NORWAY'S RUSSIA POLICY: WISHFUL THINKING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 OSLO 000399



SIPDIS



E.O. 12958: DECL 06/16/2019

TAGS: PBTS, PINS, PREL, RS, NO

SUBJECT: NORWAY'S RUSSIA POLICY: WISHFUL THINKING



REF: A. A: 2008 OSLO 321

B. B: 2008 OSLO 489

C. C: 2008 OSLO 497

D. D: OSLO 321



Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Kevin M. Johnson

for reasons 1.4 b and d



1. (C) Summary. Norwegian politicians like to brag about

their good relations with Russia, even suggesting that

Norway' Russia policy should be a model for other neighbors

of Russia to follow. This public positivism masks a growing

nervousness over developments in Russia and a definite split

in Norwegians' views on Russia. This angst and Norway's

unsymmetrical relationship with Russia also has the effect of

strengthening the U.S.-Norway bilateral relationship and

could be the basis of a future strategic dialogue.



2. (C) Norwegian security, business and environmental leaders

are much more skeptical (and worried) about Russian

motivations and actions than official statements would

suggest. Their viewpoint is mostly held quietly, leaving the

public arena primarily to Norway's government officials

(especially the PM and FM) and think tankers who choose to

stress the strong cooperative relationship with Russia and

the potential for further cooperation. However, even the

most positive acknowledge that relations with Russia are not

easy and Norway has purposely maintained a core of Russia

experts (particularly in the intelligence and defense

fields). Increased Russian military activities, the growing

strategic relevance of the Arctic, problems with Norwegian

investments in Russia all make it clear that Norway's

relations with Russia will continue to be one of Norway's

prime foreign policy considerations. Strongly supporting

increased U.S. engagement with Russia, Norway can be

convinced to be more supportive in those cases where the U.S.

or NATO believe firmness is required...but we must ask. END

SUMMARY



Russia: Public Positivism and a Focus on the Bilateral

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3. (C) The GON's official Russia policy has been

characterized by a consistent stress on the positive and a

reluctance to publicly criticize Russia actions (the Georgia

war was one exception but the GON shows little public

solidarity when Russia pressures the Baltics, Poland or other

allies). Norway has chosen to prioritize the bilateral

aspects of its relations to Russia, working to achieve

greater cooperation in the Barents, defending its interests

in a quiet manner and stressing the benefits of greater

Russian integration into the European economic and political

regimes. The GON works to maintain steady and positive

contacts with Russia as evidenced by the recent meetings of

PM Stoltenberg with President Medvedev and PM Putin, FM

Stoere's meetings with FM Lavrov and other meetings between

Ministers of Energy and Industry. (Reftel A and D)



4. (C) As a member of the wider European community, Norway

has been much more passive, at times criticizing Russian

actions, but primarily arguing for dialogue and inclusion.

Norway's focus on the bilateral relationship has resulted in

cooperative and well-functioning relationships in

environmental cleanup, nuclear safety, fisheries management

and people-to-people exchanges. It also has led to a greater

potential for cooperation in the development of energy

resources in the Barents (StatoilHydro's share of the

Shtockman Development Company is the prime example).



5. (C) These achievements impact the wider relationship as

the GON does not want to throw away the hard earned progress

in bilateral relations (or damage the potential future

cooperation on energy development or agreement on a maritime

border) for events elsewhere. GON priorities were

illustrated by a recent meeting between the Deputy Foreign

Minister and a high-ranking USG official. When speaking

about Russia the Deputy Minister choose to focus on a

recently concluded fishing agreement with Russia, ignoring

any other wider concerns.



Norway's Strategy: Partly a Free Rider?

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OSLO 00000399 002.2 OF 003





6. (C) The GON preference for bilateral issues does not mean

that the GON is unaware of negative trends in Russia or that

it is completely unwilling to press Russia. Increases in

Russian military activity in the area as well as the growing

uncertainly regarding investments in the Russian economy (the

Telenor investment the most prominent) have made the

challenges of working with Russia clear. FM Stoere has said

that Norway is concerned about Russian activities but does

not want to pick the wrong fights. (Note: A reliance on

others to confront Russia when needed is also a clear factor.

