FRENCH OFFICIALS DISCUSS WEST AFRICA WITH DAS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 001294 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2019 TAGS: PREL KDEM PINR PGOV KCOR SNAR XY FR SUBJECT: FRENCH OFFICIALS DISCUSS WEST AFRICA WITH DAS WILLIAM FITZGERALD (SEPTEMBER 17) Classified By: Andrew Young, Political Counselor, 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: French officials at the MFA, Presidency, and MOD on September 17 expressed general agreement with AF DAS William Fitzgerald on a range of West African issues, including Togo (need to keep pressing for proper presidential elections),Benin (a success story but with serious corruption problems),Burkina Faso (Compaore's positive role in Cote d'Ivoire and Togo should be encouraged),Niger (need to maintain pressure although Tandja unlikely to reverse course, China's role),Guinea-Bissau (a rapidly failing narco-state),Senegal (democratic tradition still functioning but worrying internal and regional trends),Nigeria (facing multiple threats to its democracy and stability),Guinea (the impossibility of dealing with Dadis),and Mali. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) AF DAS William Fitzgerald on September 17 met, separately, with MFA A/S-equivalent Stephane Gompertz, Presidential AF Advisor Remi Marechaux, and MOD Delegation for Strategic Affairs AF expert Jerome Spinoza. AF-watcher attended the Gompertz and Spinoza meetings; AF-assistant attended the Gompertz and Marechaux meetings. Desk officers Chloe Davezac (Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone) and Florent Cheval (Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana) attended the Gompertz meeting. Fitzgerald was transiting Paris after visiting Benin, Togo, and Burkina Faso. MEETING WITH GOMPERTZ (MFA) ¶3. (C) DAS Fitzgerald commented on the stagnating political environment in Togo and the importance of maintaining pressure on the Faure regime to hold acceptable elections in 2010, with which A/S-equivalent Gompertz agreed, although he noted there had been some progress insofar as political dialogue seemed to have resumed. Fitzgerald noted the key (and not always helpful) roles played by Ministers Gilbert Bawara and Pascal Bodjona, Gilchrist Olympio's constant indecision and lack of incisiveness, and the aging and possibly out-of-touch nature of the opposition in general. Gompertz agreed that the upcoming presidential election would be key and that President Faure and his allies were wrong if they believed the previous legislative election, relatively well run, had convinced the outside world that Togo could be trusted as a democracy. Fitzgerald thought that Olympio would be the only real opposition candidate, with Gompertz observing that more candidates would improve Faure's chances. He noted that Ali Bongo in Gabon had won with only about 40 percent of the vote, indicating that even with an opposition tally of 60 percent the dynastic candidate could still win. Fitzgerald said that NDI would not field observers but would instead train observers and carry out voter education programs before the election. Gompertz said that the soldiers Togo had provided to MINURCAT in Chad and C.A.R. were effective and had been given the difficult assignment of deploying to Birao in C.A.R. ¶4. (C) Fitzgerald described Benin as a relative success and an MCC participant, despite serious endemic corruption. Gompertz wondered whether a durable democracy had been established in Benin. Fitzgerald said that Benin seemed to share some of Burkina Faso's more positive qualities, but he noted that President Boni Yayi was blocked by parliament and was not succeeding in controlling corruption. ¶5. (C) Fitzgerald said that Burkina Faso had made progress in recovering from the recent flooding, although damage remained considerable. NGO humanitarian assistance workers were able to shift to disaster relief to good effect. Unfortunately, the health care system was severely damaged. Gompertz said that Burkina Faso's President Compaore, who was playing a positive role in Cote d'Ivoire, seemed confident that elections would take place as scheduled on November 29 in Cote d'Ivoire. Noting Compaore's involvement in Togo, Fitzgerald said that Togo's opposition was asking Compaore to intervene as well. Gompertz and Fitzgerald agreed on the importance of encouraging Compaore to engage with Togo in order to push the regime on the elections issue. ¶6. (C) Fitzgerald and Gompertz agreed on the serious difficulties posed by Niger's President Tandja and his bid to stay in office. Fitzgerald explained that Tandja's recent sham referendum had been enough for the U.S. to begin taking steps against him. Gompertz was not certain how strong Tandja's actual support was or if the military would acquiesce in