NORWEGIAN MFA AF/PAK DIRECTOR VIEW'S ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 OSLO 000540 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2019 TAGS: NATO PREL MOPS MARR AF NO SUBJECT: NORWEGIAN MFA AF/PAK DIRECTOR VIEW'S ON POST-ELECTION AFGHANISTAN REF: A. STATE 90254 ¶B. OSLO 459 ¶C. OSLO 526 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires James T. Heg for reasons 1.4(b) and (d ). ¶1. Summary: (C) CDA James Heg, PolCouns, and PolOff held wide-ranging discussions August 31 with Ambassador Bjorn Janis Kanavin, the MFA's Af/Pak Director and previously Ambassador to Pakistan and Afghanistan. Kanavin said the GON's contribution to Afghanistan would likely be strengthened after the September 14 Norwegian national elections, while noting that a "protracted limbo" after the Afghan election would not bode well, in particular if Karzai attends UNGA with no clear mandate. He welcomed increased U.S. support for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA),adding that an expanded UNAMA role would be the best way forward on increasing good governance at the district level (ref A). Kanavin described Norwegian Ambassador Aas' recent visit to Kandahar as aimed at information gathering only, with no GON engagement in the south expected in the near future. Ambassador Aas did provide recommendations on funding women's tertiary education and a youth program based on his trip, which the MFA had taken under consideration. ¶2. Summary cont'd: (C) Kanavin requested information on USAID's expected deployment of two civilians to Norway's PRT in Meymaneh. He described difficulties in putting together a Norwegian Police Mentoring Team (PMT),while pointing out deficiencies in the EU Police Mission to Afghanistan (EUPOL) PMT program (ref B). Kanavin supported an increase in reintegration and reconciliation programs. He concluded by noting that an increase in Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to 400,000 would be unsustainable, echoing views previously expressed by Norwegian MoD officials during the visit of USNATO Ambassador Daalder (ref C). We therefore anticipate Norway will respond negatively to a request to fund and train a large increase in ANSF. End Summary. Norwegian and Afghan Elections Read-out -------------- ¶3. (C) In regards to the September 14 Norwegian national elections, Kanavin asserted that any possible new government would likely strengthen rather than reduce GON contributions to Afghanistan. A center-right majority coalition, led by the popular Progress Party (FrP),while likely to reduce the overall development budget, would maintain or even increase the effort in Afghanistan if it wins. Likewise, a left-of-center government that excludes the Socialist Left (SV) would also take a firmer line on Afghanistan. There exists a strong consensus in Norway, he said, that as an active NATO member, Norway will remain committed to Afghanistan. ¶4. (C) On the Afghan elections, Kanavin said Norway's Ambassador to Afghanistan Kaare Aas reported that he expected a first round win, but is concerned about the low turn-out. More worrying, Kanavin noted, is the level of fraud, and the apparent lack of progress and lessons learned from the previous election. He also expressed concern over the "protracted limbo," now expected to last until September 24, which would likely mean Karzai's attendance at UNGA without a clear mandate. He said that Norwegian Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Stoere's point of view has been to demand a clear and concise understanding of the election, and to re-affirm that Norway is in Afghanistan for the "long-haul." Once the election results are finalized, Kanavin said, the Afghan leadership's next step should be to develop a new compact to address the needs of Afghans and outline the path for building a secure and stable country. Kanavin also expressed regret that Afghanistan had not held a census and developed a civil registry, claiming that the situation has not been "well-handled by the international community." He pointed directly to the poor performance of the UN's Population Fund (UNFPA),and concluded that Afghans would have been more inclined to vote if the election had coincided with a national identity card campaign. UN role in Afghanistan and good governance -------------- ¶5. (C) Kanavin said the GON would welcome increased U.S. engagement to support UNAMA's mission in Afghanistan (ref A). He said the UN is "lean and mean," lacking the staff numbers required to get the job done. In particular in Faryab, he said, the limited district and provincial capacity to govern would be best addressed by a strong civilian UNAMA presence in the province. He compared the light UN presence in OSLO 00000540 002 OF 003 Afghanistan to the systemic, deeply engaged UN operation in Pakistan, where, he said, 19 UN agencies operate. He outlined the August 31 Norwegian Foreign Minister Gahr Stoere and UN SYG Ban ki-Moon breakfast meeting, and their agreement to advocate for additional UNAMA funds during the General Assembly. ¶6. (C) Further on developing good governance, Kanavin expressed admiration for UK support