Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09PARIS1393
2009-10-14 16:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

FRENCH MFA ON RUSSIA, BOSNIA, KARABAKH, KAZAKHSTAN

Tags:  PREL PGOV RS BK KZ AM AJ FR 
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VZCZCXYZ0010
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHFR #1393/01 2871635
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 141635Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7360
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 001393 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV RS BK KZ AM AJ FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH MFA ON RUSSIA, BOSNIA, KARABAKH, KAZAKHSTAN

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathy Allegrone,
Reasons 1.4(b),(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 001393

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV RS BK KZ AM AJ FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH MFA ON RUSSIA, BOSNIA, KARABAKH, KAZAKHSTAN

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathy Allegrone,
Reasons 1.4(b),(d).


1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: The Government of France is
"reflecting" on ways to improve the strategic relationship
between Russia and the West, and may consider the potential
value of entering into new negotiations on the Conventional
Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, according to Roland
Galharague, French MFA Assistant Secretary-equivalent for
Continental Europe. Galharague told Political Minister
Counselor October 9 that Europeans have come to acknowledge
the continuing importance of conventional forces. He argued
that accepting the Russian request to re-negotiate the Treaty
could also be of use to the U.S. Switching to Bosnia,
Galharague described as a "good idea" the USG initiative to
propose a comprehensive transition package. He inquired
whether the USG has developed views on the criteria for
successful implementation of the proposals, or whether we
have determined the minimum we will accept as constituting
success, and he argued that the USG and EU must determine
what steps to take if the plan fails. Moving on to the
Caucuses, Galharague said it is "urgent" to reassure the
Azerbaijanis that USG and EU support for Armenian-Turkish
normalization in no way diminishes our support for
Azerbaijani-Armenian negotiations over the future of the
Nagorno-Karabakh region. When Political Minister Counselor
reported that President Sarkozy's October 6 comments in
Astana -- proposing that Kazakhstan play a role in resolving
regional disputes -- came as a surprise to the USG,
Galharague replied, "Yes, they also came as a surprise to us
(in the MFA)."


2. (C) COMMENT: French officials in both the MFA and Elysee
have informed us that they are open to considering a number
of proposals to improve the overall strategic relationship
between Russia and the West, given the many complicated
issues that are inter-related (such as CFE, European security
architecture, frozen conflicts, etc). To our knowledge,
Galharague's comments on CFE do not yet indicate a French
policy change towards Russia, but rather reflect the French
desire to think creatively about how they can play an active
role in addressing some thorny issues before additional
unfavorable Russian actions occur. More broadly, French
officials are attempting to determine the ways in which
Russia can realistically serve as a partner for France,
Europe and the U.S. -- and they are operating under pressure
from their demanding President, who is impatient with
bureaucratic processes and favors quick action. Guidance on
any of the below would be welcome as we seek to make the U.S.

position clear as early in the French decision-making process
as possible. Additional comments from Damien Loras, advisor
to President Sarkozy, on current brainstorming within the
President's office, will be reported separately. END SUMMARY
AND COMMENT.

RUSSIA
--------------


3. (C) Conveying an apparent shift in French policy, Roland
Galharague told Political Minister Counselor October 9 that
the French now want to "reflect" on the possibility of
accepting the Russian proposal to launch new negotiations on
the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, following the
Russian suspension of their participation in the CFE in 2007.
Galharague argued that the USG stands to benefit from
re-negotiating the Treaty because we could show our
commitment to multilateralism, and, at the same time,
demonstrate our tough approach toward Russia on issues of
substance. The Russians themselves have an interest in the
negotiations, Galharague claimed, because they have military
equipment to sell or discard. The Europeans are interested
in addressing the Treaty, he reported, because recent events,
such as the 2008 war in Georgia, have underscored the
continuing importance of conventional forces. Everyone
stands to benefit, he claimed.


4. (C) Galharague also recalled that historically the USG,
on the one hand, and the French and the Europeans, on the
other, developed different opinions as to the best approach
to negotiating the CFE. U.S. officials saw it as a Treaty
between two alliances (NATO and the Warsaw Pact),whereas the
French preferred to negotiate an agreement among states. Now
some states interested in the Treaty are in the EU or NATO,
or both, while others are not, Galharague observed. Thus the
French believe the role of conventional forces in Europe
could best be addressed region by region, leaving the most
controversial areas until the end (i.e. the Caucuses).
Moreover, Galharague argued that the continued Russian
presence in the break-away regions of Georgia should not pose
an impediment to launching negotiations. In 1990, he noted,
negotiations took place even while Turkey had troops in
northern Cyprus and British troops had a major presence in
Northern Ireland.

BOSNIA
--------------


5. (C) In order to make progress in Bosnia, the USG and EU
must communicate clearly and coordinate closely, according to
Galharague. He described as a "good idea" the USG initiative
to propose a comprehensive package for Bosnia, including 5
plus 2 conditions and constitutional reform. "But we must
make sure the terms are clear on all sides," he warned. He
asked if the USG had developed views on the criteria for
successful implementation of the proposals, or whether we
have determined the minimum we will accept as constituting
success. "These are not technical questions," he said. "We
need political reflection about measures of success." And,
crucially, he argued that the USG and EU must determine what
steps to take if the plan fails. He added that the French
remain unclear as to the USG view of these questions because
"the American position is not very defined."


6. (C) Galharague also stressed that the USG and the EU must
be clear on the objectives of the package, specifically
transition, as soon as possible. If, for instance, the Peace
Implementation Council (PIC) does not close the Office of the
High Representative by its November meeting, the closure will
likely have to wait until 2011, due to the Bosnian elections
of 2010. "We're not interested in transition for
transition's sake," Galharague explained; transition will
help Bosnia to stabilize and to move toward EU and NATO
accession. Nor do the French seek "constitutional reform for
reform's sake;" the EU will support reforms that strengthen
the state and improve its effectiveness. The four European
members of the Quint agree with these positions, according to
Galharague, but there is not consensus throughout the EU.
Nonetheless, he added, the incentives for progress are in the
hands of the Europeans. Thus European states on the PIC
steering board must be in agreement about the objectives and
means required for progress.

NAGORNO-KARABAKH
--------------


7. (C) "We have no illusions about Nagorno-Karabakh,"
Galharague said, implying the French are pessimistic about
the likelihood of resolving the decades-old dispute. It is
"urgent," nonetheless, he argued, to reassure the
Azerbaijanis that USG and EU support for Armenian-Turkish
normalization in no way diminishes our support for
Azerbaijani-Armenian negotiations over the future of the
Nagorno-Karabakh region. Galharague proposed that the USG
and the GOF issue a joint message to the Azerbaijanis
conveying our full support. In addition, he suggested that
the Minsk Group issue a new, joint declaration containing
three main elements: (1) we congratulate the Armenians and
the Turks on their normalization process; (2) we believe the
Nagrno-Karabakh process will help stabilize the region; (3)
we will stay engaged.

KAZAKHSTAN
--------------


8. (C) When Political Minister Counselor reported that
President Sarkozy's October 6 comments in Astana --
encouraging Kazakhstan to play a role in resolving regional
conflicts in Nagorno Karabakh, Abkhazia and Ossetia, and
suggesting that Kazakhstan host a summit during its OSCE
chairmanship to address European security issues -- came as a
surprise to the USG, Galharague replied dryly, "Yes, they
also came as a surprise to us (in the MFA)."
RIVKIN

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