MUSLIM-JEWISH RELATIONS IN FRANCE FOLLOWING GAZA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 001442 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL FR SUBJECT: MUSLIM-JEWISH RELATIONS IN FRANCE FOLLOWING GAZA WAR Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathy Allegrone, Reasons 1. 4(b),(d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: During a series of recent meetings, French officials responsible for developing and implementing GOF policy toward organized religion told poloff that the January 2009 conflict in Gaza continues to strain institutional and communal relations between France's two largest religious minorities, Muslims and Jews. The past and present Directors of the Interior Ministry's (MoI) Central Office of Religions reported that political developments in the Middle East function as a "centrifugal force" pulling apart two major religious communities in France. Although the Gaza fighting no longer impinges upon the daily life of the vast majority of members of both religious groups, and contact between rabbis and imams continues at the local level, French officials in the MoI and MFA characterized relations between Muslim and Jewish leaders in France as tense since January 2009. ¶2. (C) COMMENT: Widespread media attention to the Goldstone Report appears to have prolonged the impact in France of the conflict in Gaza. French officials responsible for GOF policy toward organized religion seem to be focused on the external sources of tension between Muslims and Jews in France; during a series of meetings, they made little mention, and offered scant information, about homegrown factors that might be contributing to inter-religious tension in France, such as growing unemployment. Moreover, they appeared to share the general GOF aversion to statistics and surveys, drawing on personal opinions and experiences when describing broad-based conclusions. Post will continue to engage with these and other French officials, and with leaders in both the Muslim and Jewish communities in order to facilitate dialogue and reduce tension. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. ¶3. (U) This cable is the first in a series on the political situation and political influence of religious minorities in France. Future cables will report the perspectives of leaders of minority religious groups and assess their impact on French foreign policy. FORMAL TIES BETWEEN GOF AND FRENCH RELIGIOUS GROUPS -------------- -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The Central Office of Religions in the MoI aims to enforce and implement the laws in France pertinent to organized religion, and to liaise between the government and religious groups, according to Bertrand Gaume, who has served as Director of the Office since April 2008. Bernard Godard, who held the same position from 2002 - 2008, told poloff that officials in the Central Office of Religions also monitor the activities of religious groups in France. In addition, Gaume said, they foster inter-faith dialogue and mediate disputes. This GOF role in religious affairs dates back to the 1905 passage of a law which strictly separated church and state, and which led to the formalization of ties between central state institutions and recognized religious groups, according to Stephane Chmelewsky, the Foreign Minister's Counselor for Religious Affairs at the MFA. The GOF created the Counselor for Religious Affairs at the MFA in 1921, Chmelewsky noted, after France re-established diplomatic relations with the Vatican, which had deteriorated following the passage of the 1905 law. Then, in a significant new development, the MFA created on June 1, 2009 a "Religions Bureau," reportedly the first in French history, according to head of the Bureau, Joseph Maila. Maila told poloff the Bureau aims to educate and sensitize French government officials on current religious issues outside of France. It focuses on international religious movements and their political implications for France, and it operates independently of Chmelewsky in his capacity as the Minister's Counselor for Religious Affairs. PRE-GAZA PROGRESS -------------- ¶5. (C) In their role as facilitators of inter-faith dialogue, MoI officials have worked closely with the official leaders of France's Muslim and Jewish communities. In recent years, according to both Godard and Gaume, they had progressively brought the groups closer together, culminating in an unprecedented meeting in the autumn of 2008 between the leaders of the two largest minority religious organizations in France, the Representative Council of Jewish Institutions in France (CRIF, founded in 1943) and the French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM, founded in 2003). Andre David Azoulay, Royal Counselor to Moroccan King Mohammed VI, facilitated this meeting, the first of its kind since the