PANAMA: HOW MERIDA FITS INTO THE EMERGING SECURITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L PANAMA 000176 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PM SUBJECT: PANAMA: HOW MERIDA FITS INTO THE EMERGING SECURITY CONSENSUS REF: A. A: PANAMA 00789/08 ¶B. B: PANAMA 00930/08 Classified By: Ambassador Barbara J. Stephenson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- Merida, Before It's Too Late -------------- ¶1. (C) The threat from home grown gangs and international criminal organizations in Panama is growing and worrisome. As Panamanians feel increasingly threatened in their homes and on their streets, some are arguing that Panama must choose between protecting itself and stopping the flow of drugs to the U.S. (see reftel b). While this dichotomy is false (very few Panamanian assets are used in drug interdiction),many in Panama, both inside and outside the government, believe that U.S. security assistance to Panama is only focused on protecting the Canal and intercepting drugs bound for the U.S. This misperception poses a long-term threat to our influence in Panama. To preserve our deep and effective law enforcement cooperation with Panama the U.S. must avoid the optic that it is not concerned with the criminal threat to Panamanians, much of which is being fed by drug trafficking. At the same time, given Panama's strategic importance to the U.S., and the threat that criminal organizations might pose to the operation of the Canal if they are allowed to grow unchecked, the U.S. has a strong interest in helping Panama address the threat. ¶2. (C) For these reasons, Merida funds are arriving at a perfect time for Post and for Panama, these new funds will allow Post to take advantage of the emerging support for a move to community policing and community organization to combat crime, and give Panama access to U.S. experience, organizational and planning capability it badly needs. The threat in Panama is real, but is at a different stage than in Central America's northern countries. Panama still has time to gain control of its marginal areas before the gangs become a serious threat. It is hard to imagine what better protects our long-term interests in Panama than being widely perceived as the catalyst for improving security. -------------- Growing Violent Crime Fuels Fear -------------- ¶3. (C) Panama has a relatively low crime rate compared to other Central American countries, but has experienced a spike in violent crime over the last year. According to a recent newspaper report citing official statistics, 51 people were killed in drive-by shootings by gunmen on motorcycles or in cars in 2008, compared with 22 in 2007. In the first two months of this year, 11 have been killed in similar circumstances. Photographs of those executed overnight appear on the front cover of the papers almost everyday, creating a climate of fear and dread among the population, even though violent crime is mostly played out among Panamanian, Colombian and Mexican drug traffickers. At the same time, small homegrown street gangs are increasingly engaged in inter-gang warfare in the slums of Panama City and Colon. Recent public opinion polls have revealed that security is a major concern of Panamanians. One poll showed 44% declaring security as their number one concern in February, compared with 17% in May. Taken together, the situation has alarmed the population of Panama and had led to calls for "strong arm" police tactics. ¶4. (C) Over the last six months, Post has seen a growing consensus from Panamanian government officials and opposition politicians on the need to adopt a mixture of "soft" crime prevention strategies while inculcating in the police a community policing doctrine. While there is significant evidence of this philosophical shift, the GOP has not produced detailed documents on how to achieve this transformation. The GOP has a singular lack of planning ability, and transformations tend to be based on the actions of a visionary leader, not on a detailed bureaucratic strategy. One of the most important contributions Merida Initiative funds can make in Panama is to give the USG a seat at the table of GOP security policy formulation process, allowing us to bring stakeholders together, deepen consensus and develop a realistic implementable strategy, while leveraging our experience and organizational abilities to help the GOP in carrying out an effective transformation of the police, and in designing and implementing an effective and coordinated crime prevention program. -------------- MOGJ Lays Out the Priorities -------------- ¶5. (C) Minister of Government and Justice Dilio Arcia told the Ambassador on December 18 2008 that the Ministry of Government and Justice (MOGJ - controls all of Panama's security forces) was focusing on controlling crime and gang activity in Panama's cities. He said the MOGJ planned to work with civil society on crime prevention programs, citing a pilot program had been successful in Veraguas. Under this program a committee had been formed in the city composed of representatives of the police, NGOs and the business community. Arcia noted that the police could not control the rising crime rate unless they formed a close partnership with the community. Arcia also mentioned the Integral Security Program (PROSI),funded by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB),that aims to prevent vulnerable youth from joining gangs and engaging in crime by building up sports infrastructure in marginal neighborhoods, along with youth centers and internet centers. ¶6. (C) Arcia also highlighted the need to create an integrated approach to prevention by bringing together the various government ministries with a role to play, including the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Social Development, so that children at risk of dropping out of school and joining gangs could be identified early on and steps taken to help them stay in school. Post strongly supports this kind of "whole of government" approach to Panama's security challenges. ¶7. (C) Arcia