GUINEA: AMBASSADOR MOLLER'S CONSULTATIONS IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 001465 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2019 TAGS: PREL PINS PINR KDEM GV FR SUBJECT: GUINEA: AMBASSADOR MOLLER'S CONSULTATIONS IN PARIS (OCTOBER 29-30) Classified By: Andrew Young, Political Counselor, 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: French officials generally agreed with U.S. Ambassador to Guinea Patricia Moller on the need for the international community to develop a visible process or framework on Guinea that could lead to a transition to a democratic government, with Burkina Faso President Campaore's intervention a possible vehicle for forming such a process. Presidential Africa Advisor Andre Parant plans to travel to Ouagadougou for meetings with Campaore on November 2, where Parant will offer France's support. While agreeing that junta leader Dadis Camara had to be removed from power, they believed that Dadis could be part of the solution to the problem if handled properly through the right combination of "carrots and sticks." The French were encouraged by the African Union's October 29 decision to take a firm stance on Guinea, and they believed that the AU, following ECOWAS's lead, could play a useful role in resolving the crisis in Guinea. Once the transition process gains traction, France is prepared to commit resources and expertise, especially for reforming Guinea's military. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) U.S. Ambassador to Guinea Patricia Moller, met, separately, with MFA AF A/S-equivalent Stephane Gompertz and Presidential Africa Advisor Remi Marechaux on October 30, following her meeting on October 29 with MOD Africa Analyst Jerome Spinoza. AF-watcher attended the meeting with Marechaux; AF-assistant attended the meetings with Gompertz and Spinoza. MFA Guinea desk officer Ann'laure Hare attended the meeting with Gompertz. Meeting with Gompertz (MFA) -------------- ¶3. (C) Gompertz began by asking what Ambassador Moller planned to do concerning her credentials. She replied that she would not present her credentials to the Dadis government and, if pressed, would say that she would do so only when a democratically-elected government was in place in Conakry. Gompertz explained that France's recently arrived Ambassador (Jean Graebling) had similarly refused to present his credentials. The CNDD Foreign Minister informed Graebling that, as a result, Graelbing would have no access to regime officials. Gompertz observed that Ambassadors Graebling and Moller would be in similar situations. He and Ambassador Moller looked forward to close working relations between the Ambassadors Graebling and Moller in Conakry. ¶4. (C) Gompertz noted the AU's October 29 communique on Guinea, which he deemed very helpful. He commented on EU efforts to develop travel bans and asset freezes. Ambassador Moller said the USG was taking similar steps. ¶5. (C) On the broader issue of next steps, Ambassador Moller stressed ultimate priority of avoiding a melt-down in Guinea, with which Gompertz agreed. To accomplish that, Ambassador Moller said that it was imperative for the international community to establish a process or framework -- the more visible the better -- to show that there was a serious commitment on moving Guinea away from the abyss and towards an acceptable democratic transition, which could be centered on African institutions such as the AU or ECOWAS, with the support and participation of other members of the international community. ¶6. (C) Gompertz agreed, and he said that Burkina Faso President Campaore, who had already taken up a mediator's role, could be the focus of such an effort. Gompertz said that Presidential AF-advisor Andre Parant was going to Burkina Faso and would meet with Campaore on November 2, to discuss Guinea as a first priority, and also Niger. Gompertz indicated that Parant would try to encourage movement on Campaore's part, although Gompertz noted Campaore's preference to move deliberately. He also mentioned that Campaore had personal economic interests in Guinea (as he had in many other African countries) that would be a factor in his decision-making. Gompertz encouraged the U.S. to talk to Campaore. ¶7. (C) Gompertz, while harboring no illusions about Dadis (describing his as "dangerous" and "insane") nonetheless believed that Dadis should be part of the solution and not simply isolated and scorned. He needed to be offered an exit or a way out. Gompertz mused on the possibility that Morocco (where the junta has cached much of its wealth) or Libya could serve as points of exile, although Ambassador Moller indicated that Morocco had signaled that it was not interested in hosting an exiled Dadis. Gompertz said that other factors to be considered were the danger of civil war (the Forestiers had to be reassured that Dadis's departure did not signal a return to Peul or Malinke dominance over the Forestiers) and the need to accommodate Guinea's military. Gompertz observed that a transition to a democratic government was essential, in order to avoid a "melt down" or else a drift into a Zimbabwe-like state, which would be hardly any better. ¶8. (C) Asked about the departure of French citizens from Guinea, Gompertz said that about 500 of 1,800 had left following the GOF's public suggestion that citizens leave voluntarily rather than wait for a possible evacuation under emergency conditions. He noted that of the remainder, many were dual nationals or long-term residents not inclined to leave in any case. Gompertz said that the suggestion to leave was more anticipatory in nature and to prepare for the worst, not an indication that conditions were at an extreme. (Marechaux