BURKINA FASO: MOD DISCUSSES WIDE RANGE OF REGIONAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 OUAGADOUGOU 001136 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2019 TAGS: PREL KPKO MASS PTER SNAR UV SUBJECT: BURKINA FASO: MOD DISCUSSES WIDE RANGE OF REGIONAL SECURITY ISSUES WITH CDA. OUAGADOUGO 00001136 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b & d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Charge d'Affaires met with Minister of Defense (MOD) on December 3 to officially handover the Letter of Agreement (LOA) pertaining to the training and equipping of a Burkinabe Gendarmerie Battalion (COESPU) scheduled to deploy to Darfur under UNAMID leadership. Engaging in a wide regional tour d'horizon, the MOD discussed the situation in Guinea, Mali and Mauritania, analyzed the overall pan-Sahel security situation, requested USG assistance within the TSCTP framework and provided an update on the Darfur deployed Laafi battalion. The Minister requested Africa Command's assistance in obtaining additional resources to ensure border integrity and surveillance. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) CDA initially met with MOD Yero Boly on December 3 to hand over the Gendarmerie COESPU Letter of Agreement (LOA) related to ACOTA training of a Burkinabe Gendarmerie formed police unit deployment to the UNAMID mission in Darfur. The MOD said they would look it over one final time and return it to us signed as soon as possible. Boly then proceeded to engage the CDA on Guinea, Mauritania and Mali and more generally discussed internal and regional security issues and provided an update on the deployed Burkinabe peacekeeping battalion already in Darfur. Guinea -------------- ¶3. (C) "Guinea is a fragile country" offered the MOD, and is prone to further destabilizing acts (the meeting took place before the assassination attempt on Dadis). The situation is preoccupying and needs to be monitored closely, but, still according to the MOD, Burkina's mediation efforts continue and President Compaore remains very engaged. Security in Northern Burkina Faso & Concerns about drugs and weapons trafficking -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Noting the recent AQIM kidnappings in Mali and Mauritania, Charge asked whether the Burkinabe armed forces were increasing their security measures. Boly responded that Burkina Faso's intelligence services have been monitoring the Burkina/Niger/Mali border and collecting important information. Despite these efforts, the country remains vulnerable from a security standpoint. The MOD mused about how to properly exploit the intelligence information and leads they had obtained thus far. The Minister of Defense explained that the northern cities of Markoy (and its market),Gorom-Gorom, and Deou are of particular interest as they are "infiltrated" and "Islamicized". Burkinabe intelligence sources have uncovered Nigerian trained Nigerien nationals (particularly former students of Koranic school in Nigeria) who are operating in that region in a believed liaison with AQIM. The GOBF has their names, they know who they are, but don't know how to move forward and properly exploit that information. Boly noted that small cells of the type AQIM are know to dispatch currently have a relatively high chance of circulating undetected by Burkinabe security forces. ¶5. (C) The Ministries of Security and Defense are actively cooperating, they are talking and trying to chart a productive way forward. Some military personnel now work under a special operating agreement with the Ministry of Security and are integrated as Special Military Assistance Brigades ("Compagnie Militaire d'Appui a la Securite"). Unfortunately while the manpower can be made available, transportation hurdles remain with a significant lack of vehicles to effectively patrol the border regions. ¶6. (C) Charge asked whether the GOBF has worked on a public media strategy to alert the population in the north especially to the risk of terrorism and radicalization. Boly responded that they had not but that such an initiative would be useful. Charge noted that Africa Command MIST teams would probably be willing and able to assist the GOBF in such a campaign should they decide to move forward. ¶7. (C) The GOBF is concerned about drug and weapons transiting through Burkina Faso particularly in its northern Sahelian region. The MOD is keen to know what USG cooperation and resources might be made available, either through TSCTP or Africa Command, to assist in the monitoring and interdiction of these drugs and weapons. Charge noted that there are additional USG programs that may also be brought to Burkina Faso's assistance in counter-narcotics programming. Clearly the MOD was looking to the USG to offer OUAGADOUGO 00001136 002.2 OF 003 to fund the purchase of vehicles to patrol the border zone. Pan-Sahel Security situation and initiatives -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Charge asked for the Minister's assessment of the