NORWAY'S NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION NARRATIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000511 SIPDIS FOR ISN/MNSA (SCOTT DAVIS),GENEVA (CD),UNVIE (IAEA),USUN (POL),USNATO (POL),USEU (POL) E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2019 TAGS: AORC CDG ENRG KNNP MNUC PARM PGOV PREL UNGA IAEA, NPT, NO SUBJECT: NORWAY'S NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION NARRATIVE REF: A. STATE 83600 ¶B. OSLO 507 Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Cherrie Daniels for reaso ns 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (SBU) Summary: In response to reftel A, poloff held extensive discussions on August 14 with Knut Langeland, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs. Langeland spelled out Norway's position on nonproliferation and disarmament issues in response to our promptings in reftel A paragraph 6. This cable provides an overview of Norway's nonproliferation priorities to help policymakers prepare for the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. Key Norwegian nonproliferation decisionmakers were previously catalogued in reftel B. End Summary. NORWEGIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD KEY ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Prior to beginning discussion of specific nonproliferation regimes, Langeland referred poloff to the latest exchange of letters between Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Stoere and Secretary Clinton dated 06/25/2009, in which areas of common interest were specifically mentioned. Text of the relevant paragraphs from Stoere's letter to S follow: "...let me express my appreciation for the strong U.S. commitment for a world free of nuclear weapons. U.S. leadership is vital if we are to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear danger. In this respect it is of the greatest importance to secure a positive and forward looking outcome of the NPT 2010 Review Conference. This includes engaging the non-aligned movement (NAM) to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. We are exploring ways to reach out and develop a substantial dialogue with key players in NAM. We have established extensive cooperation with countries such as Indonesia, South Africa and Chile. We are eager to move these issues forward, and would like to stay in close touch with the aim of securing a successful NPT Review Conference in 2010. "The forthcoming review of NATO's strategic concept provides us with an opportunity to strengthen the Alliance's arms control profile. This can, in its turn, be important for the NPT outcome. "Norwegian and U.S. officials are also working on how to best secure the establishment of a fuel bank for low enriched uranium under IAEA auspices. Negotiating a verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and implementing relevant non-proliferation instruments will in this context be of great importance." (End of excerpts.) As for the specific nonproliferation regimes mentioned in Ref A para 6, Ambassador Langeland provided the following comments on each issue: -Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT): "Norway recommends strongly that the U.S. ratify the CTBT. We consider it an important tool for disarmament and nonproliferation. We are encouraged by the strong support of the Obama administration and hopefully the U.S. will not vote against the CTBT in the U.N. first committee as has been the case since 2001." -Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT): "Norway fully supports the FMCT and is encouraged that the new U.S. administration supports an FMCT that will be verifiable. Norway considers the verifiability of the FMCT to be crucial. If we are to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons, we must deal with the issue of existing stocks in one way or another. We are pragmatic on how to achieve this, and we could explore different avenues on how to destroy existing stocks of fissile materials and convert them to peaceful uses. As a preliminary matter, we need more transparency on the issue of existing stocks. Norway supports Robert Einhorn's ideas on a Fissile Material Control Initiative (FMCI)." -NPT: "Norway wants a forward-looking outcome of the Review Conference, by which we mean that the 2010 conference will further strengthen the nonproliferation dimensions of the NPT. Specifically, we would like to advance the universality of the Additional Protocol and nuclear fuel cycle arrangements. Also, Norway considers it vital to look further into the disarmament dimensions of the NPT. One way of doing this is to revisit the outcomes of the 2000 Review Conference and consider them in light of new realities." Langeland continued: "Overall, we would like the Review Conference to affirm President Obama's goal of a nuclear-free world and identify concrete steps to achieve it. The Review Conference will be an opportunity for the U.S., NATO, and other nuclear weapon states to show we are reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in the security policy of our countries. Hopefully, we will see support for nuclear weapon free zones. Norway is happy to see that the Penlidaba treaty will soon enter into force. It is important that the declared nuclear weapon states sign a protocol guaranteeing the integrity of such zones." -U.S.