Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09OSLO653
2009-10-28 16:37:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Oslo
Cable title:  

ANALYSIS OF FM STOERE'S PUBLIC COMMENTS DEFENDING

Tags:  ASEC NO PREL PTER 
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VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNY #0653/01 3011637
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 281637Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY OSLO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7916
INFO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0639
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 2566
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY 8109
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 1790
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 3440
RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T OSLO 000653 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR S/GC, EUR/NB, INR, P, S/CT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2024
TAGS: ASEC NO PREL PTER
SUBJECT: ANALYSIS OF FM STOERE'S PUBLIC COMMENTS DEFENDING
NORWAY'S DECISION NOT TO TAKE GTMO DETAINEES

REF: A. A: OSLO 551 (EAC MEETING)

B. B: HEG/SILBERSTEIN (OSLO-EUR/NB) EMAILS 9/25/09

C. C: OSLO 403 (BHATTI RELEASED FROM PRISON) AND
PREVIOUS

D. D: TD-314/059524-09 AND TD-314/059229-09 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Charge d'affaires, a.i. James T. Heg for reasons 1.4 (b)
, (c) and (d)

S E C R E T OSLO 000653

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR S/GC, EUR/NB, INR, P, S/CT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2024
TAGS: ASEC NO PREL PTER
SUBJECT: ANALYSIS OF FM STOERE'S PUBLIC COMMENTS DEFENDING
NORWAY'S DECISION NOT TO TAKE GTMO DETAINEES

REF: A. A: OSLO 551 (EAC MEETING)

B. B: HEG/SILBERSTEIN (OSLO-EUR/NB) EMAILS 9/25/09

C. C: OSLO 403 (BHATTI RELEASED FROM PRISON) AND
PREVIOUS

D. D: TD-314/059524-09 AND TD-314/059229-09 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Charge d'affaires, a.i. James T. Heg for reasons 1.4 (b)
, (c) and (d)


1. (SBU) This is an ACTION MESSAGE - please see para 7. In
comments to the media published October 19, Foreign Minister
Jonas Gahr Stoere explained and defended Norway's decision
not to offer to take Guantanamo detainees at this time, a
decision which came to public attention in Norway two days
earlier in an article in Dagbladet newspaper that included an
interview with Special Envoy for Guantanamo Closure Daniel
Fried. An MFA spokesman was quoted in that article as
saying, "We have not received any requests from the Americans
to accept prisoners from Guantanamo. Fried has not been in
Norway, nor has anyone from his office, regarding Guantanamo."


2. (SBU) Stoere's decision not to offer to take detainees,
and his defense of that decision, were widely debated and
criticized in the Norwegian media throughout the past week.
His main arguments -- the fact that Norway's asylum system
was already under pressure and that Norway was already
dealing with demanding national security cases like that of
Mullah Krekar -- were refuted as "ludicrous." How could 1-3
additional inhabitants further strain the asylum system, one
editorial asked; how could people who are cleared for release
and don't necessarily present a threat be put in the same
national security category as Krekar? Stoere responded to
the criticism October 24 with an op-ed in Aftenposten
newspaper under the headline "Guantanamo is the U.S.'s
responsibility" (transcribed in full below). He emphasized
that none of the U.S. states have indicated a willingness to
accept prisoners from the special group of some 60
individuals in question, and added, "we should not
underestimate the challenges setlement of such individuals
will entail. One cannt assume that these prisoners will
consititute a hreat to national security. But neither can
one reclude it, with the consequences that would invole
regarding visible security measures, etc."

. (S/NF) One factor behind Norway's position, and o which
Stoere's language about "already dealing ith national
security cases" and "visiblesecurity measures" might
indirectly refer, is that Norway does not have the physical
or technical resources to provide surveillance even for the
needs already identified by the Protective Security Service,

or PST. In RAO's October 20 meeting with the outgoing
Director of te Norwegian Police Security Service (PST),Jorn
Holme, (a meeting which was unrelated to the Krekar or GMTO
issues),Holme indicated that PST's limited technical and
physical surveillance resources were fully taxed responding
to a high priority Al-Qaida related investigation about which
RAO has been reporting since June (See Ref A EAC meeting and
Ref D TDs). Holme said that as a consequence of this
investigation, PST has had to divert all of its surveillance
resources to this case, drawing them away from other high
priorities, such as Krekar and counter-intelligence threats,
particularly Russia. Holme said that this 24/7 mobilization
had put tremendous pressure on these surveillance resources,
which he claimed were nearing exhaustion. Stoere would have
been unable to mention this in a public response, but the
facts Holme mentioned likely play a significant role in the
Norwegian calculus on this matter.

Background Note on Mullah Krekar Case
--------------


4. (U) Mullah Krekar, the former leader of Ansar al Islam,
was apprehended in transit by the Dutch in September 2002 and
then deported to Norway, where he has had refugee status
since the early 1990s. The USG worked with both the Dutch and
the Norwegians to develop a criminal case against Krekar, but
was unable to assemble sufficient useable evidence. While
Krekar has never been charged with any crimes in the U.S.,
Ansar al Islam is designated under two U.S. counterterrorism
authorities, and is included on the UN consolidated sanctions

list because of its links to Al Qaida. Norway has restricted
Krekar's movements and has frozen his funding. He has been
ordered deported from Norway, but to date, Norway says it has
been unable to receive sufficient human rights assurances
from the Iraqis to proceed with deportation. Krekar was the
subject of an episode of the NBC series "The Wanted,"
broadcast in the U.S. on July 20, 2009. On July 19, the MFA
issued a press release addressing the GON's handling of the
case. Post understood from media the the Norwegian government
might try to advance discussions with Iraq on this issue on
the margins of UNGA, but we have heard no sign that such
discussions took place. End Background Note.