stressed the need to focus on the retail sale of drugs to weaken the gangs. He said community policing was key to success on this front, as "everyone" in the community knew who was engaged in these activities, but most people were afraid to come forward to the police. He said he had tasked Panamanian National Police (PNP) Director Francisco Troya with developing a community policing model that would allow the police to develop the trust of the communities, and so gain improved access to information. Vice Minister of Government Severino Mejia noted the importance of the Neighborhood Watch (Vecinos Vigilantes) program. After years of decay, according to Mejia, the program was being revived in order to form partnerships between the police and neighborhood associations. This program was recently extended to security guards, who will now have a direct connection to the PNP, to report on any suspicious activities. There is also a Merchants Watch program. Arcia noted that the GOP was also toughening laws on gun possession in order to target gang members, allowing preventive detention to be used against them and giving prosecutors a chance to build up cases. -------------- Reestablishing the Presence of the Police -------------- ¶8. (C) Troya told POLOFF February 19 that he was developing a plan to move the police into gang-infested neighborhoods building by building, floor by floor, and apartment by apartment. He said the idea was to establish the presence of the police throughout the neighborhoods (as opposed to respecting no-go areas),and developing information networks. Troy echoed Arcia's observation that the community residents "know" who the drug dealers and criminals are, but were afraid to speak out. Troya said he wanted to establish a data base of the neighborhoods so the police would know who lived where, where the gangs were, and where drugs were being sold. He said he also wanted to gather a data base of e-mail addresses, and to give residents an e-mail through which they could contact the police. This would allow information to flow between the community and the police in a confidential manner, and without putting people's lives in danger. Troya praised the NAS-funded Community Police training program, run in cooperation with the Miami-Dade Police Department, that is currently introducing the command ranks of the PNP to the community policing doctrine through a series of week long seminars. He said he wanted to se the program extended to entry level officers as well. Merida funds will become available to Post just in time to capitalize on the PNP's enthusiasm for community policing, an enthusiasm that this cable hopes to show is shared throughout the GOP. It will allow NAS to fund the expansion of the program down to the rank and file police officers, using part the $600,000 in INCLE Police Training funds. If Merida funding is continued for the full projected three years, Post will continue the program until the entire force has been trained. -------------- Challenges to Success -------------- ¶9. (C) Danilo Toro, the MOGJ official in charge of the PROSI program, told POLOFF November 26, 2008 that the GOP was committed to introducing community policing, but that there were several important challenges. He noted that the lowest grade police officers were paid only $390 a month, and that this left them vulnerable to corruption, especially given recent high inflation that had eroded their buying power. This danger was part of the reason the PNP rotated senior police every six months: to break up corrupt links between the police and the community. Since community policing depended on strong police-community ties, Toro asserted, the PNP needed to extend the rotations of their senior officers so they could oversee the implementation of the community policing strategy. Toro noted that the police needed pay raises. Balbina Herrera and Ricardo Martinelli, the two leading presidential candidates, have promised to raise police wages after the issue of low police salaries was highlighted by an independent think-tank study. Toro noted, however, that successful community policing would also require other reforms to police administration, including force deployment, duty schedules, and internal control mechanisms. To achieve all of this, Toro said, the MOGJ would need to strike a grand bargain with the PNP, giving officers raises in return for concessions on work regulations that would make community policing a success. Additional Merida funding of the Community Police program would give the USG an equity in this process, and allow Post to play a role as the necessary administrative changes are brought about, including bringing international technical advisors in to assist. ¶10. (C) Toro identified several other key challenges that would have to be overcome for the transformation to be successful. He said USG participation in all would be essential, especially in terms of training. He highlighted the following areas: A) Police supervision, self-control, and inspection. If community policing is to be successful, it will require a well disciplined and regulated force that can quickly identify and weed out problem officers. Toro said the US had the best experience in this field, and he would like the PNP to benefit from U.S. training; B) Investigative police techniques. Panama will be transferring to an adversarial justice system over the next five years. Under the new system prosecutors will be held to a much higher evidentiary standard than the present administrative law system. The Directorate of Judicial Investigation (DIJ) works for Panama's prosecutors, but depends administratively on the PNP. Toro said the DIJ needed help creating an efficient investigative force, and asked for USG assistance in this field, especially from the FBI. He said the MOGJ would be willing to help fund such courses if we brought the experts; C) Human Resources deployment. Toro said the human resources structure of the PNP was very poor, noting there was almost no training for sergeants, even though studies