Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09OTTAWA716
2009-09-15 15:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ottawa
Cable title:
CANADA: RESPONSE TO AUSTRALIA GROUP NON-PAPERS
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OTTAWA 000716
SIPDIS
STATE FOR ISN/CB (ASOUZA)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2019
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC CA
SUBJECT: CANADA: RESPONSE TO AUSTRALIA GROUP NON-PAPERS
REF: A. STATE 087595
B. STATE 087596
C. STATE 087597
D. STATE 088010
Classified By: PolMinCouns Scott Bellard, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OTTAWA 000716
SIPDIS
STATE FOR ISN/CB (ASOUZA)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2019
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC CA
SUBJECT: CANADA: RESPONSE TO AUSTRALIA GROUP NON-PAPERS
REF: A. STATE 087595
B. STATE 087596
C. STATE 087597
D. STATE 088010
Classified By: PolMinCouns Scott Bellard, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: Canada sees no immediate problem with the
proposals contained in the non-papers drawn from reftel, but
is concerned about the system for classification of AG
documents, given that there are now 41 members. Canada sees
no advantage in inviting Russia to join the AG, but foresees
no political problems with inviting Brazil, Mexico,
Kazakhstan, and Serbia to join. Ottawa insists that
candidates must prove they have effective export control
regimes in place before becoming members. The Canadians
recognize Synthetic Biology as an area of concern. End
summary.
2. (SBU) In a September 8 meeting with polmiloff, Deputy
Director Louis-Philippe Sylvestre of the Office of
Nonproliferation and Disarmament at the Department of Foreign
Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) expressed
appreciation for non-papers from reftels, and confirmed that
nothing them seemed problematic. He nonetheless requested
additional time to seek specific comments from Canadian
technical experts.
--------------
Classification of AG Papers
--------------
3. (SBU) Sylvestre raised the issue of classification of
Australia Group documents. He noted that the U.S. papers had
been tabled and were being circulated on unclassified
networks with the caveat "Australia Group in Confidence." He
expressed concern that these documents carried the same
classification as sensitive information related to denials of
exports or to problematic Iranian activities. With
forty-one AG member countries, the risk of dissemination of
documents is increased, and, since each member has access to
the Australia Group Information System (AGIS),more
restrictive classification of AG documents should not limit
legitimate information sharing among members.
--------------
Membership
--------------
4. (C) With regard to Russia's desire to be invited to join
the AG, Sylvestre observed that "nothing has changed, since
nothing has happened." Canada sees no advantage in bringing
Russia into the AG, he confirmed. Sylvestre predicted
problems in intelligence sharing in the event Russia joined
the AG, and commented that Moscow had not demonstrated good
faith and should not be invited to join until Russia has
"clean hands."
5. (C) However, Sylvestre said there should be no political
problem in admitting Brazil or Mexico. He suggested that it
would be good to have more non-EU members in the AG, but
insisted that the AG must do its homework beforehand. From
the technical point of view, the AG must examine the export
control provisions in place for any prospective member, and
be satisfied as to their effectiveness. Mexico, in
particular, must prove that it has the mechanisms in place to
exercise meaningful export controls, he commented.
6. (C) With regard to Kazakhstan and Serbia, Sylvestre again
said there should be no particular political impediment, so
long as they are held to the same standard of proof as other
candidates. He described the Global Partnership Program with
Kazakhstan as "a positive engagement." He acknowledged the
QKazakhstan as "a positive engagement." He acknowledged the
potential for political downsides with respect to Russia,
especially in light of past FSU activities in the country.
For Canada, this aspect is less important than verifying that
real export controls are in place.
--------------
Synthetic Biology
--------------
7. (C) Sylvestre deferred to the experts on his delegation
OTTAWA 00000716 002 OF 002
for detailed analysis of the proliferation risks posed by
advances in synthetic biology. He observed that the U.S. and
EU approaches represent two ends of the scale. Sylvestre
recognized synthetic biology as an area of concern, but noted
that it is a field which requires considerable sophistication.
Visit Canada,s North American partnership community at
http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap /
BREESE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR ISN/CB (ASOUZA)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2019
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC CA
SUBJECT: CANADA: RESPONSE TO AUSTRALIA GROUP NON-PAPERS
REF: A. STATE 087595
B. STATE 087596
C. STATE 087597
D. STATE 088010
Classified By: PolMinCouns Scott Bellard, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: Canada sees no immediate problem with the
proposals contained in the non-papers drawn from reftel, but
is concerned about the system for classification of AG
documents, given that there are now 41 members. Canada sees
no advantage in inviting Russia to join the AG, but foresees
no political problems with inviting Brazil, Mexico,
Kazakhstan, and Serbia to join. Ottawa insists that
candidates must prove they have effective export control
regimes in place before becoming members. The Canadians
recognize Synthetic Biology as an area of concern. End
summary.
2. (SBU) In a September 8 meeting with polmiloff, Deputy
Director Louis-Philippe Sylvestre of the Office of
Nonproliferation and Disarmament at the Department of Foreign
Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) expressed
appreciation for non-papers from reftels, and confirmed that
nothing them seemed problematic. He nonetheless requested
additional time to seek specific comments from Canadian
technical experts.
--------------
Classification of AG Papers
--------------
3. (SBU) Sylvestre raised the issue of classification of
Australia Group documents. He noted that the U.S. papers had
been tabled and were being circulated on unclassified
networks with the caveat "Australia Group in Confidence." He
expressed concern that these documents carried the same
classification as sensitive information related to denials of
exports or to problematic Iranian activities. With
forty-one AG member countries, the risk of dissemination of
documents is increased, and, since each member has access to
the Australia Group Information System (AGIS),more
restrictive classification of AG documents should not limit
legitimate information sharing among members.
--------------
Membership
--------------
4. (C) With regard to Russia's desire to be invited to join
the AG, Sylvestre observed that "nothing has changed, since
nothing has happened." Canada sees no advantage in bringing
Russia into the AG, he confirmed. Sylvestre predicted
problems in intelligence sharing in the event Russia joined
the AG, and commented that Moscow had not demonstrated good
faith and should not be invited to join until Russia has
"clean hands."
5. (C) However, Sylvestre said there should be no political
problem in admitting Brazil or Mexico. He suggested that it
would be good to have more non-EU members in the AG, but
insisted that the AG must do its homework beforehand. From
the technical point of view, the AG must examine the export
control provisions in place for any prospective member, and
be satisfied as to their effectiveness. Mexico, in
particular, must prove that it has the mechanisms in place to
exercise meaningful export controls, he commented.
6. (C) With regard to Kazakhstan and Serbia, Sylvestre again
said there should be no particular political impediment, so
long as they are held to the same standard of proof as other
candidates. He described the Global Partnership Program with
Kazakhstan as "a positive engagement." He acknowledged the
QKazakhstan as "a positive engagement." He acknowledged the
potential for political downsides with respect to Russia,
especially in light of past FSU activities in the country.
For Canada, this aspect is less important than verifying that
real export controls are in place.
--------------
Synthetic Biology
--------------
7. (C) Sylvestre deferred to the experts on his delegation
OTTAWA 00000716 002 OF 002
for detailed analysis of the proliferation risks posed by
advances in synthetic biology. He observed that the U.S. and
EU approaches represent two ends of the scale. Sylvestre
recognized synthetic biology as an area of concern, but noted
that it is a field which requires considerable sophistication.
Visit Canada,s North American partnership community at
http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap /
BREESE