claimed that about 800 French, out of 2,300, had departed, and that there were an estimated 600 known dual nationals who would likely never leave. He also verified that the GOF-supported school in Conakry would remain closed until an acceptable transition government was in place.) Meeting with Marechaux (Presidency) -------------- ¶9. (C) Presidential Africa Advisor, Remi Marechaux, who will travel with Parant to Ouagadougou, echoed many of the points made by Gompertz. In particular, he noted that it was important to support Campaore and allow him to lead, even though there would be frustrations that Campaore wanted to "maintain leeway" and that the mediation would happen "on African time." Part of the problem was that Campaore relies on only 5-6 advisors to assist with all his mediations, including for Togo and Cote d'Ivoire, and that even FM Yoda could not speak authoritatively on Campaore's thinking. ¶10. (C) In Marechaux's opinion, Campaore was "scared by the strength of the international community's strength of reaction" to the September 28 violence. Therefore, Marechaux said that in Ouagadougou, Parant would make clear that France would support Campaore, if requested, on delivering demarches, providing ideas on the way forward, and even helping with travel or other logistic requirements. Marechaux agreed with Ambassador Moller that it is important to get some visibility on a specific transition plan soon, but described the situation as still in the "threat stage," and that "we still have 2-3 weeks before we need to be greatly concerned about a lack of progress." ¶11. (C) Marechaux described the sanctions and UN Commission of Inquiry as "tools" that should not be confused with the international community's "goals." In creating the sanctions list, there was a vibrant debate within the GOF, with some wanting the sanctions to be more targeted to "destabilize" the junta. Now that the list is, in the end, quite inclusive, it needs to remain dynamic so that those listed understanding there is the option of being removed from the list if they depart the junta and help the transition process -- a process that leads to the removal of Dadis. ¶12. (C) Parant will also discuss with Campaore the question of what to do with Dadis, reminding Campaore that he needs to reach out to countries who might accept the junta leader should he step down. France also wants Campaore to consider how to avoid the possibility of an International Criminal Court (ICC) case against Dadis, which, Marechaux added, would be a disincentive for the junta to agree to give up power. Marachaux speculated that perhaps some kind of in-country court could be established which, in the end, would allow Dadis and others a way to be relocated. ¶13. (C) Another critical step raised by Marechaux is to plan for some kind of international observer force, noting the effectiveness of 50 or so ECOWAS troops who helped during Togo's 2007 elections by assuring that military forces stayed in their barracks and by conducting joint patrols with Togo's police and gendarmes. In Marechaux's opinion, it would be difficult for Guinean authorities to refuse a similar ECOWAS plan. However, a large intervention force was not realistic. ¶14. (C) Marechaux stated that reforming the military needed to be included in the transition plan, and that the U.S. and France needed to work together on this. He asserted that the majority of Guinea's military was not implicated in the September 28 attacks, and that Guinea's gendarme force had performed well. Dadis may have recruited up to 2,500 fighters from Liberia, but the Guinean forces loyal to the junta numbered only about 2,000. This left a significant military to work with. Marechaux raised the idea of possibly training Guinean troops for UN peacekeeping duty, effectively reducing the influence of the military in Guinea. Ambassador Moller remarked that peacekeeping training and deployment had been a successful strategy in Burundi. Meeting with Spinoza (MOD) -------------- ¶15. (C) Jerome Spinoza at the MOD's Strategic Affairs Delegation, befitting his position as an analyst, offered a broader, less operational view of Guinea during his October 29 meeting with Ambassador Moller. Of the three interlocutors, he was the one who most directly counseled against demonizing and isolating Dadis. He too shared no illusions about Dadis but he thought that Dadis was more reasonable and susceptible to persuasion than others might think, even if only at the level of self-interest. He believed that Dadis should be part of any process to end the junta's control of Guinea and to move to a more acceptable government. Spinoza agreed with Ambassador Moller's views on the need to establish a process for channeling Guinea in the right direction and the need to avoid a complete collapse in Guinea, which would be bad for Guinea and disastrous for the region, which was grappling with recoveries in in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Cote d'Ivoire. Spinoza acknowledged that some of his colleagues considered him "pro-junta," but he said that this was only because he believed one had to work with the junta rather than isolate it or back it into a corner where its only choice might be aggression. COMMENT -------------- ¶16. (C) The French clearly welcomed the opportunity to consult with Ambassador Moller and we expect she will a close and collaborative relationship with the French in Conakry. More importantly, in each of her discussions, French agreement on the need for a visible international process strengthened, with a focus on Campaore's initiative. END COMMENT. ¶17. (U) Ambassador Moller has cleared this message. ¶18. (U) Conakry minimize considered. RIVKIN