CJCS MULLEN OUTLINES STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 001589 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MASS AF FR SUBJECT: CJCS MULLEN OUTLINES STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR INCREASED CONTRIBUTIONS TO AFGHANISTAN WITH FRENCH CHIEF OF DEFENSE Classified By: Ambassador Charles Rivkin for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: CJCS Admiral Mike Mullen met with French Chief of Defense(CHOD)General Jean-Louis Georgelin to discuss the possibility of increasing the number of French troops committed to Afghanistan, in advance of the December 3-4 NATO Ministerial meetings. This discussion was precipitated by the expected release of a new US strategic framework for Afghanistan in the next two weeks. US attendees were: CJCS ADM Mullen, Ambassador Rivkin (US Ambassador to France),CAPT Mike Gilday (CJCS Executive Officer),and COL T. Bruce Sweeney (US Defense Attache to France). The French attendees were: GEN Georgelin, Vice Admiral Rogel (French Deputy Chief of Joint Staff for Operations),Rear Admiral Prazuk (French Communications and Public Affairs Chief),and Mr. Magnien, (Diplomatic Advisor to the CHOD). GEN Georgelin indicated that the French indeed have additional capacity to provide soldiers for Afghanistan, but that the French Joint Staff currently does not have the political support to do so. GEN Georgelin did not provide a number of additional troops that could be deployed, and did not respond to the Chairman regarding suggested numbers. Gen Georgelin then discussed the French President's public statement of "Not one more soldier for Afghanistan," followed by suggestions of how the US and NATO might approach France to get political support for additional French troops. This is a DAO Paris drafted message also reported as an IIR. End Summary. -------------- POLITICAL SITUATION: NO MORE TROOPS -------------- ¶2. (C) The official French political position on additional troops is that France "will not provide one more soldier" for Afghanistan, as stated by President Sarkozy in October 2009. In fact, GEN Georgelin spoke with CJCS to discuss the possibility of additional French troops for Afghanistan the day prior to President Sarkozy's public statement. President Sarkozy made his announcement without consulting Gen Georgelin. When GEN Georgelin later met with the French President, Mr. Sarkozy told GEN Georgelin he could perhaps add police trainers, civilian or administrative personnel to boost the total numbers of the French contribution, but no additional soldiers would be sent for now. GEN Georgelin stated that the President does not think that Afghanistan is popular with French voters or other politicians and that the President is concerned about the regional elections in March and the success of his political party in those elections. -------------- FRENCH CHOD's SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE -------------- ¶3. (C) GEN Georgelin reviewed how the French troop level in Afghanistan has increased over time, as well as how he has managed to shape the French contribution into a more effective combat force. GEN Georgelin has overseen a significant increase from approximately 2000 troops to over 3700 on the ground. This was partly effected by changing off-site troop contributions into on-site contributions (such as reducing French Naval support personnel in the Indian Ocean while increasing French Army troops in-country),and also by a direct increase in the overall numbers of French troops committed to the Afghanistan effort. Finally, GEN Georgelin has also directed a change in mission for troops in Afghanistan in order to provide a more potent combat force. By reducing French contributions to the Operation Enduring Freedom training mission (French troops had been running the Officer's Training at the Afghan National Army Training Command),and switching those billets to straight combat troops, GEN Georgelin has effected an actual increase in combat soldiers for his engaged units within the existing 3700 troop ceiling. French combat forces were recently reinforced with two additional platoons of infantry through this process. -------------- - NATO FORCE GENERATION CONFERENCE FOR AFGHANISTAN AND HOW TO GET THE FRENCH TO APPROVE ADDITIONAL FORCES -------------- - ¶4. (C) ADM Mullen said that he expected a Force Generation Conference to be part of the NATO Ministerial meeting in early December 2009, provided that President Obama made his strategic decision for Afghanistan, and that the strategic framework was provided to NATO allies. GEN Georgelin then suggested that although a full court press of reciprocal calls and visits might be appreciated and even helpful, what was really necessary to get approval of additional troops for Afghanistan was a direct discussion between President Obama and President Sarkozy. He said that President Obama must tell President Sarkozy how important the French troop contribution in Afghanistan was, how his vision in Afghanistan was correct and aligned with that of the US, how important and successful French re-integration into NATO has been (including GEN Abriel, the French Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation),and how much the US needed his help personally, as well as how much we needed additional French troops in Afghanistan. GEN Georgelin further suggested that we should ask for additional troops to take on training missions, thus lowering the risk. Finally, GEN Georgelin declared that President Obama must ask now, because it will be more difficult to get a positive result closer to or after the regional French elections in March. In effect, President Obama must speak to President Sarkozy now, and flattery will get you everywhere in this case. ¶5. (C) Finally, GEN Georgelin discussed the fact that successful French Presidents since De Gaulle have put the United States and NATO at some distance in order to have independent freedom of action, both politically and militarily. President Sarkozy has not done this, but has been, until recently, a true Atlanticist. Sarkozy's early trip to the US, his decision for France to rejoin NATO as a full member, and other moves have put him at odds with the French electorate and French elite. Thus, President Sarkozy is currently trying to distance himself from the US and improve his domestic popularity and appeal. Georgelin said that the President may be feeling vulnerable just now, and even if he agrees to additional troops for Afghanistan (if President Obama asks him) he will not take the position publicly until after the French regional elections in March. -------------- - WHAT CAN FRANCE CONTRIBUTE? -------------- - ¶6. (C) General Georgelin did not specify a number for additional troop contributions. CJCS stated that he was looking for a total of 5,000 - 25,000 additional troops from all NATO countries and suggested 2,000 from France. The French laughed (with the Chairman) at this. CJCS later opined once again that France could provide 2,000 troops and this also generated some nervous laughter. Georgelin said that the numbers discussed within the French Joint Staff have been approximately 1,500 troops, which would put total French contributions at 5,250. Although 5,250 is a large number for the French, it is sustainable given the total number of French forces and their reduced presence at overseas bases forecast by the French Government's White Paper. ¶7. (C) GEN Georgelin believes that NATO has accomplished an awful lot in Afghanistan, further believes that more can be collectively accomplished there, and thinks GEN McChrystal's strategy and way of thinking is the right way to go in Afghanistan. He feels that ISAF will be successful in changing dynamics in Afghanistan if we all go forward together, and he sees French forces as an integral part of that successful effort. RIVKIN