founding of CFCM. The MoI planned to organize further such PARIS 00001442 002 OF 003 exchanges. (NOTE: Andre Azoulay has served as Royal Counselor to King Mohammed VI since 1999. He is the most senior Jewish official in the Moroccan Government and has traditionally served as the Palace's link with the Moroccan Jewish Community. END NOTE.) BREAKDOWN DURING GAZA CONFLICT -------------- ¶6. (C) Then the January fighting in Gaza led to the rupture of contact between these leaders of the Muslim and Jewish communities in France, according to Gaume and Godard. Then-Minister of the Interior Michele Alliot-Marie facilitated a single meeting, on January 5, between the presidents of CRIF and CFCM, during which both presidents called for calm and urged French citizens to avoid transposing tensions from the Middle East into France. Soon, however, in public and in private, "very angry words were exchanged by the leaders of CRIF and CFCM," Gaume said. CFCM leaders referred to the war in Gaza as "a genocide without precedent." The Union of Islamic Organizations in France (UOIF, founded in 1983) -- which, according to Gaume and Godard, maintains ties to the Muslim Brotherhood in various countries -- also significantly hardened its rhetoric during the war. Before January 2009, Godard said, the UOIF had generally adopted a moderate, cautious approach to political developments in France and the Middle East; during the war, its leaders began to declare their support for Hamas more clearly and assertively than ever before. At the same time, Chmelewsky reported, leaders of CRIF told GOF officials that they were surprised by the size and the intensity of public protests against Israel during the war. They believed some protesters linked Israel's actions to the Jewish community in France, and so they began to feel vulnerable, Chmelewsky reported. POST-GAZA PARALYSIS -------------- ¶7. (C) Since the war in Gaza, Gaume said, it has been impossible to facilitate dialogue between the leaders of CFCM and CRIF. "Gaza has had huge consequences for the Muslim and Jewish communities," he declared. Godard described a "radicalized discourse" among UOIF and other Muslim leaders following the war. The violent images circulating on the internet had a chilling effect, he explained; people in both religious communities became more sensitive and more cautious in their interactions with each other. "This has not yet changed," he noted. For Chmelewsky at the MFA, the war in Gaza demonstrated that dialogue among Jews and Muslims in France "is guided by developments in the Near East." The "primary obstacle" to improving relations between the two communities is not in France, but international politics. FRENCH OFFICIALS SHARE BROADER REFLECTIONS -------------- ¶8. (C) Indeed, Gaume described Middle East politics as a "centrifugal force" pulling apart the Muslim and Jewish communities in France. Joseph Maila of the new "Religions Bureau" in the MFA agreed with this conclusion. Maila confirmed that tensions between Muslim and Jewish leaders in France have reached high levels this year, as described by other GOF officials, but he declined to discuss the details or sources of the tension. (NOTE: Maila explained that his role is to educate and advise French diplomats, rather than to conduct any form of "religious diplomacy" within France. END NOTE.) More broadly, Godard claimed to have witnessed a shift toward the hardline perception of the Middle East conflict among leaders in both religions. Not only have CFCM and UOIF adopted the position of more severe Muslim critics of Israel, he said, but CRIF has also changed: its leaders used to agree most often with the Labor Party in Israel; now, their positions hue more closely to those of Likud. Regardless of their views about Israel's policies, Chmelewsky argued, Jews in France have a sense that an organized effort to influence French policy toward the Middle East will not have the same impact as that of the pro-Israel lobby in the U.S. on American policy toward the region. CONTACTS CONTINUE AT LOCAL LEVEL -------------- ¶9. (C) Despite continuing tensions and lack of dialogue at the level of national leaders, rabbis and imams are "always in touch" at the local level, according to Gaume. (NOTE: Post's Public Affairs section has observed growing contact among Jewish, Muslim and Catholic religious leaders, including in local communities, prisons, and the military. END NOTE.) Gaume said he learned about these contacts during visits to religious groups around the country in 2009: "We PARIS 00001442 003 OF 003 (at the MoI) must get out and see what's happening. We are involved in politics, after all." He also said he has learned that many Jewish leaders in France want to re-commence dialogue with Muslim leaders, but it is not possible at the moment, because of the lingering, divisive impact of the war in Gaza. RIVKIN