of the Independent Directorate of Local Government (IDLG),noting that the IDLG has grand plans under the good leadership of Jelani Popal, but that it still lacks capacity for implementation. He used the example of Norway's PRT Meymaneh, where the strategy is to transition to a smaller, military task force and a separate civilian effort, with the goal of normalizing relations. He expressed dislike for the Commander Emergency Response Funds (CERF),noting that these funds often end up wasted and fail to build local governance capacity. (Note: the Norwegian PRT does not have CERF or any equivalent, with GON funds instead channeled through NGOs or the national program. End note). Kanavin said that SE Holbrooke had told him the US would channel 40 percent of CERF through the multi-year agricultural initiative, which he thought made sense. He also expressed concern about PRTs becoming too entrenched, rather than serving in a supervisory context. He again recommended pressing UNAMA to expand their role, with other international actors falling under UNAMA's umbrella. Kanavin asked for an update regarding reports that USAID would send two civilians to assist at PRT Meymaneh, and said that they must coordinate closely with the Norwegian effort in Faryab. Norway Heading South? Not Anytime Soon. -------------- ¶7. (C) Kanavin said that while Norwegian members of both the multinational and Norwegian-led Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLT) would travel south if requested by the Afghan government, Norway has "no agenda or intent" to expand its military presence in the south. He said Norway's Ambassador to Afghanistan Kaare Aas expressed surprise at the interest generated by his visit to Kandahar (Kanavin noted that the Dutch had also inquired),adding that Aas' personal view is that the GON should engage more in the south, but he understood the current political reality in Norway. Kanavin said Aas did develop specific recommendations on GON opportunities in the south, including a technical school for women's tertiary education and a youth-orientated program. Aas told Kanavin that he also feels it is important for him to have a good understanding of the situation in the south, as significant Norwegian aid flows to the area through the national programs, and in the unlikely case that the Norwegian OMLT rotates to serve there. Concerns Re EUPOL's Police Mentoring Program (PMT) -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Kanavin questioned the effectiveness of EUPOL's PMT program, as according to Kanavin, EUPOL's PMTs are not allowed to operate at the district level. He confessed that the GON had encountered difficulties staffing their own PMT, exacerbated by Ministry of Defense and Norwegian civilian police having opposing views on how the PMT should operate; the MoD would like a Military Police-only team, with no civilian police incorporated. (Note: This contradicts MoD Security Policy Director Svein Efjestad, who previously reported MoD would appreciate additional civilian police presence, but commented that it was difficult to find satisfactory civilian police for the job (Ref. B). End Note) Reconciliation and Reintegration: "Overdue" -------------- ¶9. (C) Noting that reconciliation and reintegration programs were "absolutely over-due," Kanavin advocated strongly for a first class reintegration program, as the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) current program is weak, under-funded, and unable to do the job. Kanavin said that a program which offers ex-combatants the opportunity to settle-down and return to their communities needs to be developed. He added that the program must be supported by the Afghan government, as a solely international effort would fail to achieve results. Skepticism Over Increased ANSF and NATO Trust Fund -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) Kanavin also said he was "not thrilled" by the requirement for 400,000 Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) expected out of Gen. McChrystal's report, noting that such a level would be unsustainable. He specifically cited OSLO 00000540 003 OF 003 the recent statement by UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown calling for an increase of 50,000 Afghan troops as a more reasonable request, and well-timed to make a point even before the McChrystal report is released. Kanavin noted Norway's pledge of $U.S. 20 million for the Expanded NATO Trust Fund. He added that under normal circumstances the GON would not contribute to such a fund with such a lack of transparency in procurement. Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) Norway will strongly welcome increased support for UNAMA's mission in Afghanistan, and may contribute additional funds to expand UNAMA's mission. In regards to ANSF, this is the second time the GON has questioned an increase to a 400,000 strong ANSF, the first time being in discussions between U.S. Ambassador to NATO Daalder and MOD Deputy Secretary Barth Eide (ref C). We anticipate that the GON would likely not support a request to fund and train an increase in ANSF up to that level. End Comment. HEG