CANADA WELCOMES U.S. OUTREACH ON MISSILE TECHNOLOGY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OTTAWA 000700 SIPDIS STATE FOR ISN/MTR AND WHA/CAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2019 TAGS: PREL PARM MNUC MTCRE ETTC KSCA TSPA CA SUBJECT: CANADA WELCOMES U.S. OUTREACH ON MISSILE TECHNOLOGY REF: OTTAWA 616 Classified By: A/PolCouns Kurt van der Walde, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Canadian nonproliferation and enforcement officers told visiting U.S. officials that Canada is in broad agreement with U.S. goals for the upcoming plenary session of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Canadian political leaders are likely to support U.S. efforts to single out Iran and North Korea in the plenary press release. Officials promised to take immediate steps to widen the scope of Canada's Controlled Goods Program beyond nuclear materials to include missile technology. They also agreed to consider ways to enhance visa screening for proliferation concerns as part of the effort to control the transfer of intangible technology. Beyond specific policy agreement, Canadian officials expressed a clear desire to work as closely as possible with the U.S. on nonproliferation issues. End summary. ¶2. (C) Pam Durham, Director of the Office of Missile Threat Reduction in the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN/MTR),and Deputy Director Ralph Palmiero, visited Ottawa September 1-2 in preparation for the November Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) plenary in Rio De Janeiro. Durham met with Canadian border security and nonproliferation officials from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT),the Canadian Border Security Agency (CBSA),Public Safety Canada, and Public Works Canada to discuss controls on the flow of intangible technology. ¶3. (C)In an initial meeting with DFAIT Director General of the International Security Bureau Don Sinclair, Durham expressed the administration's desire to reinvigorate U.S. engagement with partners, especially Canada, which has been an MTCR leader. Sinclair welcomed the renewed U.S. emphasis on diplomacy and pledged Canada's commitment, concluding that it is morally incumbent on Canada to support the objectives of the MTCR. ¶4. (C) Durham sought Canadian support for specific U.S. objectives at the November MTCR Plenary. She noted that the U.S. favored an explicit focus on regional nonproliferation with specific references to Iran and North Korea. Durham argued that "it would be wrong" if the MTCR did not act, and that the press release following the plenary should cite Iran and North Korea by name. She also called for partners to use their bilateral relationships to urge other nations not to do business with these two countries. Palmiero also noted a number of papers the U.S. intends to present at the Plenary Information Exchange (IE) to include discussions of the overlap between ballistic missile and space launch vehicle technology, missile program developments in Iran, North Korea, and Syria, emerging technologies, and an update of the Machine Tools Handbook that many partners have found especially useful. Durham strongly urged Canada to reassert its traditional role as a leading MTCR partner by presenting papers within the IE. ¶5. (C) Sinclair reiterated that Canada values U.S. leadership, noting we enjoy seamless cooperation on many of these issues. He agreed with the U.S. objectives, underscoring that pushing on Iran and DPRK would not be a problem for the Canadian Government. He cautioned that Canada was likely to be more "vitriolic" on Iran than on DPRK, but assured that senior political leaders are willing to "name names." ¶6. (C) Subsequent meetings with policy and enforcement officials focused on methods to improve visa screening for Qofficials focused on methods to improve visa screening for applicants seeking access to controlled technology and research in areas such as aerospace engineering and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) technology. Durham pointed out that the Department's ISN bureau screens more than 60,000 visa applications each year for proliferation concerns. CBSA enforcement and DFAIT officials replied that Canada's Controlled Goods Program has been more focused on nuclear materials than on missile technology. They promised to take immediate steps to broaden the program's scope. Under provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA),Canada can deny visa applications if there exists "reasonable grounds to believe" that the applicant intends to engage in activities detrimental to Canadian national security. CBSA refers applications of concern to the Security Screening Branch of the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS),which can seek further information from the Office of Intelligence Operations. CBSA also seeks advisory opinions from DFAIT before making its recommendation to the overseas post adjudicating the visa application. Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) officials underscored that derogatory information warranting denial of a visa application must be related to the OTTAWA 00000700 002 OF 002 individual applicant, rather than to a class of applicants, such as all Syrian aerospace engineers. Canadian and U.S. officials agreed on the difficulty in tracking or determining the intent of foreign graduate students once they have entered the country. DFAIT and other agencies pledged to review the aerospace file to improve screening procedures and expand the scope of control programs. ¶7. (C) In further discussions of preparations for the November MTCR plenary, Canadian officials expressed their eagerness to incorporate U.S.-drafted "Frequently Asked Questions" (FAQs) regarding the MTCR into the Regime website, which they administer. As part of their goal of expanding outreach, the Canadians will translate the FAQs into French and "make them their own" for presentation to the Plenary. Other topics of discussion for the Information Exchange and Law Enforcement Working Group include new developments in brokering transfers, shipping trends, and new proliferation trends. The Canadians agreed with the U.S. desire to clarify controls on windtunnels, and the need to improve end user verifications and visa screening procedures. The Canadians favored U.S. proposals for presenting enforcement case studies, and examining proliferant procurement practices. ¶8. (C) Comment: Beyond the specific policy agreement demonstrated by these meetings, the Canadians showed a clear desire to work as closely as possible with the U.S. on nonproliferation issues. They appreciated the emphasis on diplomatic engagement and admitted they had discovered gaps in their own enforcement practices, which they will take steps to rectify. Visit Canada,s North American partnership community at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap / BREESE