PANAMA: NEW MOGJ MINSTER LAYS OUT PLANS

S E C R E T PANAMA 000015 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/02/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PM SUBJECT: PANAMA: NEW MOGJ MINSTER LAYS OUT PLANS REF: PANAMA 00008 Classified By: Ambassador Barbara J. Stephenson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Security has become the government's weak spot, newly appointed Minister of Government of Justice Dilio Arcia told the Ambassador December 19. He described plans to address gang violence, including tougher sentences and implementation of community policing initiatives. In discussing the FARC presence in the Darien, Arcia said that increased mobility for GOP police forces was key, as Panamanian forces could not arrive quickly enough to confront FARC incursions. He also spoke about the need to improve governance in the Darien. He reaffirmed GOP policy that the U.S. should not have a permanent physical presence in the Darien, and forcefully asserted his and the President's authority to decide on any increase in temporary presence or qualitative change in the nature of USG presence. He and his Vice Ministers described recent outreach to the Embera Indians, following a FARC incursion into their autonomous comarca. They also discussed forthcoming equipment upgrades, including the arrival of helicopters in February and March. End Summary. -------------- It's the Crime, Stupid! -------------- ¶2. (C) Dilio Arcia, who was appointed Minister of Government and Justice on November 18 replacing Daniel Delgado, met with the Ambassador and EMBOFFs on December 19, together with Vice Minster of Public Security Rodrigo Cigarruista and Vice Minster of Government Severino Mejia. Arcia said that his top priority was to develop and implement policies to confront the crime wave affecting the country. He complained that the political opposition was using the security issue to politically weaken Martin Torrijos' government and Balbina Herrera's presidential campaign. He said security had become the "weak spot" of the government. Arcia complained that Panama was being overwhelmed by the effects of "Plan Mexico." (Comment: Arcia was referring to the Merida Initiative. End Comment) He said foreign drug traffickers were hiring local gangs to kill people as a result of lost drug shipments seized by the authorities in Panama. He said the MOGJ, the Supreme Court and the Attorney General's Office were working together on an anti-gang strategy, that would focus on combating illegal weapon possession. The MOGJ proposed an increase in the penalty for weapon possession to four-six years, so that preventive detention could be used against offenders. (Note: Under the current Penal Process Bridge Law, which is in effect until the judicial system switches over to the new adversarial law system, preventive detention can only be requested for crimes that carry a prospective sentence of four years or more. The current sentence is two-four years. End Note) Arcia said this will allow gang members caught with guns to be investigated for other crimes while in detention. He said the police needed to focus on the retail sale of drugs, the main source of funds for the gangs. -------------- Community Policing -------------- ¶3. (C) Arcia also asserted that the MOGJ was interested in implementing community policing programs. He emphasized getting NGOs and business groups to work with the police, citing a pilot program in the province of Veraguas he said had been successful and an existing program called "Vigilant Neighbors." He also praised the Integral Security Program (PROSI),which is an IDB-funded crime prevention program that focused on building up recreational infrastructure in poor, gang prone neighborhoods. He also stressed the need to bring in other elements of the GOP, like the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Social Development to help develop a coordinated GOP strategy to prevent kids from finding their way into gangs. Arcia complained that prisoners were continuing to run their criminal operations from prison, and said he would like to see a program to build new prisons that were smaller and easier to control and improve the old ones. -------------- To Forward Deploy, or Not to Forward Deploy? -------------- ¶4. (C) Asked by the Ambassador about the Darien, Cigarruista said Panama was primarily a transit and R&R zone for the FARC, though he also noted the 57th Front charged tolls for cargo being smuggled into the Darien. Arcia said Panamanian police forces needed greater mobility to be able to deal with the FARC effectively. He said even if the security forces heard about incursions, they could not get to the scene quickly enough to do anything about it. He asserted that with the National Frontier Service (SENAFRONT) police's separation from the Panamanian National Police (PNP),Panama would now have a permanent presence along its borders, noting that 350 new police graduates would make it possible to keep SENAFRONT police deployed on the borders, and not bring them into Panama City to reinforce the PNP, as had often happened in the past. Arcia said the plan was to concentrate large groups of SENAFRONT police in a few places, and then respond quickly by helicopter to any reports of incursions. Mejia said the Darien was a big, tough area to patrol and that it could only be patrolled by helicopters and boats. He said that to be effective, SENAFRONT needed to deploy closer to the border and that to do so they needed helicopter lift capability. Asked by the Ambassador if SENAFRONT would then be moved closer to the border, Cigarruista said they would not/not be deployed on the border, but would observe and react from bases further back. Mejia stressed that the GOP had great cooperation with Colombia, and that the GOC would help them. Arcia interjected that the situation was far from imminent hostilities, noting that the main threat from the FARC was their use of Panamanian territory for R&R, drug trafficking and kidnappings. Mejia agreed, noting the FARC was not looking to start a two-front conflict, while Cigarruista noted that Panama also did not want a regional conflict. He said the GOC would support them, but that the answer would be the extension of