GUINEA: MFA PROVIDES OVERVIEW TO DIPLOMATIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 001369 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2019 TAGS: PREL PHUM KDEM PINS GV FR SUBJECT: GUINEA: MFA PROVIDES OVERVIEW TO DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY Classified By: Andrew Young, Political Counselor, 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The MFA provided on October 8 a briefing on Guinea to Paris diplomats, stressing the need for Dadis Camara to step down or otherwise be replaced as Guinea's leader, with elections to follow. French officials said that any military intervention force would have to be led by Africans. They expressed fear that Guinea could continue to deteriorate and eventually sink into civil war, possibly based on ethnic divisions. MFA briefers strongly and unequivocally condemned the Dadis regime for its human rights abuses and its refusal to speak the truth to its own people. The French said they would explore with European and other international partners sanctions and other forms of pressure that could be applied to the junta. The MFA officials said the GOF was quietly encouraging French in Guinea to leave voluntarily. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) The French MFA on October 8 provided a briefing on Guinea to invited members of the Paris diplomatic corps, with about two dozens representatives attending, most from EU member states. The briefing took place in the MFA's Crisis Center, a relatively new MFA office akin to the Department's Operations Center. Visiting S/ES-O Director Stephanie Sullivan and Lieutenant Colonel Paul Matier, Air Force secondee to the Ops Center, also attended the meeting. DADIS IS RESPONSIBLE ¶3. (C) Crisis Center Director Serge Mostura and MFA AF PDAS Olivier Chambard led the briefing, which began with a description of Dadis Camara's taking power after President Conte's death. Chambard noted the somewhat favorable initial impression Dadis made, which was steadily replaced by an increasingly negative impression, all of which culminated in the September 28 massacre. Chambard described Dadis as "half crazy," although he said the GOF would never say that publicly for fear of retaliation by the junta against French of other foreigners. Those in his entourage were perhaps "less crazy" but also extremely dangerous. Chambard said that Dadis and his Red Beret associates were responsible for the massacre. ¶4. (C) Mostura said that Dadis wanted to send a strong message to the opposition and its Forces Vives umbrella structure and thus unleashed the Red Berets> This personal guard force was largely composed of untrained thuggish "mercenaries," often unemployed or denizens of the drug world, usually sharing Dadis's Forestier ethnic roots. Mostura said that the "official" junta version of the massacre was a complete falsification -- the junta claimed "only" four death by gunshot and 53 "wounded in the panic." The true figures were closer to 150-160 dead (half by gunshot) and over 1, 200 wounded. Many rapes took place in public during the massacre. Dadis naturally denied responsibility. FRENCH MEDICAL TEAM'S OBSERVATIONS ¶5. (C) Soon after the massacre, France sent about a half-dozen medical personal to treat the injured. They worked at Conakry's hospitals, although the junta did not offer much help, once asking that the team leave, which it refused to do. Guinean doctors (drawn from the military) accompanied the French everywhere and told them whom to treat ("this one's going to die, that one will heal on his own, so treat this one"). They were discouraged from talking to the victims. ¶6. (C) Notably, the team reported that none of the victims they saw or were allowed to treat suffered from gunshot wounds and that all of the victims they saw or were allowed to treat were males, even though it was known that there were women at the stadium. All of the patients had been beaten (some severely) but none had been shot. Mostura speculated that the women had been hidden away by the regime or were themselves in hiding at home or at another refuge. One of the pictures displayed during Mostura's presentation showed UPG leader Jean Marie Dore in his hospital bed, the victim of a beating. Mostura mentioned that France had helped opposition leader Cellou Dalein Diallo leave Guinea and come to France for treatment. Diallo suffered "no fatal wounds but was very badly beaten." FRENCH EMBOFF'S OBSERVATIONS ¶7. (C) The briefing continued with comments by French Embassy Conakry's Cultural Affairs Officer, who made two PARIS 00001369 002 OF 003 points. First, he commented on the complete doublespeak employed by the junta and its habit of saying one thing to the Guinean public (generally all lies) and another thing to the international community (also generally all lies). The daily "Dadis Show" on television epitomized this practice. The second point he made concerned women who were at the stadium. He also believed there were either in detention or in hiding. Some had come to the Embassy's medical unit and described their experiences. The French emboff