his staying in power. The international community needed to maintain pressure on Tandja but both Gompertz and Fitzgerald agreed that he had probably "passed the point of no return" and that it would be difficult to PARIS 00001294 002 OF 004 imagine his reversing course completely. ¶7. (C) Discussion turned to Guinea-Bissau's transformation into a failed state, exacerbated by the drug trafficking problem. Fitzgerald said the U.S. was considering reopening its embassy in Bissau, in part to respond to the drug trafficking problem; we also hoped to increase our DEA presence in the region. Gompertz noted that while most drugs transited West Africa and ended up elsewhere, a domestic market was developing, with crack becoming more available in a number of countries. The killing of President Vieira appeared to have been in retribution for the assassination of former Army Chief of Staff Batista Tagme Na Wai, but the people and motives behind that action remained clouded in mystery. Gompertz also wondered what role current Armed Forces Chief of Staff Naval Captain Zamora Induta was playing in the drug trade, along with the killings ¶8. (C) On Senegal, Gompertz expressed concern about some of President Wade's more wayward tendencies, the succession issue, and Wade's quest for a Nobel Peace Prize, about which he had several times telephoned President Sarkozy asking for his support. Gompertz remarked that it was probably good that Wade had experienced setbacks in recent local elections, which showed that democracy in Senegal was perhaps stronger than generally portrayed. Still, Senegal was experiencing a decline in traditional society and the rise of extremist groups. According to Gompertz, we needed to watch some of these trends -- radical Islam, terrorism, drugs, and non-political crimes. ¶9. (C) Nigeria presented special challenges. Fitzgerald noted the very poor elections that brought President Yar'Ardua to power. His precarious health raised succession concerns and questions about the military's role. Nigeria represented a big security challenge. Gompertz agreed, noting the fragility of Nigeria's democracy and the several threats to stability, from the north, along the sea coast (piracy and kidnappings),and in the Delta region. He said that 1/3 of Nigeria's oil was lost to thieves. ¶10. (C) Gompertz did not mince words in describing Guinea's Dadis as "crazy" and "insane," with Fitzgerald agreeing that he was not someone with whom one could work. The rest of the military was perhaps as bad or worse. Half jokingly, Gompertz said that he would not mind if a coup took place removing Dadis from power. Gompertz said that France was steadily reducing its engagement with Guinea but not in ways that would affect the general population. Gompertz said that the French have several times countered Dadis's argument that he should receive the same treatment as Aziz in Mauritania, who also staged a coup then was elected president. The French had emphasized to him the differences between Aziz and himself, notably Aziz's resigning and agreeing to a broad political framework before running for office. MEETING WITH MARECHAUX (PRESIDENCY) ¶11. (C) Presidential AF Advisor Remi Marechaux contended that there had been some progress in Togo -- for example, the opposition's participation in the legislative elections, along with the agreement over the holding of the elections. He noted that the older generation was passing from the scene and that Faure had a "different mentality" and was aware of the problems posed by Togo's long isolation. Marechaux said that French worries about the elections were somewhat alleviated three weeks previously, when there was agreement over the electoral code. He agreed that Bodjona could create problems and that Compaore could play a useful role. ¶12. (C) Marechaux agreed that Guinea's Dadis was a "disaster." France continued to oppose a Dadis presidential candidacy and sought to refute his claims of a "double standard" with respect to Mauritania's Aziz. Marechaux said that France was not sure about declaring conditions that, if met, would make the elections acceptable -- he thought Dadis would pretend to meet the conditions but do nothing. Marechaux noted that, initially, Dadis enjoyed some international support, with France sending Cooperation Secretary of State Joyandet to Guinea. The French view had changed completely, Marechaux said. He remarked that France engaged in some military cooperation projects in Guinea. The military seemed divided with respect to Dadis, with the Presidential Guard (i.e., those close to Konte) perhaps the most unhappy. Some of Guinea's ethnic groups (e.g., Peul, Mandingo) were wary of Dadis. ¶13. (C) Marechaux said the French were also concerned that Senegal's President Wade might decide to get