IRAN NUCLEAR FACILITY DEMARCHE REDUX, THIS TIME

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 OSLO 000609 SIPDIS STATE FOR IO, ISN, EUR/NB, NEA/IRAN, USUN/W E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2019 TAGS: IR MNUC NO PARM PREL SUBJECT: IRAN NUCLEAR FACILITY DEMARCHE REDUX, THIS TIME JOINTLY WITH FRENCH AND UK DCMS REF: A. A: STATE 100153 ¶B. B: OSLO 598 Classified By: Charge d'affaires, a.i. James T. Heg, Reasons 1.4 b and d. ¶1. (C) Summary: Then-Charge d'affaires Daniels (now A/DCM upon the return of Post's charge later on October 2) followed up post's initial Iran nuclear facility demarche of September 25 with an additional demarche October 2 to the acting head of the Norwegian MFA's Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Department, Amb. Knut Langeland. This time the demarche was conducted jointly with the French and UK DCMs in Oslo, with each country speaking separately from their respective capitals' points on the matter. The joint demarche was at the British and French Embassies' initiative, based on instructions they received after the Obama-Sarkozy-Brown joint statement in Pittsburgh September 25. The timing for a second shot at our own Iran demarche was fortuitious, as it allowed for an extensive discussion of Norway's views of the nuclear facility in Qom and its views on the outcome of the P5 plus 1 talks just ended in Geneva. France and the UK were strong in emphasizing that the ball is squarely in Iran's court to act soon and decisively to meet its international obligations or face increased pressure from a united international community. (Note: Post subsequently received State 103219 with guidance on next steps to follow up with host governments regarding P5 plus One discussions; we will deliver those points separately.) End Summary. ¶2. (C) The U.S. Charge d'affaires, a.i., took part in a productive joint demarche October 2 with the UK and French DCMs to Amb. Knut Langeland, acting head of the Norwegian MFA's Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Department. From the U.S. side, post delivered points from Ref A and points drawn from the President Obama's statement September 25 in Pittsburgh with French President Sarkozy and UK PM Brown. Charge also handed over a copy of President Obama's statement October 1 upon the conclusion of the Geneva talks. MFA Senior Advisor Erling Skjonsberg and MFA Iran desk officer Mai Tonheim also participated. (Tonheim received post's initial working-level demarche September 25 and offered the interim reply reported Ref B.) ¶3. (C) French DCM de Corail opened with strong points emphasizing that Iran's claim that its Qom facility is intended for civilian use is not credible. Iran's secret construction of the Qom facility was "yet another violation of five UNSC resolutions and nine IAEA Board of Governors resolutions, as well as of relevant Nuclear Safeguards agreements to declare nuclear projects," he said. France sought Norway's support for the position outlined by President Sarkozy in Pittsburgh. First, that Iran allow IAEA inspectors in to investigate quickly and provide a detailed report on the Qom facility. And second, if by December there is no sign of action by Iran, additional international sanctions will have to be taken. ¶4. (C) UK DCM Hill followed up with points from UK PM Brown's statement in Pittsburgh, emphasizing the next steps lie with Iran to restore the confidence of the international community (IC). "The patience of the IC is running out, and is nearly exhausted already, and then we have Qom," he said, adding, "refusing to face facts is not negotiations, and refusing to cooperate with the IAEA is not diplomacy." In points he noted were written before the October 1 Geneva talks but were still as relevant afterward, Hill concluded by saying, "It's time for Iran to decide what it wants to do. If the Iranians do not act along lines outlined to them by the EU 3 plus three, then we will act. It is Iran's choice." The U.S. charge d'affaires, a.i., reiterated relevant points from Ref A and read from (and provided copies of) President Obama's statement in Washington October 1 upon the conclusion of the Geneva P5 plus 1 talks. Concrete and specific actions by Iran -- not agreements -- are what matters now, and time is of the essence, she emphasized. Norway Associates with P5 plus 1 position and EU position in Vienna -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Ambassador Langeland received the three countries' demarches in very positive terms and engaged constructively and thoughtfully in an hour-long conversation largely focused on Norway's strong support for the P5 plus 1 positions. Norway is very pleased with what it has heard about the Geneva talks, characterizing them as more useful than anticipated. "Norway remains committed to a negotiated OSLO 00000609 002 OF 003 outcome, but we support pressure, including political pressure and sanctions," Langeland emphasized. Norway agrees with the need for full transparency by Iran about its Qom facility, in accordance with IAEA and UNSC demands, and supports full implementation by Iran of nuclear safeguards, including the Additional Protocol. Setting up a new facility in secret was not compatible even with the old comprehensive safeguards by which Iran says it is bound. Iran's excuse that its Qom facility was "not in violation because Tehran does not have to inform anyone about the design and plan of such a facility until six months before introducing nuclear material" does not hold water in Norway's view. Langeland said he made that point to the Iranian Charge d'affaires during a chance meeting late last week. "I