noted that there were few photos of the Red Berets in action at the stadium. This was because during the worst of their atrocities, the public was too panicked to take photos with cell phones and also because the Red Berets confiscated all cell phones from those leaving the stadium. ¶8. (C) The French emboff believed that the Forces Vives (FV) opposition movement was trying to reorganize. He said, however, that those associated with the FV were receiving threatening phone calls. This was the reason for what he described as the relatively soft statement FV issued after the massacre; its second statement, he said, was tougher. Chambard later commented that one of the FV's weaknesses was that it was an umbrella group and not a unified movement of its own. Several of its members were political competitors. Still, it was a player in Guinea. Chambard thought that it would be useful to convey to the FV the need to avoid ethnic conflict. CURRENT STATE OF PLAY ¶8. (C) Chambard said that the FV was overcoming its shock. He noted Burkina Faso's President Compaore's effort to start a negotiation outside Guinea. In Chambard's view, tensions existed within the junta, which he believed was not a united group. The army was not completely in-step with the junta and the gendarmerie even less so. France supported the call for an international investigation of the September 28 incident as well as Compaore's effort, although Chambard stressed that an "investigation will not solve Guinea's problems" and it was hard to tell now whether (and when) Compaore's efforts would bear fruit. ¶9. (C) There was also the nascent call for an outside force to enter Guinea and provide stability. This had yet to be fleshed out, however. Chambard stressed that any such force would have to be African, either under AU or ECOWAS auspices, although it could of course receive the UN's blessing. In response to a question, Chambard said that the question of an "anglophone" or "francophone" intervention was irrelevant. The essential point was that it be African. The EU might be able to help with financing such a mission. Meanwhile, the longer the junta remained unchecked, the more danger it posed. ¶10. (C) Chambard said that the international community could well consider sanctions and other measures to apply to Guinea. France had cut its small military cooperation program (which featured about 10 military who worked with the Guinean military at various training academies). Sanctions would not make the junta step down but could serve as one of a series of pressures. Chambard mentioned targeted sanctions against Guinea's current leadership. ETHNIC CONSIDERATIONS ¶11. (C) Chambard cautioned that the ethnic dimension had to be considered, with the worse case involving a civil war on ethnic lines. The country's main ethnic group were all present in Conakry, but Guinea was the only country in Africa where the Peul ethnic group, present in many other African countries, was the largest ethnic group. They were also the dominant ethnic group economically. If Guinea's other ethnic groups went after the Peul, there could be repercussions in other countries with a significant Peul population. Similarly, Dadis's ethnic group, the Forestier, had related groups in Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire, and he could seek to recruit supporters there. Chambard reiterated that Guinea's problems could well spill over into the broader region, a further reason to work together for change. ¶12. (C) Chambard said France's message was to support these efforts to bring change to Guinea and also to emphasize the dangers that Guinea represented for the region. Mostura said that there was no threat to foreigners in Guinea at present but that this could change quickly, especially given Dadis's claims that he could not control the army. Mostura said that the MFA's Crisis Center valued its exchanges with similar centers in other countries, including the U.S. He indicated PARIS 00001369 003 OF 003 that close contact over Guinea would be in everyone's interest. CITIZENS SERVICES ¶13. (C) Mostura said that France was taking precautionary measures. The French lycee in Conakry would remain closed indefinitely. He said the GOF was quietly encouraging French citizens to leave Guinea voluntarily, with the French offering to assist with temporary deplacements to Dakar. The French were especially encouraging families with children to leave, as "evacuations are much simpler without children." COMMENT ¶14. (C) While the briefing touched on many aspects of the crisis previously known or reported, the briefing itself reinforced the seriousness with which the French are taking the crisis in Guinea, their concern about the danger to the region, and their lack of illusions about Dadis and his regime. The briefing was also the first of its nature that we have attended in the MFA's Crisis Center. Moreover, the French are clearly welcoming close cooperation with all others concerned about events in Guinea and we expect that they will continue to be more than willing to exchange views with us. END COMMENT. RIVKIN