GUINEA: DAS FITZGERALD'S CONSULTATIONS IN PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001532

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2029
TAGS: PREL PGOV GV FR
SUBJECT: GUINEA: DAS FITZGERALD'S CONSULTATIONS IN PARIS
(NOVEMBER 16)

REF: A. PARIS 1465

B. OUAGADOUGOU 987

Classified By: Andrew Young, Political Counselor, reason 1.4 (b and d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: French officials at the MFA and Presidency
were in general agreement with AF DAS William Fitzgerald
November 16 on the need for a change in leadership in Guinea,
but they also agreed that effecting change, making sure Dadis
steps down, and identifying a suitable replacement government
were difficult challenges. They thought that the mediation
effort of Burkina Faso President Compaore could offer a
solution but wondered whether Compaore would move fast enough
and whether he might devise a formula that could include
Dadis in a future government, which would be difficult to
accept. The French said they would continue to discuss the
matter with Compaore and would also continue to try to find a
country willing to offer Dadis exile. The two sides also
discussed the possibility of establishing an observer force,
drawn from ECOWAS, that could be deployed in Guinea as a
stabilizing influence, with Nigeria a possible major
contributor to such a force. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) AF DAS William Fitzgerald on November 16 met
separately with MFA AF A/S-equivalent Stephane Gompertz and
desk officer Ann'laure Hare (with Africa Watcher attending)
and, at the Presidency, with Deputy Diplomatic Advisor Andre
Parant and AF-advisor Remi Marechaux (with Africa Assistant
attending).

MFA'S GOMPERTZ -- WILL DADIS DEPART?
--------------

3. (C) With Gompertz and Hare, DAS Fitzgerald underscored a
number of immediate priorities: the need to gain a better
understanding of the apparent build-up of troops affiliated
with CNDD President Dadis Camara, to expose whatever outside
training assistance Dadis is receiving for these new troops
(there are credible reports of South African and Israeli
trainers in Guinea),and to verify arms shipments arriving in
Guinea. Gompertz confirmed that he had seen similar reports
through French channels. DAS Fitzgerald noted the
significant funds that are available to the junta, including
the USD 100 million-plus "security deposit" from the Chinese
International Fund (CIF),USD 20 million per quarter from
SAG for its gold mining concession, and new resources as a
result of the Russian Aluminum company RUSAL's recent
agreement with the junta allowing the restart of its
operations.


4. (C) Gompertz noted that EU financial sanctions against
junta leaders were working their way through the process, but
that the big hole in the sanctions regime is Morocco.
Gompertz will be travelling to the kingdom on November 17 and
planned to ask Rabat to join the sanctions regime. Gompertz
hopes that the U.S. will deliver the same message. On this
trip, Gompertz will also travel to South Africa and he
promised to raise the issue of South African military
trainers with Pretoria.


5. (C) Gompertz agreed with DAS Fitzgerald that we need to
work together to convince Nigeria to provide personnel to an
observation force similar to the force deployed in 2005 in
Togo. France believes the UN Commission of Inquiry will
arrive in Conakry on November 16, is expected to complete its
work by December 5 and report back by December 16.


6. (C) While stating that "another problem is that Dadis is
crazy," Gompertz wondered what can be done about the current
situation. He noted that Defense Minister Sekouba Konate
(who was recently in Paris to discuss reforming Guinea's
military) may be distancing himself from Dadis and agreed
that security chief Claude Pivi might be moving in Konate's
direction. However, Compaore is determined to keep
negotiations alive, which favors Dadis. Fitzgerald and
Gompertz agreed that it is difficult to get any readout from
Compaore because he operates in such a guarded manner,
although Gompertz noted that French officials have had some
luck getting information from one of Compaore's close
associates, Colonel-Major Gilbert Diendere.


7. (C) Gompertz noted that there are troubling signs that
Guinea's opposition Forces Vives coalition is starting to
splinter, a development that would be "game over" in favor of
Dadis. Appearing somewhat uncomfortable with the idea,
Gompertz also floated the possibility of a transitional
government that includes Dadis, perhaps with Sekouba Konate
as PM,, citing recent examples of Kenya and Zimbabwe -- also
led by "murderers" -- where an unpalatable leadership has

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been accepted as an intermediary step. DAS Fitzgerald
pointed out a number of differences in these situations,
including the military-led brutality of Guinea's attacks on
peaceful protesters as well as the fact that Presidents
Kibaki and Mugabe had been initially installed as legitimate
leaders.

Meeting at the Presidency (Parant and Marechaux)
-------------- ---

8. (C) Parant began by recounting his consultations in
Ouagadougou on November 3 (reftels). He said that Forces
Vives leaders and Compaore were not in synch -- the former
wanted a way forward that excluded Dadis and his cronies from
the beginning, with a discussion of transitional structures,
elections, and new leadership to follow, whereas as Compaore
favored a discussion of the latter subjects (which suggested
the possibility of Dadis's remaining as part of a transition)
before addressing issues related to Dadis's future. Parant
said the opposition did not at all favor Compaore's approach.


9. (C) DAS Fitzgerald noted the often splintered nature of
the opposition, with some members probably willing to work
with Dadis. In any case, the USG considered Dadis
unacceptable. There was movement, with the UN group
investigating the September 28 massacre soon to arrive in
country. We needed to keep pressure on Dadis, to consider
approaching Morocco again in terms of sanctions (in view of
the presence there of Dadis's wealth and members of his
family) and as a possible point of exile for Dadis, and to
consider a possible ECOWAS observer mission, with Nigeria
playing a lead role. Parant remarked that his predecessor as
Deputy Diplomatic Advisor, Bruno Joubert, had recently
arrived in Rabat as Ambassador to Morocco and would be adept
at managing the Guinea issue in Morocco.


10. (C) DAS Fitzgerald noted troubling indications that
Dadis was building an ethnic-based militia force, with the
possible inclusion of trainers from South Africa and Israel.
This militia force apparently also included child soldiers
and was possibly receiving equipment from Libya (or else
eastern European arms transiting Libya). Revenue from China
and gold mining operations was enough to cover these arms
expenditures. Parant said that the GOF had obtained similar
information about Dadis's militia forces.


11. (C) Parant then raised what he considered the key
problematic issues: How to convince Dadis to leave, finding
a country that would take him as an exile (with Morocco again
mentioned as a possibility),and the question of "what comes
after," should Dadis be persuaded to go. Parant observed
that the issue of guaranteeing Dadis some sort of immunity
from later prosecution, as part of a deal resulting in his
leaving power, would have to be addressed, difficult as that
might be. The Charles Taylor case was not a good precedent
insofar as it would loom large in Dadis's likely
calculations. Parant said that another issue would involve
delivering the message to Dadis, i.e., presenting to him the
deal that would have to include his departure from power.
Parant and DAS Fitzgerald said that the best messenger would
likely be a francophone African leader such as Jean Ping.


12. (C) As for what might come after, Parant and DAS
Fitzgerald agreed that the Guinean army would likely play an
important role in any transition, along with any outside
observer force that might be deployed to serve as a
stabilizing force after Dadis's departure and during a
transition phase. They agreed that there were elements in
the army that seemed trustworthy, although there would always
be a certain amount of risk involved in placing faith in any
army personnel or faction. Sekouba Konate was again
mentioned as a military figure with whom the opposition might
be able to work, an impression Parant said he had when he met
with the opposition in Ouagadougou.


13. (C) The meeting ended with Parant and DAS Fitzgerald
promising to keep in close contact over Guinea.


14. (U) DAS Fitzgerald has cleared this message.


15. (U) Conakry and Tripoli minimize considered.
PEKALA