told him Iran is in violation because the Additional Protocol to which Iran is subject demands more transparency, not less." Langeland told us Norway associated itself entirely with the EU statements and positions at the IAEA in Vienna and in general regarding the carrot and stick approach. ¶6. (C) Langeland and his two MFA colleagues offered sincere praise for the U.S. administration for engaging directly in the diplomatic track with Iran. "This has created a whole new dynamic," they said. Advisor Skjonsberg said it was important to Norway that the right outcome be achieved using political and diplomatic channels, and in that respect the Geneva talks were a somewhat hopeful sign. He and Iran desk officer Tonheim were particularly pleased that "respect" was a key theme at the talks, with such touches as the separate meeting between former Under Secretary of State Burns and Iran's nuclear negotiator and what they characterized as the USG's dropping of preconditions for talks. They also emphasized the importance of the fact that the IC was now clearly united behind preserving Iran's Article four rights to civilian nuclear uses, finally removing that charade ("We are being denied our God given Article four rights") from Iran's diplomatic tool kit. ¶7. (C) Langeland highlighted that he had met with Iranian Charge Tourabi and his political secretary a couple of weeks ago and encouraged Iran to negotiate in earnest in Geneva with the P5 plus 1. He emphasized Norway was fully on board with the need for political pressure and the idea of timelines, namely, that the process of compliance could not be dragged out forever to buy time, as Iran was wont to do. "We told the Iranians that that period is over," he said. Moreover, Norway and the IAEA both encouraged the Iranians to ratify the international safety convention (not further described),to step closer toward full compliance with their obligations. Status of Norway funding of IAEA approved Nuclear Safety training for Iran -------------- - ¶8. (C) Skjonsberg took the opportunity of the joint meeting to update us on the status of Norway's plan, undertaken in 2008, to finance an IAEA Board of Governors-approved,UNSC- endorsed Nuclear Safety training project for Iranian Nuclear Regulatory Authorities (IRNA). The MFA sent us additional details on the program after the joint demarche, including a congratulatory letter to Norway's MFA for its financing of the program, signed by IAEA Deputy Director General for the Director General in December 2008. Skjonsberg thanked the U.S. for helping clear the way with the Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians and Bulgarians for the 20 to 22 Iranian engineers to travel to those countries to shadow their nuclear regulatory authorities. Norway provided a detailed briefing on the project to the UN's 1737 committee which was established pursuant to that UNSC resolution, and they now report that the program is scheduled to continue through the spring of 2010. The Norwegians hope the project will facilitate Iran's ratification of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Russia, China, and the NAM -------------- ¶9. (C) Asked by the UK where he saw Russia going on the possibility of additional UN sanctions if those become necessary, Ambassador Langeland said the Russian and Chinese positions had both evolved significantly since 2005. Russia was now at the point where it voted for the first round of sanctions in 2007 after refusing just two years prior. At this moment, two factors influenced its decision making on next steps: first, the importance to Moscow of improved OSLO 00000609 003 OF 003 relations with the United States; and second, Russia's assessment of the threat posed by Iran. "Qom did not help Iran" in relation to Moscow's view of that threat, Langeland assessed. In fact, Russia is frustrated with Tehran. It would like to have a smooth, diplomatic solution in which Iran meets its obligations so that Russia can continue business and commerce with Iran unfettered by sanctions complications. Instead, Iran is obviously not complying. Langeland believes Russia will support a process to get progress toward Iranian compliance with IAEA safeguards and UNSC demands, and will likely agree to tighten sanctions another time. If it does, China will likely go along, he added. ¶10. (C) Langeland then raised the issue of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and asked for ideas on how the IC could work together to get the NAM to be more concerned about Iran. The UK DCM offered his thoughts from a previous tour in Oman,where he had given demarches to the Omanis on that subject. Langeland said that Norway viewed it as a positive sign of the new atmosphere opened by U.S. direct engagement in talks with Iran that Tehran could no longer play the situation off as "Iran versus the West." In his view, Iran's lack of transparency and compliance, including the secret facility at Qom, and especially the lack of clarity in Iran's intentions, threatened the nuclear non-proliferation goals agreed to by the UN Security Council last week under U.S. leadership. Iran's actions and the possibility of Israeli military action in response threatened the stability of the region, he cautioned. He expressed appreciation for the US, French and UK positions on next steps, and said Norway would continue to cooperate closely with our governments to push Iran toward the concrete actions required in the wake of new commitments in Geneva. He provided us copies of Foreign Minister Stoere's remarks about the Qom facility dated September 25. Post reported the substance of those remarks in Ref B. HEG