show that they are the officers most often in charge when the PNP reacts to criminal events. Many of the PNP's officers are poor, frustrated, and ill trained. While community policing can help solves these problems, the PNP also needs to learn to treat its officers well, give them the training and tools they need, and how to turn the police into a career of which its officers can be proud. With Merida funding, Post would be able to design training programs and provide technical advisors to strengthen the PNP in each of these critical fields. -------------- To PROSI or NOT To PROSI? -------------- ¶11. (C) At an earlier meeting on September 30 Toro outlined the PROSI program. He said PROSI was being funded by a $20 million loan from the IDB. He said there were 35 projects underway, and 200 projects in the works ranging from technological improvement for the PNP, like video cameras to monitor street crime and a computer program to keep track of crime in real time, to youth and sports programs designed to keep kids out of trouble. He said one of the main tenants of the program was getting all the GOP agencies to work together, from local governments to the various ministries. However, IDB Country Rep Marcelo Anterini told POLOFF and USAID Country Director on October 8 2008 that the PROSI project was "not going well." He said a lot of the money was going on facilities, like a juvenile detention facility, and that he was not convinced the IDB or the MOGJ really had a strategy for how the money was going to improve security in Panama. Anterini said the loan was very large, but that the GOP was having trouble spending the money, noting that by 2006 they had only managed to spend $1.4 million of the $22 million loan. He said he would be very happy to work with the USG if we could provide MOGJ technical assistance that might be spent to help make the IDB loan more effective. This is an excellent example of what Merida money would allow Post to do in Panama. Without our own contribution, the USG cannot effect how Panama spends its own money, or the money it borrows from international lenders (which itself mostly comes from the USG as well). USAID's $150,000 in community policing support funds should give the USG a voice in how the IDB PROSI loan is used, allowing us to lend our organizational knowledge and experience to the GOP to take advantage of this opportunity to build an effective and coordinated gang-prevention program. While many have noted that Panama has resources of its own to address its problems, few have noted that its organizational and planning abilities are not at the same level as its funding capability. Given our strategic interest in Panama's success in its battle against international and gang violence, using Merida seed money as a way to get us influence over Panama's security planning and the ability to assist Panama's well intentioned but poorly coordinated efforts, is an excellent investment. -------------- Militarization Distraction -------------- ¶12. (C) The emergence of a GOP consensus in favor of prevention and community policing has been obscured for the last six months by the divisive "remilitarization" debate (see reftel a). Marcel Salamin, GOP National Security Advisor, told POLOFF January 20 that the security reforms were actually an attempt to complete the civilianization of the security forces, not their militarization. He explained that under Omar Torrijos, there was a large police force, with a small military force in reserve. Under Noriega the percentages were reversed, building a large military force to take over for the US after withdrawal. After Operation Just Cause in 1989, the U.S. military disbanded the Panamanian Defense Forces, but the personnel was not changed, and no new police doctrine was imposed. This allowed the military-trained Panamanian security services officers (PNP, Maritime Service and Air Service) to resist the idea that they were really police services, because their leadership had a military mentality. This led them to apply military tactics to a police mission, according to Salamin, such as keeping a large force in reserve, or staging large "operations" to sweep up criminals, neither of which makes sense in modern policing. Salamin said that at the beginning of the Torrijos Administration it was decided to change the security doctrine from National Security to one of Citizen Security. The idea was that Panama would concentrate on internal problems it could hope to handle, and the US and international community would worry about external threats to the Canal. As part of this doctrinal shift, Panama had to turn its security forces into real police forces, and target criminal and terrorist threats. The security reforms were designed to formalize this change. To that end, he said, the PNP needed to start patrolling the streets and building up community support and knowledge. He said he was aware of our community policing program, and strongly supported it. -------------- And now what? -------------- ¶13. (C) Ebrahim Asvat, President of Panama's oldest daily La Estrella de Panama and a possible MOGJ Minister if Martinelli wins, told POLOFF November 25, 2008 that Panama needed to create a Ministry of Public Security to administer all the reforms that were required to build an effective police force. These included adopting a community policing strategy with public participation, devising a national strategy against crime, gathering crime statistics, acquiring adequate equipment for the police and re-deploying forces in such a way as to prevent crime. Asvat had been a fierce critic of the Torrijo's government's security reforms. Yet his plans for police reform are largely interchangeable with those of Toro, Arcia, Troya or Salamin. Asvat specifically praised PROSI as a "great plan", though he noted implementation had not been satisfactory. Jaime Abad, a former Director of the extinct Judicial Technical Police (PTJ),another potential MOGJ Minister if Martinelli wins, also supports community policing and the NAS-funded program. STEPHENSON