Panama's effective control over its own territory. Arcia said the extension of effective governance was the key, and that the GOP was going as far as to consider the development of new towns in the Darien as a solution to the difficult challenge of providing essential services in such a thinly populated area. -------------- Need any Help? -------------- ¶5. (C) EMBOFF asked about the deployment of SOUTHCOM Joint Planning Assistance Team (JPAT) and Counter Narco-Terrorist (CNT) training teams currently in-country to the Darien to support the development of SENAFRONT. (Note: These teams are currently forbidden by the GOP to train SENAFRONT police in the Darien, thought they are permitted limited "technical assessment" visits. All USG training for GOP police deployed to the Darien takes place in training areas closer to Panama City. End Note) Arcia said the GOP did not want a permanent U.S. physical presence in the area that might create misunderstandings. Mejia said an increased U.S. presence depended on SENAFRONT Director Commissioner Frank Abrego. Arcia immediately and forcefully cut Mejia off, and said Abrego could recommend such a change to him, the Minister, or directly to President Torrijos, but could not/not decide this on his own. Arcia justified this assertion of authority by saying that he was a lawyer, and wanted to make sure everything was "legal". -------------- Taking Care of the Little People -------------- ¶6. (C) Arcia said they had met with indigenous leaders in the Darien (Embera) to assure them they would not be abandoned by the GOP, following a recent FARC incursion in their territory (see reftel). He said the President himself had gone to Puerto Indio to meet with the Gran Cacique of the Embera and had promised that the GOP would have a presence in their areas. Mejia said the MOGJ would train the Embera "police" - traditional Embera figures who help maintain internal order in the Embera semi-autonomous comarcas - to get intelligence for them, and would set up meetings for them with SENAFRONT police to increase cooperation. Arcia said they had explained to the Embera that despite their semi-autonomy in their comarcas, they were Panamanians under the security responsibility of the President. He said a GOP official in the past had decided to withdraw the police from the comarcas, but that following the recent incursion, the Embera were ready to cooperate with the GOP. -------------- New Equipment on the Way -------------- ¶7. (C) Cigarruista said that the MOGJ was refurbishing 5 Bell-212 helicopters, and the first one would be delivered on March 1, after which two more would be delivered each month and a half. He also said that another new helicopter the MOGJ had bought would be delivered on February 15. He said two new boats would also arrive in February for the National Aero-Naval Service (SENAN). Mejia noted that SENAN assets, especially the helicopters would be used for multiple missions, including search and rescue, moving teachers into remote areas, disaster relief, and flying foreign dignitaries, in addition to law enforcement. Cigarruista said Panama had an immediate need for helicopters, especially for maritime patrol and border support. He added that Panama was buying six small target acquisition radars that had sea and air capability for $4.5 million. He said they also planned to use radars of the Panama Canal Authority (ACP) that could see 180 n.m. into the sea and air. He said the ACP was only using 30% of its radar capacity, so the SENAN would be able to use them as well. Mejia said the MOGJ was interested in acquiring mobile computers for the police to give them the information to "enact a plan," and not just react to crime. Cigarruista noted that the MOGJ was working on a computer system to amass crime data that could then be used to target areas of high crime in real time, similar to the COMPSTAT program used by U.S. law enforcement agencies. He said the MOGJ needed assistance to bring in experts to train their personnel in how to interpret the data so they could use it effectively. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) Arcia's embrace of community policing is a welcome change from Delgado. Arcia is in many ways the anti-Delgado, focusing on urban crime and community outreach, while Delgado framed the issue as a choice between democracy and law and order, and did not really care what civil society thought. Arcia has been quoted in the papers calling for NGOs and community involvement in the fight against crime. This brings the MOGJ in line with Post, as we are both now focused on urban police reform and anti-gang programs. While the reason for Arcia's embrace of community policing might be to help undo some of the political damage Delgado and Torrijos himself did, it is a further step towards institutionalizing the idea of community policing as the best way to respond to Panama's crime/gang problem. ¶9. (S//NF) This meeting also reinforced the fact that MOGJ does not have operational control of the security forces in Panama. While Arcia was quick to point out that Abrego could not decide on increased cooperation with the U.S. on his own, he added a telling line that he had to check with him - or the President. In reality, it is Torrijos and the National Intelligence and Security Service (SENIS),under Erik Espinosa and his deputy Javier Fletcher, who really control the operations of the security services. The confusion shown here among Mejia and Cigarruista about how far forward the SENAFRONT would deploy indicates they might not be the ones who would decide. The heads of the PNP, SENAFRONT and the SENAN all report directly to Torrijos, who then delegates operational control and oversight for major operations to Fletcher. Under Delgado MOGJ had the political weight to challenge Espinosa/Fletcher, but under Arcia this influence is likely to wane. The real mission of the MOGJ is to administer these services and buy supplies, a limited mission in which the MOGJ's effectiveness is highly questionable. Post will continue to coordinate training issues with the MOGJ and the service chiefs in parallel, but high-level planning for law-enforcement operations will continue to be done through Fletcher or the service chiefs. STEPHENSON