FRANCE WELCOMES NEW U.S. SUDAN STRATEGY, WANTS TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001464 SIPDIS DEPT FOR S/USSES:OCLARK AND EUR/WE ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2029 TAGS: PGOV PREL SU FR SUBJECT: FRANCE WELCOMES NEW U.S. SUDAN STRATEGY, WANTS TO WORK TOGETHER REF: STATE 109669 Classified By: Andrew Young, Political Counselor, reason 1.4 (b and d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: France's assessment of the new U.S. Sudan strategy is positive, viewing it as a more "holistic" approach to Sudan's many challenges, according to the MFA's Desk Officer for Sudan. France appreciates the U.S. willingness to engage with a broad range of interlocutors and partners and is ready to work closely with us. At the same time, France is not ready to describe the current situation in Darfur as genocide, and is skeptical of both the Doha process (especially without Abdulwahid el-Nur's participation) and of the AU/Mbeki panel's recommendations. With Bashir's Darfur advisor Dr. Ghazi Salahuddin Atabani coming to Paris in November, France hopes to improve its dialog with Khartoum. END SUMMARY. FRANCE SUPPORTS THE NEW POLICY; WILL WORK WITH US -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Having previously shared reftel information to allow a GOF inter-ministerial review, AF-Watcher met on October 29 with MFA Sudan Desk officer Thierry Caboche, who, while admitting that there was not yet a final inter-ministerial response, stated that the new U.S. Sudan strategy was welcome, and that he did not anticipate any "critique or difficulty" within the GOF. Caboche, who frequently participates in Sudan-related International Contact Group meetings (including last May in London) and conference calls, stated that there was nothing surprising in the U.S. policy statement, but that a "return to a more holistic approach" was a positive step and one that France could fully engage on. He added that the MFA appreciates our willingness to engage in a "sustained and broad" manner, and to include "international actors." Caboche stated that France would welcome a closer dialogue with the U.S., citing what he perceived as a more effective and close coordination between then-U.S. Special Envoy Williamson, France, and the UK in 2007-2008. ¶3. (C) Caboche also underscored the importance of Washington's willingness to engage with Khartoum as a key to resolving the various challenges outlined in our policy. In addition, France is trying to "establish a better dialogue" with Khartoum, with whom the current relationship is "very difficult." Advisor to President Bashir Dr. Ghazi Salahuddin Atabani will come to Paris in November, which will be the first high-level dialog since meetings with the former Presidential Advisor on Darfur Dr. Nafie Ali Nafie in April, which, according to Caboche, did not go well. Despite France's desire for improved relations with the National Congress Party (NCP),Caboche said he could not envision difficulties between the U.S. and France should the need arise for "disincentives" and "pressure." POSSIBLE AREAS OF DIVERGENCE: Genocide label, Doha process, and the Mbeki panel recommendations -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) While the overall assessment of the new U.S. Sudan policy is positive, Caboche identified three areas where Paris could diverge somewhat from Washington, noting, however, that France has already highlighted these through the ICG. First, France is not prepared to describe the situation in Darfur as "on-going genocide," though France "understands the pressures within the United States" that influence this term for Washington policy makers. Second, France believes the Doha process is important, though the follow-on steps are not yet clear. In particular, even if PARIS 00001464 002 OF 002 there is success in bringing all the Darfuri groups together, there will still be problems in confirming who can speak for the group, who can take up negotiations with the government. Similarly, France sees value in ensuring that Abdulwahid el-Nur is included. Caboche described Abdulwahid as "out of his mind" and marginalized, but though his influence is limited, it is still important, particularly among displaced Darfuri youth. Therefore, Abdulwahid could still play the role of "spoiler" if an accord is signed without him. Third, France maintains doubts about Thabo Mbeki and the African Union's (AU) High-Level Panel on Darfur, even though France's Ambassador to Addis Ababa (and the AU) attended the meeting in Abuja. The hybrid courts idea is problematic. They would be expensive, difficult to organize, and face many legal hurdles. The panel's recommendations could also hurt progress on implementation of the CPA, according to Caboche. COMMENT -------------- ¶5. (C) It is clear that France wants to work closely with the U.S. in refining and implementing our new policy. At the same time, Sudan represents one of France's major African foreign policy forays outside of the Francophone world and it wants to be influential -- a reflection of Sarkozy's much-hyped move towards a more strategic approach to the continent. Sudan also serves as a gateway to Chad, C.A.R., and other francophone countries to Sudan's west and south, and the French would very much like to prevent Sudan's problems, and those of its eastern neighbors, from spreading further west and south. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. RIVKIN