Comment
--------------


5. (S/NF) Norway's lack of bench depth with surveillance
resources has been an issue for the USG before. When an Oslo
court released Arfan Bhatti from prison in June 2009 pending
a retrial on the attempted murder portion of his conviction
(Ref C),PST could not provide nearly the amount of
surveillance as would be expected for a person who had
planned attacks on the U.S. and Israeli embassies and had
carried out a shooting at the Oslo synagogue. That re-trial
is now set to begin around November 4, and in the meantime
Bhatti has been living freely at home with an obligation to
report to the police once a day. Another problem with
Norway's resources and structure for dealing with counter
terrorism cases and issues in general has been the inadequate
legal framework provided by Norway's anti-terrorism law. The
law requires a suspect to proceed to a late stage -- or
practically complete -- a terrorist act before a case
against him can be successfully prosecuted. The law
additionally requires proof of intent to commit an act of
terrorism, which is harder to prove than the mere intention
to commit an act (such as possession of explosives and plans
to explode a bomb). These are larger problems which are not
new, and are issues on which we need to be ready to engage
the Norwegians in the months ahead after the arrival of our
new Ambassador this week.


6. (C/NF) Comment Continued: Norway has significant financial
resources at its disposal, as evidenced by the assets held in
its Global Pension Fund. The GON's decision over many years
not to devote what we would consider sufficient budgetary
resources to expanding its surveillance and counter terrorism
capabilities is therefore just that - a political decision.
That decision, to some degree, can be traced to the GON's
mentality that "Norway is good, has few enemies, and a
terrorist act cannot happen here." It is also driven by the
generous welfare-state-focused priorities which are largely
accepted across the political spectrum here. The same
calculus affects Norway's spending on defense. Outgoing Chief
of Defense Sverre Diesen complained publicly in recent weeks
that Norway does not spend enough to meet its most basic
defense needs, let alone enough to match its global
aspirations. Such budget decisions stem in part also from a
self-imposed fiscal conservatism in which the government
directs itself not to spend more from the Global Pension Fund
in a given year than the Fund is projected to earn in that
year, which amounts to about four percent of the entire Fund
on average.

Action Request
--------------


7. (C) ACTION REQUEST: Post requests the Department provide
guidance and suggested talking points on the GTMO and Krekar
cases which our incoming Ambassador can use with Minister of
Foreign Affairs Stoere, Minister of Justice Storberget, or
the new PST chief in his introductory calls on those
officials in the days after he presents his credentials to
the King on November 5.

Embassy Translation of FM Stoere's op-ed "GUANTANAMO IS THE
U.S.'s RESPONSIBILITY
-------------- --------------


8. (U) FM Stoere's op-ed appeared in Aftenposten Saturday,
October 24. The gist of it was covered in Embassy Oslo's

press summary email to the Department Monday, October 26.
Begin text:

"Norway has made it clear that we are not ready to accept
prisoners from the Guantanamo prison camp. The editorial in
Aftenposten October 19 about Norway's position is in need of
some nuance.

"Norway, like other European nations, has been in contact
with the U.S. on this issue during the past months. We have
not so far received a specific request regarding the
acceptance of prisoners from GTMO. But when a U.S. official
in Dagbladet October 17 urges Norway to accept prisoners, it
becomes necessary to clarify Norway's position.

"Our position is based on a collective assessment of several
factors. By closing the GTMO base, Obama is straightening up
an untenable situation created by the Bush administration. It
is important to establish that it is a U.S. responsibility to
administer the people who are imprisoned in the camp.

"Most of them will stand trial in the U.S. But a group of
about 60 individuals cannot, for various reasons, be taken to
court in the U.S. or be returned to their home countries:
they cannot be returned because of teh treatment one fears
they may be subjected to, and they cannot be brought to trial
in the U.S. because the evidence against them is deemed
insufficient, and also in some cases, because torture has
been used in interrogations. It is individuals from this
group that the U.S. has urged European nations to accept.

"We have noted that none of the U.S. states have indicated a
willingness to accept prisoners from this group. It is a
challenging message to other nations, that the U.S. itself
is unwilling to settle anyone from this group on its own
soil.

"Furthermore, we should not underestimate the challenges
settlement of such individuals will entail. One cannot assume
that these prisoners will constitute a threat to national
security. But neither can one preclude it, with the
consequences that would involve regarding visible security
measures, etc.

"The Government must ensure that there is respect and
acceptance for the entire range of immigration issues, where
asylum, residency on humanitarian grounds, and labor
migration are by public opinion perceived as coherent parts
of a whole. In a situation where there is considerable
pressure on the immigration issue, this is an additional
reason why Norway currently has not given a green light to
accept prisoners from Guantanamo. This is moreover a position
that has broad support from the parties in the Storting
(parliament)."

End text of Embassy translation.




HEG

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