Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09PARIS1464
2009-10-30 14:24:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:
FRANCE WELCOMES NEW U.S. SUDAN STRATEGY, WANTS TO
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001464
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR S/USSES:OCLARK AND EUR/WE
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2029
TAGS: PGOV PREL SU FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE WELCOMES NEW U.S. SUDAN STRATEGY, WANTS TO
WORK TOGETHER
REF: STATE 109669
Classified By: Andrew Young, Political Counselor, reason 1.4 (b and d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001464
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR S/USSES:OCLARK AND EUR/WE
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2029
TAGS: PGOV PREL SU FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE WELCOMES NEW U.S. SUDAN STRATEGY, WANTS TO
WORK TOGETHER
REF: STATE 109669
Classified By: Andrew Young, Political Counselor, reason 1.4 (b and d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: France's assessment of the new U.S. Sudan
strategy is positive, viewing it as a more "holistic"
approach to Sudan's many challenges, according to the MFA's
Desk Officer for Sudan. France appreciates the U.S.
willingness to engage with a broad range of interlocutors and
partners and is ready to work closely with us. At the same
time, France is not ready to describe the current situation
in Darfur as genocide, and is skeptical of both the Doha
process (especially without Abdulwahid el-Nur's
participation) and of the AU/Mbeki panel's recommendations.
With Bashir's Darfur advisor Dr. Ghazi Salahuddin Atabani
coming to Paris in November, France hopes to improve its
dialog with Khartoum. END SUMMARY.
FRANCE SUPPORTS THE NEW POLICY; WILL WORK WITH US
-------------- --------------
2. (C) Having previously shared reftel information to allow
a GOF inter-ministerial review, AF-Watcher met on October 29
with MFA Sudan Desk officer Thierry Caboche, who, while
admitting that there was not yet a final inter-ministerial
response, stated that the new U.S. Sudan strategy was
welcome, and that he did not anticipate any "critique or
difficulty" within the GOF. Caboche, who frequently
participates in Sudan-related International Contact Group
meetings (including last May in London) and conference calls,
stated that there was nothing surprising in the U.S. policy
statement, but that a "return to a more holistic approach"
was a positive step and one that France could fully engage
on. He added that the MFA appreciates our willingness to
engage in a "sustained and broad" manner, and to include
"international actors." Caboche stated that France would
welcome a closer dialogue with the U.S., citing what he
perceived as a more effective and close coordination between
then-U.S. Special Envoy Williamson, France, and the UK in
2007-2008.
3. (C) Caboche also underscored the importance of
Washington's willingness to engage with Khartoum as a key to
resolving the various challenges outlined in our policy. In
addition, France is trying to "establish a better dialogue"
with Khartoum, with whom the current relationship is "very
difficult." Advisor to President Bashir Dr. Ghazi Salahuddin
Atabani will come to Paris in November, which will be the
first high-level dialog since meetings with the former
Presidential Advisor on Darfur Dr. Nafie Ali Nafie in April,
which, according to Caboche, did not go well. Despite
France's desire for improved relations with the National
Congress Party (NCP),Caboche said he could not envision
difficulties between the U.S. and France should the need
arise for "disincentives" and "pressure."
POSSIBLE AREAS OF DIVERGENCE: Genocide label, Doha process,
and the Mbeki panel recommendations
-------------- --------------
4. (C) While the overall assessment of the new U.S. Sudan
policy is positive, Caboche identified three areas where
Paris could diverge somewhat from Washington, noting,
however, that France has already highlighted these through
the ICG. First, France is not prepared to describe the
situation in Darfur as "on-going genocide," though France
"understands the pressures within the United States" that
influence this term for Washington policy makers. Second,
France believes the Doha process is important, though the
follow-on steps are not yet clear. In particular, even if
PARIS 00001464 002 OF 002
there is success in bringing all the Darfuri groups together,
there will still be problems in confirming who can speak for
the group, who can take up negotiations with the government.
Similarly, France sees value in ensuring that Abdulwahid
el-Nur is included. Caboche described Abdulwahid as "out of
his mind" and marginalized, but though his influence is
limited, it is still important, particularly among displaced
Darfuri youth. Therefore, Abdulwahid could still play the
role of "spoiler" if an accord is signed without him. Third,
France maintains doubts about Thabo Mbeki and the African
Union's (AU) High-Level Panel on Darfur, even though France's
Ambassador to Addis Ababa (and the AU) attended the meeting
in Abuja. The hybrid courts idea is problematic. They would
be expensive, difficult to organize, and face many legal
hurdles. The panel's recommendations could also hurt
progress on implementation of the CPA, according to Caboche.
COMMENT
--------------
5. (C) It is clear that France wants to work closely with
the U.S. in refining and implementing our new policy. At the
same time, Sudan represents one of France's major African
foreign policy forays outside of the Francophone world and it
wants to be influential -- a reflection of Sarkozy's
much-hyped move towards a more strategic approach to the
continent. Sudan also serves as a gateway to Chad, C.A.R.,
and other francophone countries to Sudan's west and south,
and the French would very much like to prevent Sudan's
problems, and those of its eastern neighbors, from spreading
further west and south.
MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
RIVKIN
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR S/USSES:OCLARK AND EUR/WE
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2029
TAGS: PGOV PREL SU FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE WELCOMES NEW U.S. SUDAN STRATEGY, WANTS TO
WORK TOGETHER
REF: STATE 109669
Classified By: Andrew Young, Political Counselor, reason 1.4 (b and d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: France's assessment of the new U.S. Sudan
strategy is positive, viewing it as a more "holistic"
approach to Sudan's many challenges, according to the MFA's
Desk Officer for Sudan. France appreciates the U.S.
willingness to engage with a broad range of interlocutors and
partners and is ready to work closely with us. At the same
time, France is not ready to describe the current situation
in Darfur as genocide, and is skeptical of both the Doha
process (especially without Abdulwahid el-Nur's
participation) and of the AU/Mbeki panel's recommendations.
With Bashir's Darfur advisor Dr. Ghazi Salahuddin Atabani
coming to Paris in November, France hopes to improve its
dialog with Khartoum. END SUMMARY.
FRANCE SUPPORTS THE NEW POLICY; WILL WORK WITH US
-------------- --------------
2. (C) Having previously shared reftel information to allow
a GOF inter-ministerial review, AF-Watcher met on October 29
with MFA Sudan Desk officer Thierry Caboche, who, while
admitting that there was not yet a final inter-ministerial
response, stated that the new U.S. Sudan strategy was
welcome, and that he did not anticipate any "critique or
difficulty" within the GOF. Caboche, who frequently
participates in Sudan-related International Contact Group
meetings (including last May in London) and conference calls,
stated that there was nothing surprising in the U.S. policy
statement, but that a "return to a more holistic approach"
was a positive step and one that France could fully engage
on. He added that the MFA appreciates our willingness to
engage in a "sustained and broad" manner, and to include
"international actors." Caboche stated that France would
welcome a closer dialogue with the U.S., citing what he
perceived as a more effective and close coordination between
then-U.S. Special Envoy Williamson, France, and the UK in
2007-2008.
3. (C) Caboche also underscored the importance of
Washington's willingness to engage with Khartoum as a key to
resolving the various challenges outlined in our policy. In
addition, France is trying to "establish a better dialogue"
with Khartoum, with whom the current relationship is "very
difficult." Advisor to President Bashir Dr. Ghazi Salahuddin
Atabani will come to Paris in November, which will be the
first high-level dialog since meetings with the former
Presidential Advisor on Darfur Dr. Nafie Ali Nafie in April,
which, according to Caboche, did not go well. Despite
France's desire for improved relations with the National
Congress Party (NCP),Caboche said he could not envision
difficulties between the U.S. and France should the need
arise for "disincentives" and "pressure."
POSSIBLE AREAS OF DIVERGENCE: Genocide label, Doha process,
and the Mbeki panel recommendations
-------------- --------------
4. (C) While the overall assessment of the new U.S. Sudan
policy is positive, Caboche identified three areas where
Paris could diverge somewhat from Washington, noting,
however, that France has already highlighted these through
the ICG. First, France is not prepared to describe the
situation in Darfur as "on-going genocide," though France
"understands the pressures within the United States" that
influence this term for Washington policy makers. Second,
France believes the Doha process is important, though the
follow-on steps are not yet clear. In particular, even if
PARIS 00001464 002 OF 002
there is success in bringing all the Darfuri groups together,
there will still be problems in confirming who can speak for
the group, who can take up negotiations with the government.
Similarly, France sees value in ensuring that Abdulwahid
el-Nur is included. Caboche described Abdulwahid as "out of
his mind" and marginalized, but though his influence is
limited, it is still important, particularly among displaced
Darfuri youth. Therefore, Abdulwahid could still play the
role of "spoiler" if an accord is signed without him. Third,
France maintains doubts about Thabo Mbeki and the African
Union's (AU) High-Level Panel on Darfur, even though France's
Ambassador to Addis Ababa (and the AU) attended the meeting
in Abuja. The hybrid courts idea is problematic. They would
be expensive, difficult to organize, and face many legal
hurdles. The panel's recommendations could also hurt
progress on implementation of the CPA, according to Caboche.
COMMENT
--------------
5. (C) It is clear that France wants to work closely with
the U.S. in refining and implementing our new policy. At the
same time, Sudan represents one of France's major African
foreign policy forays outside of the Francophone world and it
wants to be influential -- a reflection of Sarkozy's
much-hyped move towards a more strategic approach to the
continent. Sudan also serves as a gateway to Chad, C.A.R.,
and other francophone countries to Sudan's west and south,
and the French would very much like to prevent Sudan's
problems, and those of its eastern neighbors, from spreading
further west and south.
MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
RIVKIN