involved in PARIS 00001294 003 OF 004 Guinea. He noted Wade's quest for a Nobel Prize and his repeated calls to Sarkozy to support his bid. Marechaux said the French maintained contact with Karim Wade, whom he described bluntly as "corrupt and dishonest." But Marechaux noted that Karim was "more powerful" than the ministers and that he knew his subjects well. Like Gompertz, Marechaux took comfort in the fact that the Wade faction had not done well in the recent local elections, which "gives us hope" concerning the state of democracy in Senegal. ¶14. (C) Marechaux noted France's strong interest in Niger -- 80 percent of France's electricity is produced by nuclear power, and 40 percent of France's nuclear fuel is from Niger. Notably, he said that "France has its principles but also our practical interests." Marechaux recounted French anger (especially within the French Presidency) over the way Tandja declared his intention to seek a third term not long after Sarkozy's March visit -- "he lied to and used us." France counseled first Tandja's advisors against a third term, and then raised it with Tandja himself, to no avail. Marechaux said that Areva has advised the GOF that Niger had few levers to apply against Areva should it seek to exact revenge on France for not supporting Tandja. Areva was considering slowing down one project, so any GON action to shut it down would actually conform to Areva's plans, while any action against Areva's other activities would hurt the GON more than it would Areva. ¶15. (C) Marechaux said that Niger's opposition needed to be more active, rather than maintain its current passive approach featuring complaints rather than action. He said that the opposition could not expect the outside world to do more than it was willing to do itself. He pointed to Madagascar, where hundreds of thousands were ready to take to the streets, in contrast to the desultory hundreds that participated publicly in Niger. Marechaux noted the AQIM problem in the region and how instability in Niger could help AQIM, which made him wary of a military coup. Marechaux said that France had talked to China about Niger -- "they immediately understood our concerns." Marechaux said the French were telling the Chinese that Tandja was also putting China's activities in Niger at risk. MEETING WITH SPINOZA (MOD) ¶16. (C) Jerome Spinoza, one of the Africa analysts at the MOD's Delegation for Strategic Affairs, took a somewhat contrarian view on the situation in some of AF/W countries. For Guinea, he offered that Dadis might actually provide some stability to the country, noting that as an ethnic Forestier, he, and others of his group in the military, held the respect of other ethnic groups. Dadis had been close to President Konte, as evidenced by the simple house arrest of Konte's son related to drug trafficking. In Spinoza's opinion, the international community should not rush to impose presidential elections in Guinea, and should perhaps allow Dadis to remain in power for the next year or more, something he thought would be acceptable to the population. Spinoza thought that our priorities for Guinea should be to help bring basic services to the people and help it establish sufficiently effective governmental institutions to create a working political system and enable "real democratic progress" in the future. ¶17. (C) In Spinoza's opinion, the drug traffickers in Guinea-Bissau were so well established that they were, perversely, now a force for stability in the country. However, the recent outbreaks of violence in Senegal's Casamance region were the result of the MFDC's (or various factions') desire to maintain influence over the trafficking networks. Spinoza viewed Senegal as a country in transition, creating a new ruling elite within the younger generation, based largely on insider-business dealings. ¶18. (C) On Cote d'Ivoire, Spinoza speculated that President Gbagbo will hold elections, likely in December or January, after the state will have collected the year's cacao revenue and oil receipts which Gbagbo could then use for his electoral campaign. Spinosa predicted that Gbagbo would win, largely because he could best manipulate the country's ethnic divisions -- which was exactly why Alassane Ouattara could not win. ¶19. (C) Spinoza also touched briefly on the security situation in northern Mali, noting that President Toure had to play a delicate balancing act if he wanted to stay in power. He must do enough on improving security and reaching out on development in the north to maintain good relations with donors, but at the same time he could not push too hard PARIS 00001294 004 OF 004 against the trafficking networks, particularly Tuareg, which remained a vital political constituency. ¶20. (U) DAS Fitzgerald has cleared this message. RIVKIN