GUINEA - U.S./FRENCH MEETING WITH PRESIDENT COMPAORE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OUAGADOUGOU 001158



SIPDIS



E.O. 12928: DECL: 11/23/2014

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, GV, UV

SUBJ: GUINEA - U.S./French Meeting with President Compaore



Classified by Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and

d)



1. (C) Summary: AF DAS Fitzgerald and French MFA Africa Advisor

Montel urged President Compaore to take advantage of the window of

opportunity provided by the assassination attempt against CNDD leader

Moussa Dadis Camara. The U.S. and France emphasized that acting CNDD

leader General Sekouba Konate offered the only real hope for a

political transition that could meet all parties' concerns and allow

for a real democratic transition. Compaore agreed that the

assassination attempt had dramatically changed the situation but said

he would have to meet Konate personally this week to determine if he

was willing and able to accept the leadership role. If so, Compaore

is prepared to ask Morocco to have Dadis stay and to tell Dadis there

was no point in going back to Guinea. End Summary



2. (C) AF DAS William Fitzgerald and Foreign Minister Kouchner's

Africa Advisor Charlotte Montel met with Burkinabe President Blaise

Compaore on December 14 -- the day following the Ouagadougou meeting

of the International Contact Group for Guinea (reported SEPTEL).

Charge and French DCM attended as note takers. Compaore was joined

by Foreign Minister Bedouma Alain Yoda. Compaore said he had wanted

to meet with the two delegations given the important role the U.S.

and France are playing in the Guinea crisis.



3. (C) DAS Fitzgerald assured President Compaore that the U.S. and

France support his mediation efforts but voiced a shared concern that

there was a window of opportunity available now because of Dadis'

absence from Conakry that will be lost if something is not done

before Dadis tries to return from Morocco. Fitzgerald noted the risk

of reprisals should Dadis be allowed to return. Montel, noting the

frequent discussions about Guinea between Foreign Minister Kouchner

and Secretary Clinton and the unity of vision between the two

capitals, emphasized the deterioration of the situation and our

belief that Konate could be a viable and acceptable alternative to

Dadis through a democratic transition period. Recognizing that

Konate suggests he is "tired" and not interested in the leadership,

Montel called for a "dynamic" to get him to accept and to keep Dadis

out. Fitzgerald noted that the Forces Vives had clearly stated their

willingness the day earlier to work with Konate but, given the last

minute change in the CNDD delegation that put pro-Dadis hardliners in

charge, were unsure whether Konate had authority. Montel emphasized

that Konate would be hampered by a lack of control posed by pro-Dadis

troops "as long as the fiction of his return" remains. If Dadis

could be kept out, she felt Konate would be able to maintain order

through the transition.



4. (C) Compaore shared his view of the current situation and of his

strategy. His approach has been admittedly "prudent" given the risk

of escalated violence inherent in Guinea's fractured and

undisciplined military. "This is not a normal army where one general

is replaced by another. Each has his own troops loyal to him and now

we see the creation of militia as well." His original negotiating

paper did not specifically call for Dadis to step down since that was

likely only to provoke violence. He asesses Konate as someone who

would be the "ideal" solution for the crisis saying that, in his

previous encounters, he had seen someone who did not seek power.

That said, he is not sure Konate is politically willing or physically

able to displace Dadis through the transition. He will try to meet

with Konate in Conakry within the next few days to see if Konate is

up for the job. If not, pursuing this "ideal" solution is fruitless

and likely to provoke violence. If so, he is prepared to urge

Morocco to keep Dadis in Morocco and tell Dadis there is no hope for

him to gain any legitimacy. Compaore saw Dadis as a clearly unstable

element but, if Konate will not take the leadership, he sees the

continued need for a "Plan B" that accepts Dadis in some minimized

role but does not exclude him. In that vein, he continues to work on

a second draft of his mediation paper that establishes the artifice

of the "Council of the Republic" -- a collective body performing the

role of head of state but not head of government. Dadis could be

subsumed in this body while Konate might serve as the executive

agent.



5. (C) Compaore directed the Foreign Minister to share the current

draft with the U.S. and France. That document (e-mailed to

Department, Embassies Conakry, London and Paris, and USAU) does not

make reference to a "Council of the Republic." Instead, it presents

an amalgam of entities that apparently aim to diffuse power. It

includes: a "National Transition Council" -- a 150 person body

representing "the components of Guinean society" headed by a

president coming from the religious community who is selected by

consensus by the members of the National Transition Council; the

"Head of State of the Transition" coming from the security and

defense forces who names the Prime Minister; The "Government of

National Unity" directed by the Prime Minister (who shall come from

the Forces Vives). The document stipulates that legislative

elections should be held in May 2010 and presidential elections in



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October 2010. The document makes no specific exclusions of

individuals wishing to run for president but stipulates "The members

of the National Transition Council, the members of the Government of

Transition, and the members of the defense and security forces must

resign at least four months prior to the election.



6. (C) Comment: Compaore remains cautious to a fault in his

willingness to exploit Dadis' absence. He does, however, recognize

the opportunity and is certainly now engaged in sounding out Konate

as an alternative transition figure to Dadis who could be acceptable

to the Forces Vives and the international community. Compaore says

he already started talking with members of the CNDD to prepare them

for a transition without Dadis. Compaore is clearly aware of U.S.

and French interest and, according to the other delegations at the

ICG-G meeting, is hearing from ECOWAS, the AU and the UN that Konate

offers to one viable hope for a peaceful and consensual transition.

He still comes across as timid and reticent to push things too far,

too fast.



7. (U) DAS Fitzgerald cleared this cable.



8. (U) Conakry Minimize Considered.



HANKINS