Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09OSLO513
2009-08-18 14:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Oslo
Cable title:
NORWAY COUNSELS THE NEED TO PROMOTE THE IAEA
how-toVZCZCXYZ0000 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHNY #0513 2301430 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 181430Z AUG 09 FM AMEMBASSY OSLO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7717 INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 0103 RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 0155 RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 0222 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1557 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 4061 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1007 RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 3421 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0092
C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000513
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019
TAGS: ENRG UEU KNNP IAEA KU NO AE SW
SUBJECT: NORWAY COUNSELS THE NEED TO PROMOTE THE IAEA
NUCLEAR FUEL BANK AMONG NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES
REF: SECSTATE 83455
Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Cherrie Daniels for reaso
ns 1.4(b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000513
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019
TAGS: ENRG UEU KNNP IAEA KU NO AE SW
SUBJECT: NORWAY COUNSELS THE NEED TO PROMOTE THE IAEA
NUCLEAR FUEL BANK AMONG NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES
REF: SECSTATE 83455
Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Cherrie Daniels for reaso
ns 1.4(b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: In discussions about the Nuclear Fuel Bank
with Norway's Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs, the
official emphasized the hesitance of Non-Aligned Movement
(NAM) countries and offered his counsel that Fuel Bank
supporters such as the U.S. and Norway must present the
proposal "attractively" to these countries to overcome their
reticence. End Summary.
2. (C) In discussions on August 14, poloff presented reftel
points on the Nuclear Fuel Bank to Knut Langeland, Ambassador
for Disarmament Affairs at the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA). Norway had confirmed it would contribute $5
million to the Fuel Bank at the IAEA Board of Governors
meeting in March 2009.
3. (C) Langeland said that "Norway considers the Fuel Bank as
one key part of the whole picture of the nuclear fuel cycle
architecture," but said that NAM countries are still hesitant
to accept it because there is a perceived threat to their
rights under Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT). Langeland pointed to a statement he said was
made by the Brazilian Ambassador to the IAEA that the Nuclear
Fuel Bank is "a solution to a problem that does not exist."
Langeland believes that the main challenge is to convince NAM
countries of its usefulness. The argument, he counseled,
must be phrased in terms of (a) a cost/benefit analysis in
which there is (b) no need to invest in fuel production
equipment/technology, and (c) no need to import raw uranium.
Langeland added that safely and securely returning spent fuel
to the country of origin was also of vital importance to the
operation of the Fuel Bank.
4. (C) Langeland emphasized that "it's all in how we present
the argument." For example, requiring countries to meet IAEA
comprehensive safeguards and the Additional Protocol "will
never fly" in this context, in his estimation. He pointed
out that Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) countries themselves
can't even agree on that level of safeguard. Furthermore,
"what is important is that we present the Fuel Bank as not
'constraining' Article IV, but as making more use of Article
IV." He continued, "What some think we are talking about here
is the IAEA 'legitimizing' the existing market consortium for
Nuclear Fuel, and that's what's scary to NAM countries."
Brazil and Argentina, he pointed out, present a
counterexample with their regional arrangement, and the
perception that we would "freeze the existing structure of
production" is what gives NAM countries pause.
5. (C) Langeland closed by noting that Norway has exhibited
the strongest support for a multilateral nuclear fuel cycle
solution, mentioning that it was the only country in 2005 to
support Mohamed El Baradei's proposal to bar new countries
from creating new production capacity.
HEG
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019
TAGS: ENRG UEU KNNP IAEA KU NO AE SW
SUBJECT: NORWAY COUNSELS THE NEED TO PROMOTE THE IAEA
NUCLEAR FUEL BANK AMONG NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES
REF: SECSTATE 83455
Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Cherrie Daniels for reaso
ns 1.4(b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: In discussions about the Nuclear Fuel Bank
with Norway's Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs, the
official emphasized the hesitance of Non-Aligned Movement
(NAM) countries and offered his counsel that Fuel Bank
supporters such as the U.S. and Norway must present the
proposal "attractively" to these countries to overcome their
reticence. End Summary.
2. (C) In discussions on August 14, poloff presented reftel
points on the Nuclear Fuel Bank to Knut Langeland, Ambassador
for Disarmament Affairs at the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA). Norway had confirmed it would contribute $5
million to the Fuel Bank at the IAEA Board of Governors
meeting in March 2009.
3. (C) Langeland said that "Norway considers the Fuel Bank as
one key part of the whole picture of the nuclear fuel cycle
architecture," but said that NAM countries are still hesitant
to accept it because there is a perceived threat to their
rights under Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT). Langeland pointed to a statement he said was
made by the Brazilian Ambassador to the IAEA that the Nuclear
Fuel Bank is "a solution to a problem that does not exist."
Langeland believes that the main challenge is to convince NAM
countries of its usefulness. The argument, he counseled,
must be phrased in terms of (a) a cost/benefit analysis in
which there is (b) no need to invest in fuel production
equipment/technology, and (c) no need to import raw uranium.
Langeland added that safely and securely returning spent fuel
to the country of origin was also of vital importance to the
operation of the Fuel Bank.
4. (C) Langeland emphasized that "it's all in how we present
the argument." For example, requiring countries to meet IAEA
comprehensive safeguards and the Additional Protocol "will
never fly" in this context, in his estimation. He pointed
out that Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) countries themselves
can't even agree on that level of safeguard. Furthermore,
"what is important is that we present the Fuel Bank as not
'constraining' Article IV, but as making more use of Article
IV." He continued, "What some think we are talking about here
is the IAEA 'legitimizing' the existing market consortium for
Nuclear Fuel, and that's what's scary to NAM countries."
Brazil and Argentina, he pointed out, present a
counterexample with their regional arrangement, and the
perception that we would "freeze the existing structure of
production" is what gives NAM countries pause.
5. (C) Langeland closed by noting that Norway has exhibited
the strongest support for a multilateral nuclear fuel cycle
solution, mentioning that it was the only country in 2005 to
support Mohamed El Baradei's proposal to bar new countries
from creating new production capacity.
HEG