-Russia Arms Control Efforts: "Norway welcomes the framework agreement reached by Presidents Obama and Medvedev in July 2009 and believes it will be the most important operative agreement for the next 18 years. We see it as involving deeper cuts to nuclear arsenals than the Moscow Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START),and are pleased that limits are set on both warheads and means of delivery. We are also pleased," Langeland added, "that verification is built into the agreement. We consider this agreement to be an important step and hopefully it will be followed by other agreements addressing both strategic and substrategic weapons." OVERARCHING NORWEGIAN POLICY -------------- ¶3. (SBU) From the broadest perspective, Norwegian policy on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament is informed by three high policy-level principles, which are: -Security at the lowest level of armament. -A world free of weapons of mass destruction. -A world free of conventional weapons having unacceptable humanitarian implications (e.g. cluster munitions). These three principles were made explicit in the fall of 2008 in Stortingsmelding ("Parliament White Paper") number 27. COUNTRIES THE NORWEGIANS WORK WITH -------------- ¶4. (C) Amb. Langeland listed several areas of the GON's international cooperation on these matters: -Norway works closely with the UK on verification of disarmament. -The Seven Nation cross-regional initiative - which includes South Africa, Indonesia, Chile, Australia, the UK, Romania, and Norway - put forward a nonproliferation/disarmament consensus text in 2005 for consideration at the UN World Summit. The countries have maintained consultations afterward. Langeland suggested that there may be a new group of countries that will come to consensus on a similar text in ¶2010. -Norway worked closely with Germany in the context of the German-Norwegian disarmament initiative within NATO, proposed in July 2007. -With the United States, Norway is happy about the exchange of letters between Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Stoere referred to in paragraph 2. NPT Preparatory Conference Three involved an "encouraging" meeting between Steffen Kongstad, the MFA's Director General for Security Policy, and Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, according to Langeland. -Also at Preparatory Conference Three, Norway worked closely within NATO on a joint paper defining common positions on disarmament and nonproliferation, cooperating with The Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Poland, Turkey, and Lithuania. -Finally, Langeland also listed Australia and Japan as "close partners" on disarmament and nonproliferation matters. THE ROLE THE NORWEGIANS PLAY -------------- ¶5. (C) Norway is, according to Langeland, very actively working on the NPT. He stated that Norway's ambition is to support and sustain the NPT, Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Norway "considers these as important in setting fundamental norms on nonproliferation and WMD." In the BWC, Norway is actively contributing in the implementation of the current program of work. For example, there was a June 2009 workshop in Oslo on disease surveillance, which was organized jointly with the Indonesian government and the UN Secretariat. In the CWC, the Norwegians provide funds for implementation of other countries' national nonproliferation obligations. HOW NORWEGIAN POLICY IS DEVELOPED -------------- ¶6. (C) Many nonproliferation issues are addressed at the working level in the MFA. If policy level decisions must be made, an internal memorandum is drafted by the nonproliferation section of the MFA and circulated up to the foreign minister. Such a policy level decision may then be cleared through the Ministry of Defense. Langeland said that there is no set protocol and the treatment of any particular issue is bureaucratic until policy parameters are approached, at which point the question is forwarded to the appropriate political level. Langeland added that "it is the firm Norwegian policy to be inside NATO, and considerations of NATO strategic objectives inform our other nonproliferation and disarmament policies." ROLE OF NGOS -------------- ¶7. (C) Norway has no nuclear power industry. The GON provides money to academic institutions in the amount of about $6 million per year to investigate how to strengthen nonproliferation regimes. The GON has extensive contacts with the NGO community interested in nonproliferation, and the MFA "takes the temperature" of these NGOs' thinking. According to Langeland, "no Norwegian politician would want to be embarrassed in public by them." Langeland went on to say, "the political reality is that no one in Norway really likes nuclear weapons, but again, we take being a NATO partner seriously." ¶8. (C) Regarding the additional NPT questions of reftel A, paragraph 7, key alliances are covered in paragraph 3. Due to the relatively compressed nature of the Norwegian MFA, it is post's impression that Norwegian Missions to the UN, CD, and the IAEA do not deviate from guidance received from Oslo. The MFA Section on Nonproliferation and Disarmament usually sends personnel directly to all major nonproliferation meetings. Post therefore feels that the Norwegians need no further guidance from the MFA in Oslo in order to engage on Review Conference objectives. ¶9. (C) Comment: Based upon poloff's 12 months of consultations with Amb. Langeland on various nonproliferation and disarmament issues, it is post's estimation that he is completely plugged into the MFA's policy on disarmament and nonproliferation, and that his statements catalogued in para 2 accurately restate the bedrock of Norwegian policy on these matters. One side note of interest: It was Langeland who drafted the portions of Foreign Minister Stoere's letter to S in paragraph 2 above. End Comment. HEG