BURKINABE STILL CONFIDENT OF PROGRESS ON GUINEA - BUT NOT TOO QUICKLY

C O N F I D E N T I A L OUAGADOUGOU 001038



SIPDIS



E.O. 12928: DECL: 11/18/2014

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, GV, UV

SUBJ: BURKINABE STILL CONFIDENT OF PROGRESS ON GUINEA - BUT NOT TOO

QUICKLY



REF: CONAKRY 722



1. (C) Summary: Guinea mediator President Compaore will convene a

second round of CNDD and Forces Vives proximity talks November 19 and

20 in Ouagadougou. Bukinabe advisors indicate Compaore will present

a "synthesis paper" that pulls together agreement on most security

and humanitarian issues but recognizes fundamental differences on

political issues -- particularly the continued presence of Dadis. No

breakthrough is expected at this meeting. The Burkinabe see little

chance of an armed ECOWAS intervention force (as requested by the

Forces Vives but want more than the unarmed civilian ECOWAS

Observation Mission the CNDD has indicated it would accept.) End

Summary



2. (C) Charge met November 18 with MFA Cabinet Director Vincent

Zakane to get a read out on Burkinabe mediation efforts in Guinea.

Zakane, who has been intimately involved in President Compaore's

mediation efforts, confirmed that the two Guinean delegations as well

as AU and ECOWAS representatives would arrive in Ouagadougou today

for meetings November 19 and 20. Zakane noted that the talks would

be in proximity format since "it is still too early" to get the two

sides to sit at the table together. Zakane outlined that the two

previous visits of the Forces Vives and CNDD delegations had elicited

position papers on political, humanitarian and security issues.

Compaore had developed a synthesis from these two documents that

Zakane noted "tries to emphasize areas of convergence" in

humanitarian and security areas where "their positions are the same."

Zakane recognized that the two sides remain diametrically opposed on

the key political issues of transition back to rule of law --

particularly on the future role of Dadis. Highlighting somewhat

Compaore's limitations, Zakane noted that, as a mediator, "we have no

army to force a solution in Guinea. All we have is the force of

dialogue." Zakane, who did not share the synthesis document,

expected limited results from the November 19 and 20 talks as he

assumed the two parties would have to consult with their bases

further. Nonetheless, he said he was "personally optimistic" that

Compaore will eventually find a mutually acceptable political exit

strategy for Compaore -- noting the heavy political investment

Burkina Faso has made in this initiative.



3. (C) Charge noted that the U.S. strongly supports the idea of an

observation mission for Guinea to help stabilize the inherently

fragile situation. Zakane noted that the Forces Vives strongly

stressed the need for an armed intervention force or, at minimum, a

robust civil/military observation mission. The CNDD, on the other

hand, rejects completely the idea of an intervention force and is

opposed to a military observer element in any observation mission.

Noting that, "we can't introduce an intervention force if it will be

resisted by the Guinean armed forces," Zakane said he thought it

would be essential to have military members in any observation

mission, "to allow us to understand credibly what is going on and to

help diffuse any problems that arise with the military." Zakane

called the Guinean military "a sick institution" that, while an

important element in any solution, is itself deeply flawed.



4. (C) Noting Charge's experience in Mauritania, Zakane said the

precedents set following the Mauritanian coup played a heavy and

generally negative role in the Guinea crisis as "Dadis wants to be

treated by Aziz and the Forces Vives are afraid of being

diplomatically trapped like the Mauritanian opposition." Zakane was

critical of the recent history of international community response to

coups saying, "You reject them all but don't seem to have the will to

stick with it to the end. Coup leaders know there is a good chance

the international community will relent which, inevitably, gives them

incentive to stay on." Although somewhat contradictory from his

first argument, Zakane also criticized western efforts to exclude

individuals from post-coup elections since such exclusions "normally

stir up ethnic or tribal concerns." In the Guinea case, Zakane

noted, "Dadis has successfully personalized in himself the fate of

the Guinea Forestieres who see any effort to block his ability to

present his candidacy as an effort to marginalize their ethnic group

which has never been allowed to govern."



5. (U) Conakry Minimize considered.

HANKINS