chances for regional counter-terrorism cooperation in the face of the evidently increasing AQIM threat. Boly noted that cooperation was fraught with difficulties adding that Mali's attempt to hold a regional counter-terrorism conference for well over a year is indicative of the problem. There are many factors at play offered the MOD, Algeria's position, Libya as a player -- even if only on the perimeter, and internal political problems in Mali and Niger. While he had seen some tentative steps following the Algerian conference in Tamanrasset, Boly suggested that the Sahelian countries were still unclear what Algeria really wanted -- suggesting Algeria was demanding much but offering little. Gauging Mauritania, Mali and Niger, Boly noted "Aziz (of Mauritania) is a soldier and understands the threat," but suggested that Mali and Niger -- while increasingly focused on the AQIM threat -- continued to see internal Tuareg issues as more important. Boly added that he had recently made a visit to Rabat and was told that no tran-Sahara/Sahel solution could be developed with out Morocco's active participation. That, he recognized brings in to complication of Western Sahara and the inability of the Maghreb group to function. Part of the problem, Boly suggested, is that because some states can't get along in general, then they are precluded, de facto, from getting along on a sensitive issue like counter-terrorism. It is first and foremost a political issue, and only then becomes a technical issue the MOD offered. Niger/Burkina Faso and Mali can surely talk, but can Morocco/Algeria talk the MOD wondered. Boly suggested that Burkina Faso might be better placed then Algeria to forge consensus between the three Sahelian countries while recognizing such an initiative could irritate Algeria and, perhaps, Libya. That said, Boly recognized that Burkina Faso has probably only been lucky up to now that AQIM has not focused activities here so Burkina Faso has an interest in seeing the problem addressed. Assistance within the TSCTP framework -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) The MOD reiterated how happy Burkina was to be the newest member of TSCTP and suggested that through that program regional cooperation could be ameliorated. He said that Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger did not always readily share important information on a strictly bilateral basis, but that perhaps through the TSCTP program that information exchange could be enhanced. The Minister noted that Burkina Faso had already highlighted to the Embassy and Africa Command their need to enhance their border security capabilities in the North. Charge noted that the proposal had been noted and was under review in Stuttgart. Peacekeeping operations -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) Charge asked how the Minister had found their first major deployment in a UN peacekeeping operation. Boly noted the Darfur deployment had been a major increase in the professionalization of the military allowing them to gain expertice in multilateral operations. The minister stressed that, without US assistance, deployment of the PKO battalion would have been impossible. Despite US assistance, the financial burden on Burkina Faso's budget remains substantial, especially when factoring in costs and expenses that had not been initially anticipated. This deployment was a much "heavier" operation then they had originally thought both in terms of manpower and financial constraints. The GOBF has not yet been able to secure airlift to move 40-50 metric tons of equipment remaining in Ouagadougou and needed in El Geneina. The Laafi Battalion, which has been flown into Darfur in tranches, is expected to reach full complement by December 27. Boly added that the pending deployment of a formed police unit will be a further expansion of Burkina Faso's peacekeeping contribution. He noted that the demand for police units far exceeded that for military units, indicative of the greater utility such units can have in urban settings. ¶11. (C) Chief of Defense Brigadier General Dominique Djendjere will spend Christmas with the Laafi battalion (he will fly out on December 23 and remain through December 27.) ¶12. (C) This meeting turned out to be far more substantive than originally anticipated. A civilian trained at the elite French Ecole Nationale d'Administration (ENA),Defense Minister Boly is believed to be one of President Compaore's OUAGADOUGO 00001136 003.2 OF 003 closest confidants. Most telling, was Boly's recognition that Burkina Faso is also subject to the AQIM threat as well as his rather pessimistic view on the immediate prospects for effective subregional counterterrorism cooperation. Building on President Compaore's regional initiatives in Togo, Cote d'Ivoire, and Guinea, the Minister is probably correct that Burkina Faso could be effective in trying to facilitate better cooperation between Mauritania, Mali , and Niger. ¶13. (U) Conakry and Tripoli Minimize Considered. HANKINS