader Abbas who, when he met with President Sarkozy, reportedly broke down in tears. The future of the region, Fillon stressed, is fundamental to Europe. -------------- IRAN -------------- ¶14. (C) Fillon asked about U.S. policy toward Iran and whether President Obama will take the initiative quickly or whether he will wait until after Iranian elections in June. They discussed the difficulty of knowing who actually controls and influences foreign policy in Iran. Petraeus observed that Iran's policy toward Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, the West Bank, and Gaza is controlled by the IRGC-Quds Force, which reports directly to Supreme Leader Khamenei. Fillon immediately jumped to the conclusion that if that is the case, the June election could be a non-event for issues of concern. -------------- ANTI-PIRACY -------------- ¶15. (C) Fillon asked about the anti-piracy campaign, noting that France had fought hard to launch the Atalanta ESDP mission. He asserted that France wants to ensure that there is good cooperation between Atalanta and TF 151. Petraeus, who praised France's leadership on this issue, noted that the final disposition of the captured pirates, the so-called persons of interest, remains unresolved. Fillon, who noted that seven are in French jails, said they had made an agreement with Somalia on handling the pirates. All agreed, PARIS 00000276 005 OF 005 however, the risk remains that the courts will either refuse jurisdiction or free them. They both agreed another problem is shipping companies themselves, which have not prepared their ships to take adequate action. Fillon recalled that a shipping company had sought to refuse French help during their first intervention but that France had prevailed by insisting that it was an issue of national security. -------------- QUESTIONS FROM SENATORS AND DELEGATES -------------- ¶16. (SBU) Petraeus met with a bipartisan group of some fifteen National Assembly members for more than an hour and separately with a bipartisan group of more than twenty Senators for ninety minutes February 10. The parliamentarians, primarily from the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committees, were well informed, respectful, and asked pertinent questions that demonstrated a growing concern in some quarters about Sarkozy's decision to return France fully to NATO. Among the questions were: how many people do you need in Afghanistan; what are the lessons learned from Iraq and do they translate for the situation in Afghanistan; how do you protect civilian populations in asymmetric conflicts; how do you win over the Afghan population when it appears to them that NATO and the West are responsible for so much damage; and, will the U.S. consult with allies about Afghanistan, or simply present them with requirements once the strategic review is finished. Petraeus' remarks, which flowed from his speech in Munich and echoed much of what he said in private to government officials, were met with appreciation. ¶17. (U) General Petraeus has cleared this cable. PEKALA