Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09OTTAWA707
2009-09-11 19:26:00
SECRET
Embassy Ottawa
Cable title:
CANADA: SHARING U.S. VIEWS ON THE LATEST IAEA
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S E C R E T OTTAWA 000707
SIPDIS
STATE FOR ISN/RA -- MICHAEL BEDKE AND JODY DANIEL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2019
TAGS: PARM KNNP IAEA MNUC TRGY PREL SY IR CA
SUBJECT: CANADA: SHARING U.S. VIEWS ON THE LATEST IAEA
REPORTS ON IRAN AND SYRIA
REF: STATE 91633
Classified By: PolMinCouns Scott Bellard, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
S E C R E T OTTAWA 000707
SIPDIS
STATE FOR ISN/RA -- MICHAEL BEDKE AND JODY DANIEL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2019
TAGS: PARM KNNP IAEA MNUC TRGY PREL SY IR CA
SUBJECT: CANADA: SHARING U.S. VIEWS ON THE LATEST IAEA
REPORTS ON IRAN AND SYRIA
REF: STATE 91633
Classified By: PolMinCouns Scott Bellard, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: Canada is in full agreement with U.S. views
concerning Iranian and Syrian nuclear-related activities.
Ottawa is prepared to consider additional steps, and seeks
enhanced dialogue and coordination with the U.S., as well as
additional insights into U.S. thinking for the G20 and UNSC.
End summary.
2. (C) In a September 10 meeting with polmiloff, Deputy
Director Shawn Caza of the Non-Proliferation and Nuclear
Disarmament Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade (DFAIT) confirmed that Ottawa agreed with
all the U.S. views on the latest IAEA reports on Iran and
Syria (reftel). He welcomed the very close coordination
between the U.S. and Canada on the issue of the Iranian
nuclear program, underscoring that "we are pretty well
stitched up."
3. (S) Caza predicted that the IAEA General Conference next
week in Vienna would likely produce no resolutions, but that
"like-minded" nations would have to manage the conference's
response to issues related to the Middle East. He asked more
generally about the direction of U.S. thinking on Iran,
noting that "there are not a lot of easy options left." He
also asked for close and sustained dialogue related to U.S.
plans at the G20 meeting and at the UN, including prospects
for additional action within the UN Security Council. Caza
indicated that there was political appetite in Ottawa to do
more, but that Canada would not act alone. Canada would,
however, be eager to "join in" on any U.S. initiatives, he
added, cautioning that any additional sanctions would
nonetheless be labor-intensive for Canada, requiring formal
amendments to existing regulatory regimes since Canada does
not have an Executive Order process for such cases.
4. (C) Caza opined that perhaps the time had come to
consider new approaches, even to include "going after" the
oil sector in Iran. He acknowledged the likely difficulty in
persuading European partners to agree to such measures, but
argued that the waiver granted for the Russians to continue
their existing cooperation program limited the effectiveness
Qtheir existing cooperation program limited the effectiveness
of current efforts.
Visit Canada,s North American partnership community at
http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap /
BREESE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR ISN/RA -- MICHAEL BEDKE AND JODY DANIEL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2019
TAGS: PARM KNNP IAEA MNUC TRGY PREL SY IR CA
SUBJECT: CANADA: SHARING U.S. VIEWS ON THE LATEST IAEA
REPORTS ON IRAN AND SYRIA
REF: STATE 91633
Classified By: PolMinCouns Scott Bellard, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: Canada is in full agreement with U.S. views
concerning Iranian and Syrian nuclear-related activities.
Ottawa is prepared to consider additional steps, and seeks
enhanced dialogue and coordination with the U.S., as well as
additional insights into U.S. thinking for the G20 and UNSC.
End summary.
2. (C) In a September 10 meeting with polmiloff, Deputy
Director Shawn Caza of the Non-Proliferation and Nuclear
Disarmament Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade (DFAIT) confirmed that Ottawa agreed with
all the U.S. views on the latest IAEA reports on Iran and
Syria (reftel). He welcomed the very close coordination
between the U.S. and Canada on the issue of the Iranian
nuclear program, underscoring that "we are pretty well
stitched up."
3. (S) Caza predicted that the IAEA General Conference next
week in Vienna would likely produce no resolutions, but that
"like-minded" nations would have to manage the conference's
response to issues related to the Middle East. He asked more
generally about the direction of U.S. thinking on Iran,
noting that "there are not a lot of easy options left." He
also asked for close and sustained dialogue related to U.S.
plans at the G20 meeting and at the UN, including prospects
for additional action within the UN Security Council. Caza
indicated that there was political appetite in Ottawa to do
more, but that Canada would not act alone. Canada would,
however, be eager to "join in" on any U.S. initiatives, he
added, cautioning that any additional sanctions would
nonetheless be labor-intensive for Canada, requiring formal
amendments to existing regulatory regimes since Canada does
not have an Executive Order process for such cases.
4. (C) Caza opined that perhaps the time had come to
consider new approaches, even to include "going after" the
oil sector in Iran. He acknowledged the likely difficulty in
persuading European partners to agree to such measures, but
argued that the waiver granted for the Russians to continue
their existing cooperation program limited the effectiveness
Qtheir existing cooperation program limited the effectiveness
of current efforts.
Visit Canada,s North American partnership community at
http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap /
BREESE