PRUDENCE RULES IN ADVANCE OF ICC ACTION ON BASHIR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000238 C O R R E C T E D C O P Y FOR MISSING SUBJECT TAG & SIPDIS CAPTION SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/14/14 TAGS: PREL UNSC RU SU FR SUBJECT: PRUDENCE RULES IN ADVANCE OF ICC ACTION ON BASHIR REF: A. STATE 2559 B. KHARTOUM 000126 PARIS 00000238 001.3 OF 002 Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew R. Young ¶1. (C) Summary: Impending ICC action against Sudanese President Bashir dominated U.S., UK, and French consultations on February 11 as well as consultations with a broader informal group including Presidential Envoy for Sudan Mikhail ¶V. Margelov. In a pre-meeting, U.S., UK and French officials agreed to oppose any effort at the UNSC to defer Bashir's prosecution by invoking Article 16 of the Rome Statutes. Senior Representative for Sudan Shortley stressed that the USG would review its policies for Sudan generally but he could not envisage any recourse to Article 16. Russian Presidential Envoy for Sudan Mikhail Marghelov joined the discussions for a working luncheon. He argued Russia, which he maintained had minimal economic and military links to Khartoum, could be an honest broker on Sudan. Marghelov stated Bashir had pledged to him there would be no violent reaction against local embassies in Khartoum in the event of an ICC arrest warrant against the Sudanese President. End Summary. -------------- P-3 United Against Article 16 -------------- ¶2. (C) AF A/S-Equivalent Stephen Gompertz hosted AF Senior Representative for Sudan and Director of Sudan Programs Group Tim Shortley and UK Special Envoy for Sudan Michael O'Neill for February 11 discussions on Sudan. AF DAS-Equivalent Helene Le Gal and AF PDAS-Equivalent Caroline Dumas also attended the P-3 meeting. The P-3 agreed to oppose any effort at the UNSC to defer ICC prosecution of President Bashir by invoking Article 16 of the Rome Statutes. They also agreed on the advisability of coordinating public statements after the issuance of the ICC arrest warrant, taking care to maintain a low-key response and avoid any inflammatory tones. ¶3. (C) There was general agreement that it would be prudent for all at the table to adopt a muted reaction in public to the forthcoming ICC arrest warrant of Bashir. AF A/S-Equivalent Gompertz and UK Special Envoy O'Neill jointly broached the challenges likely to face western embassies after the event in terms of interaction with Bashir. O'Neill disclosed the FCO planned to take the line publicly that the ;UK would avoid "non-essential contacts" but anticipated some embassy contact with Bashir was inevitable. -------------- Doha Underway... -------------- ¶4. (C) With Doha talks underway, Gompertz expressed satisfaction that Khalil Ibrahim had indeed reached Qatar. Gompertz regretted Khalil would not get to meet with Sudanese Intelligence Director Salah Ghosh, who had already departed, but a meeting with Nafie would take place. Gompertz expressed apprehensions that the JEM had been through Cairo for consultations for two days prior to the kick-off of Doha; AF DAS-Equivalent Helene Le Gal noted continuing Egyptian recalcitrance on the Doha process, with Gompertz adding that Mubarak seemed personally less hostile toward Doha than FM Abult Gheit or Intelligence Director Suleiman. (Note: Romain Serman at the French Presidency commented separately on February 13 that the French had taken care to make Khailil Ibrahim's own travel arrangements expressly to preempt possibility of a stop in Cairo. End Note) Shortley remarked on Abdulwahid El-Nur's declining viability as a Fur leader given his continuing refusal to participate at Doha; he related recent USG outreach to Fur civil society notables. -------------- Margelov: "Moscow can be Honest Broker" -------------- ¶5. (C) Margelov joined the group for an expanded working luncheon also joined by Presidential Deputy NSA Joubert, MFA Spokesperson Eric Chevallier, and IO A/S-Equivalent Sylvie Bermann. Margelov explained he was dual-hatted as both Presidential Envoy for Sudan (since 12/07/08) and Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee; he had visited Sudan in both capacities, traveling most recently to Juba, El Fashir and Khartoum (Refs A,B). Russia, he said, sought to become more active in Africa, considered Sudan a country of special concern, and could play the role of honest broker. Russia and Sudan shared some historical ties, he admitted, dating to the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, but links were not too strong otherwise; economic ties, relative to other nations (a tacit reference to China) were negligible; and Margelov discounted the significance of past military Russia sales, saying Russia had provided two helicopters to Bashir that were used principally for his personal protection. PARIS 00000238 002.2 OF 002 -------------- "Bashir is Not Lukashenko" -------------- ¶6. (C) With respect to the ICC, Margelov described the Russian position as close to the USG, noting Russia was not a party to the Rome Statutes. He did not respond to a suggestion by A/S-Equivalent Bermann that Russia incurred additional obligations toward the ICC in Sudan because of its vote in favor of (2005) UNSCR 1593. Bashir, according to Margelov, had personally pledged a sober response to the forthcoming ICC actions against him, stating there would be no violence against embassies and quipping "I'm no Lukashenko." Margelov claimed he told Bashir he must cooperate wtih the ICC and with the UN, and not act the part of "Mr. Nyet" (a path that Moscow itself had found unfruitful, Margelov added.) He suggested that Bashir would not try to provoke the international community by traveling abroad. To Gompertz's query whether Bashir would really miss the African Union summit this summer, Margelov said he thought Bashir was too worried about keeping a grip on the home front. Joubert speculated Bashir would try to generate visits from other African heads of state, as a way of maintaining an international profile. Margelov further suggested African leaders might visit Sudan (and thus encounter Bashir) in the guise of election monitors. -------------- Russian Complaint at Exclusion from Doha -------------- ¶7. (C) Margelov said Russia had now asked to be an observer at the Doha talks after failing to score an invitation. Shortley stated this was surely an oversight by the organizers and not a conscious decision to exclude Russia. ¶8. (U) Cleared by Senior Representative for Sudan Shortley. PEKALA