WHY SARKOZY THINKS ENGAGING SYRIA IS WORKING

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000135 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2024 TAGS: FR PGOV PREL SY SUBJECT: WHY SARKOZY THINKS ENGAGING SYRIA IS WORKING REF: DAMASCUS 89 Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathleen H. Allegrone, reas ons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Over the past 12 months, President Sarkozy has portrayed his Syria policy as one of performance-based, carefully benchmarked engagement -- engagement that could be easily halted or reversed in the event of Syrian back-sliding. Although Sarkozy has publicly touted this policy as a success, its performance-based nature appeared less credible after Syrian President Bashar al-Asad conspicuously failed to send an ambassador to Beirut by the end of 2008 and just as conspicuously failed to persuade Hamas to embrace the Egyptian ceasefire plan during the recent Gaza crisis. Nevertheless, President Sarkozy's cell of diplomatic advisors still asserts that engaging Syria has paid off, claims it suffers "no delusions about the nature of the Syrian regime" and predicts that al-Asad will deliver on his promises "because he knows we will stop everything if he does not." Having invested personally in ameliorating relations with Damascus, Sarkozy and his advisors appear anxious to keep Syria in the "win" column even if that means engaging in verbal gymnastics. On the other hand, their readiness to stick with this policy even when progress is not readily apparent reflects their conviction that Syria's successful rehabilitation will set an important precedent for Iran, and that improved relations with Syria will advance French interests on an array of regional interests including Lebanon, the peace process, and stability in Iraq. End summary. Vini, Vidi, Rupturi -------------- ¶2. (S/NF) President Sarkozy and his advisors swept into office in May 2007 determined to break with the broad range of President Chirac's foreign and domestic policies. One area where this "rupture" (the oft-trumpeted theme of Sarkozy's approach) appeared was with respect to Lebanon and Syria. Profoundly convinced that Chirac had lost sight of France's long-term interests due to his intimate personal relationship with the Hariri family, Sarkozy and FM Kouchner steadily dismantled key aspects (excluding the UN Independent International Investigative Commission and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon) of Chirac's Lebanon policy ostensibly to head off a new civil war. The net effect was to distance France from the March 14 movement and improve relations with �A;the Lebanese opposition and Syria. After Syria failed the grade in an initial approach in 2007, Sarkozy put the relationship on ice in December of that year. A second run at engagement gathered steam after the Doha Accord in early 2008 and culminated in Syrian President Bashar al-Asad's visit to Paris in mid-July and Sarkozy's reciprocal visit to Damascus in early September. ¶3. (S/NF) Sarkozy numbers his opening to Syria among his diplomatic successes. He believes it has paid solid dividends, namely: -- Syrian support for conclusion of the Doha Accord; -- Syrian acquiescence to the election of Lebanese President Michel Sleiman, and to Lebanese PM Siniora retaining his post; -- Creation of Lebanon's National Unity Government; -- Passage of Lebanon's elections law; -- The opening of a Syrian embassy in Lebanon and President al-Asad's "solemn promise" to exchange ambassadors; -- Syrian participation in the bilateral committee on delineating the Lebanese-Syrian border, and in talks on the return of Lebanese political prisoners; -- The release of one or more Syrian political prisoners; -- The August 14 visit of Lebanese President Sleiman to Damascus and subsequent visits by other GOL officials; -- An improved tone in high level meetings between SARG and GOL officials; -- A Syrian commitment (pre-Operation Cast Lead) to continue indirect contacts with Israel and an invitation for France and the U.S. to co-sponsor direct-Syrian-Israeli peace talks; -- Syrian support of the French formula for resolving the Arab League's participation in the Union for the Mediterranean, which allowed the Marseille Ministerial to be declared a success. ¶4. (S/NF) Most recently, the French credit Syria with having intervened with Hamas in the wake of Israel's declaration of a unilateral ceasefire, so that a mere 24 hours after Hamas Politburo Chief Khaled Meeshal insisted to reporters that Hamas would not accept a ceasefire, Gaza-based Hamas leader Ismail Hanniyeh was announcing the opposite. In addition, the French have urged the Syrians to encourage the Iranians to accept the P5 1 offer. PARIS 00000135 002 OF 003 ¶5. (S/NF) MFA and Elysee officials here understand, on the basis of many conversations with Emboffs and officials in Washington, that the USG remains quite skeptical of much of this alleged progress. Specifically, Emboffs have pointed out that Bashar al-Asad failed to send an ambassador to Beirut by year's end 2008, notwithstanding his "solemn promise" to Presidents Sarkozy and Sleiman; that Syria and Lebanon have made no real progress on delineating their border; that the limited release of Syrian political prisoners was immediately followed by more arrests; that Syrian support of the Doha Accord, Lebanon's national unity government, and President Sleiman appeared to involve no significant costs for Damascus; that Syria (as even the French admit) has essentially sided with Tehran on the Iranian nuclear question; and that Syria's public position during the Gaza crisis did not appear to have advanced Egyptian efforts to broker a ceasefire. Denial Ain't Just a River in Egypt -------------- ¶6. (S/NF) Moreover, Emboffs have pointed out that for months the French insisted the exchange of ambassadors between by Syria and Lebanon by year's end would be the primary litmus test for measuring Syrian performance against Sarkozy's benchmarks, and that a delay beyond the first few days of January would lead to serious ructions. Instead, the French appear to have lowered the bar: their standard talking point these days is that the dispatch of a Syrian ambassador to Lebanon is "not a priority" in light of the Gaza crisis, that they still "suffer no delusions about the nature of the Syrian regime" and that al-Asad will deliver "because he knows we will stop everything if he does not." Clearly, having invested heavily in the policy of improving ties with Syria, the French are prepared to engage in whatever verbal gymnastics may be required to keep Syria in the "win" column. In general, French Presidency staff members are more fervent in making these arguments than are their colleagues at the MFA, where FM Kouchner is said to harbor doubts about the wisdom of France's speedy rapprochement with Damascus. ¶7. (S/NF) Nevertheless, USG officials should not underestimate the extent to which Sarkozy and his inner circle remain persuaded that their decision to re-engage Syria was the right one. As Sarkozy himself stated in a November 29 interview with al-Sharq al-Awsat newspaper, "Of course I'm generally satisfied by the way the situation in Lebanon has evolved over the past few months. Who wouldn't be? . . . things are going much better today than they were yesterday, and that is why I'm optimistic . . . Would any of this had been possible if we hadn't taken the risk of talking to Syria? I do not believe so." Variations of this talking point are frequently repeated by French officials and parliamentarians. Comment -------------- ¶8. (S/NF) Although the above quote may seem like spin, there is a more hopeful element at work here as well. Sarkozy believes that Syria's successful rehabilitation, following on Libya's, will set an important precedent for Iran's return to full membership in the international community as well. Moreover, he remains deeply convinced that France's improved relations with Syria will, over the long run, advance French interests on an array of regional issues including Lebanon, the peace process, and stability in Iraq. Consequently, he is prepared to stick to this policy even when progress is not readily apparent. All of this suggests that the way to engage Sarkozy about his Syria policy is not to argue it has failed, but rather to ask where he wants to steer the relationship in the coming months, what he believes al-Asad can deliver, and how he hopes to ensure fuller Syrian compliance with its existing commitments. PARIS 00000135 003 OF 003 PEKALA