GUINEA - BURKINABE MEDIATION TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATING PROCESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OUAGADOUGOU 001052



SIPDIS



E.O. 12928: DECL: 11/23/2014

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, GV, UV

SUBJ: GUINEA - Burkinabe Mediation To Continue Negotiating Process



REF: OUAGADOUGOU 1048



Classified by Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and

d)



1. (C) Summary: President Compaore and his team have convinced the

CNDD and Forces Vives to continue negotiations of a Guinea agreement.

Both sides are expected to formally comment on last week's mediation

"discussion paper" on November 23 with a third round of proximity

talks planned in Ouagadougou not later than November 26. Western

diplomats underscored to inherent failings of the "discussion paper"

which the Burkinabe said would be addressed -- all the while

suggesting that a solution will almost certainly need to include

Dadis in some capacity through the transition. The Burkinabe have

left the door open for some form of observer mission in any future

transition. End Summary



2. (C) Foreign Minister Convokes Western Diplomats: Foreign

Minister Bedouma Alain Yoda convoked Western heads of mission (Dutch

(representing the EU Presidency),French, German, European

Commission, and U.S. Charge) to discuss the status of President

Compaore's mediation efforts on Guinea. As noted REFTEL, Compaore

had come under tremendous press criticism when the Guinean parties

publicized last week's mediation "discussion paper" as a formal

"proposal" that effectively would have legitimated Dadis' short and

long term role as Guinean head of state. Mission sources report a

crisis mode in the Foreign Ministry over the weekend as the Burkinabe

struggled to get things back on track. With an obvious sensitivity

to the criticisms made of his president, the Foreign Minister started

the meeting with a lengthy rehash of the various Contact Group

meetings that had resulted in President Compaore being asked to

assume a mediation role in Guinea. Yoda further stressed that the

President was not acting in isolation, but in strict collaboration

with ECOWAS, the AU and the UN. Yoda said Burkina Faso "wishes to be

transparent with its partners, but also wanted the partners to be

aware of the limitations on the mediation."



3. (C) Guineans Back With The Plan: Foreign Minister Yoda said the

Burkinabe had worked through Saturday to get the two parties to

understand that the document they had alternately "accepted" and

"rejected" was not a mediation "proposal" but simply a "discussion

paper" designed to get them to focus on areas of agreement and

disagreement (Comment: The Foreign Ministry shared French and English

versions of the document and its Annex which has been sent to Embassy

Conakry and AF/W. End Comment). Yoda suggested neither side had

carefully studied the paper in its entirety previously -- instead

zeroing in only on the phrases most important to them. The Forces

Vives was cited as particularly difficult, "because it is not a party

-- rather a collection of parties, unions, and civil society -- all

of who have different specific interests." Nonetheless, Yoda said

that by Saturday evening Compaore had been able to get both sides

committed to staying engaged in the mediation process and had

"received a reiteration of their confidence in and support of the

mediator." Both sides are now expected to come back with written

comments on the "discussion paper" by the afternoon of the 23rd. He

said he understood the CNDD would have nine points of disagreement

and the Forces Vives two main objections. The parties will return to

Ouagadougou no later than November 26 for another round of proximity

talks. At this meeting, Compaore will provide a new "discussion

paper" meant to address issues raised by both sides. Yoda said

Compaore's strategy is to continue this series of Draft - Response -

New Draft for as many rounds as needed to get to something that can

work. Yoda saw three main phases: (1) setting conditions of

"serenity" allowing a transition to take place, (2) the transition

itself; and, (3) elections and their aftermath.



4. (C) Diplomats State the Obvious: The Dutch Ambassador backed by

the French Ambassador told Yoda they could clearly understand where

the Forces Vives found the text of the discussion paper unacceptable.

Both setting Dadis up as Head of State during the transition with

both executive and legislative power, and allowing Dadis to present

his candidacy for president with a theoretical absence of only four

months do not set the conditions of confidence needed for free and

fair elections. The French ambassador noted, "Having the person in

charge of maintaining 'serenity" also being a potential candidate,"

seems untenable. The European Commission Representative asked, "Why

do you have to give Dadis 'a flower" by making him Head of State.

Yoda struggled somewhat but emphasized that the terms of the

agreement would certainly change but then went on to talk about

political realities as they saw it. "The President told both sides a

solution will require sharing power during a transition -- the CNDD

will have to yield some control to the Force Vives and the Forces

Vives will have to accept a lingering CNDD power." Yoda went on,

somewhat unconvincingly, to say the mediation had to deal with

forces, not individuals, suggesting that the language in the

"discussion paper" saying "The President shall come from the CNDD,"

did not presuppose that the CNDD would select Dadis. As for the

eligibility of transition figures to run for President, Yoda noted

the basic conundrum that "the same people (CNDD and Force Vives)



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needed to give any transition credibility, also have their own

political ambitions."



5. (C) Transition Institutions: Yoda asked the diplomats to

carefully examine the paper that had been put forth to see that it

was, in fact, the Prime Minister (to be proposed by the Force Vives)

as head of the Council of Ministers who would have the power in the

transition with the President "just signing off on decisions of the

Council." The French Ambassador (working it seemed without guidance)

engaged in several detailed questions of (1) why the executive and

legislative authorities were combined? (Answer: Since the mediation

is dealing with an "exceptional circumstance," the traditional

division of institutions would prove divisive and threaten a

successful transition); (2) Why is there a need for a President at

all if the Prime Minister supposedly has the power? (Answer: A "Head

of State" is essential in the African context. With no "leader," the

government has no credibility; and, (3) If Dadis has to be given a

transition role, can it be in a more "advisory" role with no

executive authority? (Answer: Perhaps). Comment: The French

Ambassador's points did make clear a reluctant French willingness to

accept a transition role for Dadis, and perhaps run for president,

all the while trying to ensure he is defanged during that transition.

End Comment.



6. (C) Observer Mission: Charge told Yoda the U.S. shared the

substantive concerns raised by his European colleagues over Dadis as

president during the transition and his ability to present his

candidacy for the presidential elections. Charge asked whether

President Compaore was prepared to support an ECOWAS observer

mission, perhaps along the lines of the 2005 ECOWAS Mission in Togo.

Yoda replied that the CNDD would clearly reject an interpositional

force but that an observer mission might still be possible. He noted

that the discussion paper had called for an Oversight and Evaluation

Committee headed by the mediator that would be "assisted by an

International Observer Group." While that "Group" remains

intentionally undefined, Yoda saw it as leaving the door open for an

ECOWAS observer mission.



7. (U) Conakry Minimize Considered.



HANKINS