CANADA ON RECONCILIATION OF AFGHAN INSURGENTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L OTTAWA 000486

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/A - T. REOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2019
TAGS: PREL MOPS NATO AF CA
SUBJECT: CANADA ON RECONCILIATION OF AFGHAN INSURGENTS

Classified By: A/PolMinCouns Kurt van der Walde,
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade (DFAIT) officials want to coordinate with
State Department counterparts on the development of a plan
for the reconciliation of Afghan insurgents. In particular,
the Canadians would like to hear current U.S. thinking on
security, status, monitoring, UNSCR 1267 implementation, and
unified messaging with respect to potential "reconcilees."
DFAIT officials want to discuss the matter before the G-8
meeting in Trieste. End summary.


2. (C) On June 22, DFAIT Afghanistan Task Force (FTAG)
Deputy Director for Counterinsurgency and Security Niall
Cronin briefed pol/mil officer on Canadian thinking about
potential reconciliation of insurgents in Afghanistan.
Cronin asked for State Department feedback this week, before
special envoys meet to discuss the matter on the margins of
the G-8 meeting in Trieste, June 25-27.


3. (C) Cronin recounted an informal meeting Canada hosted in
Washington on May 14 where Canada, the UK, the U.S. (DOD
only),Australia, and the Netherlands, as well as a
representative from UNAMA, discussed the development of a
"contact and facilitation plan" for allies to deal with
potential reconcilees. There was agreement at the meeting
that the ongoing influx of U.S. troops into RC-S likely would
lead to a "burst of requests" for reconciliation, he said.
It would be important, he observed, for allies to adopt the
same general principles for dealing with opponents seeking to
quit the fight:

-- authorities must have the means to assure former
insurgents' security and status. Assurances for an insurgent
leader who leads 200 men away from the insurgency would be
different than those made to a single fighter defecting from
an insurgent force, Cronin added;

-- authorities must have the capability to monitor former
insurgent leaders and fighters to ensure that they do not
directly or indirectly support, or rejoin, the insurgency;

-- allies must agree on how to implement UNSCR 1267 with
respect to former insurgents;

-- allies and the Afghan authorities should agree to a
single, unified message to promote the defection of
"reconcilable" insurgents to the government side. Even
subtle differences in messages would sow confusion and
undermine the effort, he warned.


4. (C) Cronin said that some partners had opposed the
creation of a reconciliation plan, asserting at a March
meeting of Regional Command-South (RC-S) partners that the
time was not right, or that reconciliation should be
Afghan-led. Cronin noted that Canada, the U.S., and the UK
had countered that allies needed to be ready with an agreed
plan "for when the time was right to engage insurgents
seeking to quit the fight." He commented that the main
take-away from the subsequent May 14 meeting was that key
partners in RC-S are close to agreement on how best to
address the matter in a way that respects allied redlines.
The only discordant note sounded among allies during the
session, he observed, was a British Embassy Kabul initiative
to drop the requirement that acceptance of the Afghan
constitution be a precondition to reconciliation. According
to Cronin, that particular view was not shared by British
officials in London.


5. (C) Action request: Cronin emphasized that Canada would
like to benefit from the State Department's current thinking
on reconciliation before special envoys meet to discuss the
Qon reconciliation before special envoys meet to discuss the
matter in Trieste. Embassy Ottawa requests SCA subject
matter experts engage Cronin upon receipt of this message.

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