NORWAY: "EVEN WE MIGHT HAVE TO VOTE AGAINST NEW

C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000634 SIPDIS FOR IO/RHS (KRAZZOUK,CENAV),IO/UNP (AMORRISON),NEA/IPA (JGIAUQUE),USUN/NY (ASCHEDLBAUER, EGERMAIN),GENEVA (MCASSAYRE) E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2019 TAGS: PREL PHUM PTER IS KPAL NO SUBJECT: NORWAY: "EVEN WE MIGHT HAVE TO VOTE AGAINST NEW GOLDSTONE RESOLUTION" REF: A: STATE 106423 B: OSLO 601 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: A/DCM Cherrie S. Daniels for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) A/DCM (PolEconcouns) delivered Ref A demarche to head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Middle East Section, Jorn Gjelstad, on October 14 prior to the open UNSC meeting on the Middle East in New York. Generally, Gjelstad was very positive and emphasized the congruencies between U.S. and Norwegian priorities. (Comment: Previous meetings with MFA officials on Goldstone, per Ref B, had emphasized how far apart the U.S. and Norway were on this issue. Gjelstad's responses and tone during this demarche were thus on the conciliatory side of average for the GON. End comment.) He shared the USG view that it was not useful to have a substantive debate on the Goldstone Report in the UNSC on October 14, and that the priority should be to successfully launch negotiations on final status issues. Norway's statement in New York later that day would reflect those principles, he reported. ¶2. (C) Regarding the October 15-16 special session of the UN Human Rights Commission (HRC),Gjelstad reported that Norway's aim is to contribute to a process that would turn the new Palestinian draft Goldstone resolution into something more moderate - into a form that some states might be able, at a minimum, to abstain from. However, after a thorough discussion about all the points in Ref A, he held out the possibility that "even Norway" might be forced to vote against the resolution if, as it currently seems, the Palestinians and the OIC succeed in including many unrelated and unhelpful issues into the text. (He mentioned the status of East Jerusalem as an example he had already heard about.) ¶3. (C) Gjelstad said the Palestinians feel "boxed in" by overwhelming domestic political concerns, and President Abbas must regain some domestic political momentum on this issue. The Norwegians were advising the Palestinians to take a pragmatic approach and seek language that could be seen as constructive; but in the current political environment, the GON was not hopeful they would take this advice. Thus, a new resolution could lead to a situation in which "even hardcore supporters like Norway might have to vote no," (Gjelstad's exact words). ¶4. (C) Gjelstad reiterated that while Norway agreed that the UNSC session October 14 was not the venue to discuss the Goldstone Report, and agreed also that debate should remain in the HRC as long as possible to give negotiations a chance to take off, Norway does not/not want the Report to be "buried in the HRC," either by the parties or by the UNSC. After the Report was issued, Foreign Minister Stoere laid out Norway's overall objective that international humanitarian and human rights law be upheld. But the "follow up" on the Goldstone Report which the Norwegians seek does not "necessarily" mean an international mechanism through the UNSC or through the ICC. Therefore, Norway's policy is largely in line with ours, Gjelstad said, in that the parties themselves have the most immediate duty to investigate abuses uncovered by the report. He committed to pass all our points to the Norwegian delegation in Geneva and ask them to coordinate closely with the U.S. delegation during the October 15-16 session to make the best of the very difficult situation brought about by Palestinian public and wider Arab reactions to the Abbas government's handling of the Goldstone issue. HEG