NEW CONCERNS ABOUT COTE D'IVOIRE ELECTIONS FROM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001213 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2029 TAGS: PREL PINR PGOV IV FR SUBJECT: NEW CONCERNS ABOUT COTE D'IVOIRE ELECTIONS FROM SARKOZY AFRICA ADVISOR REF: PARIS 997 Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew R. Young, for reason 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Africa Advisor at the Elysee, Romain Serman, told Poloffs he believed Cote d'Ivoire President Laurent Gbagbo was taking new steps to further delay elections, including asking France to help in making "disarmament of rebels" a precondition. Serman asserted he told Gbagbo's representative that idea had no credibility and France had no interest in postponing the vote. Suspecting Gbagbo might foster some sort of "fake coup" as another way of legitimizing a long delay before elections, Serman passed the message that the France and the international community would see through any such charade. Sermain believes Gbagbo has concluded he cannot win an election and therefore hopes to "wait-out" the main opposition leaders Bedie and Ouattara. Serman also reiterated the GOF's request for a special UNSC session during September on Cote d'Ivoire and the need for elections. End Summary STALLING FOR TIME -- REQUEST FOR REBEL DISARMAMENT -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Romain Serman, an Africa advisor at the French Presidency, on September 2 shared information with PolCouns, AF-watcher, and AF-assistant on possible new delaying tactics for Cote d'Ivoire's elections, orchestrated by President Laurent Gbagbo. Serman (please protect) recounted a meeting he held earlier in the day with an unnamed Gbagbo "lawyer," whom he described as a young French-Ivoirian woman. The meeting was held at her request so that she could deliver a message on behalf of Gbagbo -- that France should promote the total disarmament of "rebel forces" as a precondition before elections are held as a necessary security requirement. Serman stated that his reply was that this demand was inappropriate and "ridiculous." He pointed out that such a requirement was not part of any operative agreement or resolution, was years from being timely, and that such a request from the GOCI would be greeted with derision by the international community. Serman said he told the lawyer that it is not credible for Cote d'Ivoire to further delay elections due to minor risks of violence when, for example, Afghanistan and Liberia both held two elections since 2005. ¶3. (C) Serman's analysis is that Gbagbo's goal is to continue creating excuses for delaying the elections in order to "wait-out" his main rivals Bedie, who may soon be perceived as too old to mount an effective campaign, and Ouattara, who will soon run out of money for his campaign. (In fact, Serman confirmed that Ouattara had recently met with Sarkozy in Paris and admitted that his campaign would be broke by the end of December.) ¶4. (C) Gbagbo may be considering other delaying tactics as well, including, according to Serman's unnamed Liberian sources, instigating a "fake coup" against himself to create an excuse to delay the elections until this "new military/security threat is dealt with." Serman said he told Gbagbo's lawyer that he was aware of this scheme and advised that it should be dropped from consideration. Serman said that Gbagbo's goal was to delay an election as long as it appeared possible that he could lose such an election. FINDING THE RIGHT BALANCE OF PRESSURE -------------- ¶5. (C) Serman told us that French policy makers were becoming "fed-up" with Gbagbo's strategy of delaying elections, even though they understood it was unlikely that Gbagbo could win a free a fair vote. The delicate task is to create enough pressure on Gbagbo to move him towards elections, while not making him "feel he's being backed into a corner," in which case it is possible that Gbagbo will orchestrate new violence as a pretext for remaining in power. Serman is hopeful that the messages he delivered via Gbagbo's lawyer would help. With apparent pained resignation, he admitted that French forces in Operation Licorne would probably remain in Cote d'Ivoire until elections are finally held since the issue of assuring the safety of French citizens in the country remains politically potent. Serman indicated that maintaining French forces in Cote d'Ivoire as part of Licorne in support of UNOCI was a decision made by President Sarkozy. GOF REQUESTS A UNSC SESSION ON PUSHING FOR ELECTIONS -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) In addition, Serman reiterated the GOF's request for a special UNSC session during September on Cote d'Ivoire and the need for elections. He said a concerted effort is PARIS 00001213 002 OF 002 necessary to demonstrate that the stalling tactics are "unacceptable." Serman confided that the actual level of representation for such a meeting was not important -- "it doesn't have to be the PermReps, it could even be First Secretaries" -- but holding such a meeting was important and valuable. COMMENT -------------- ¶7. (C) We were slightly surprised at the vehemence of Serman's condemnation of Gbagbo, even given Serman's well-known flamboyance. GOF assessments of the likelihood of elections in Cote d'Ivoire can vary -- MFA AF A/S-equivalent Gompertz, for example, told us several weeks ago (reftel) that he was a contrarian and thought the elections would take place as scheduled. Serman, however, was unequivocal in expressing his belief that Gbagbo would do anything -- even engineer a false coup -- to delay the vote. He commented dryly that Gbagbo was always scheming to gain favor with Sarkozy. Based on Serman's remarks, we believe Sarkozy has taken the full and proper measure of Gbagbo and is unlikely to offer support unless Gbagbo changes his ways drastically. RIVKIN