End Note)



7. (C) The "right fights" for the GON appear to be any issue

which has an economic impact on Norway or actions such as the

Georgian war where Russia uses force. FM Stoere and PM

Stoltenberg both raised the Telenor investment issue with

their counterparts at recent meetings and the GON has

enforced its fishing laws and its sovereignty over Svalbard

despite Russian opposition. Also the GON has been unwilling

to accept the Russian position on the maritime border, given

that it would exclude Norwegian rights over a sub sea area

thought to be rich in energy resources.



8. (C) The general GON policy towards Russia is to increase

Norwegian (and other countries) presence in the High North,

create new tools to deal with the region's challenges, and

increase the level of knowledge about the Barents region

within Europe and with allies. The GON's initiative on this

front has taken several shapes, including pushing to expand

the Arctic Council, proposing a NATO focus on the alliance's

core areas, increasing Nordic cooperation and activities, and

holding bilateral dialogues with the U.S., UK, France,

Germany and Canada on High North issues. Norway hopes

increased attention to the High North will make it harder for

Russia to obtain its objectives on Svalbard or elsewhere in

the region with the use or threat of brute force. (Reftel B

and C)



Quiet Concerns

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9. (C) The GON's strategy of public positivism and increases

in international attention to the region is not satisfactory

to all in Norway. The leaders of the two biggest opposition

parties have criticized the GON's approach as too weak on

Russia, especially regarding negative developments in its

democracy and economy. They point to the dismissal of the

governor of Murmansk, known for his close cooperation with

Norway, as evidence that the GON's soft touch has not

resulted in any changes in Russian behavior. Security policy

experts have always kept a wary eye on Russian activities and

remain very concerned about the limited ability of the

Norwegian military to respond to any threat. They would like

to see increased NATO attention and planning in the region.

Environmental and Human Rights leaders in Norway including

the influential heads of Bellona (an environmental group with

offices in Norway and Russia) and the Helsinki Human Rights

Committee have been very critical of Russia and the GON's

policy. Business leaders also are becoming more concerned

given the problems that even state-owned telecommunications

firm Telenor has faced with their investment in Russia. For

these disparate groups, the positive rhetoric used by the GON

is increasingly not matched by the reality in Russia.



10. (U) These criticisms were echoed by well-known Russian

environmental activist Alexander Nikitin in a June 12 speech

in Oslo. Nikitin criticized what he called FM Stoere's

guiding principle "not to provoke, but to collaborate."

Nikitin expressed disappointment that the GON fails to take

advantage of its strong positions (not dependent on Russian

energy, secure due to NATO) to speak out about Russia's

democratic failings, the reluctance of Russia to take

responsibility for the environment, Russia's aggressive

behavior in the Arctic, or the overarching control of the

Kremlin over local authorities. Nikitin said that local

cooperation in the Barents is good but this is an unstable

structure on which to base a bilateral relationship. He

challenged Norway to ask difficult questions of Russia.



Test Cases-Will the Kid Gloves Pay Off

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11. (C) According to the GON, the bilateral Norway-Russia



OSLO 00000399 003.2 OF 003





relationship has never been so good. The Norwegian Embassy

in Moscow believes that the Kremlin needs to show that it can

cooperate with a NATO country and has decided that Norway is

the best candidate. Both sides point out the cooperative

relationship on fisheries, the visa-free travel border zone,

growing border crossings and cultural exchanges and the

potential for economic cooperation offshore. The close

cooperation that Norway and Russia enjoy is admirable and

real.



12. (C) However, Norway has precious little to point to as

concrete results of its positive Russia policy:



--The decision to grant StatoilHydro participation in the

Shtockman development company is often mentioned as the prime

example of how the GON policy pays dividends. However this

joint project is only now in the beginning stages of

development with the investment decisions to be made later

this year. Other foreign energy companies have had similar

positive beginnings with joint projects with Gazprom only to

see them fall apart later. How this joint project develops

will be a key test of the claim that the Norwegian

relationship with Russia is somehow better than others.



--The resolution of the Telenor case will be another.

Telenor, the GON state owned telecommunications firm invested

with the oligarch-controlled Alfa Group to establish a mobile

phone company in Russia. After disagreements over the joint

company's future, the Alfa Group succeeded in freezing

Telenor's shares in the company and threatened to sell them

at a huge loss to Telenor. This action was raised by all

Norwegian Ministers during their recent meetings with Russian

counterparts. PM Stoltenberg received promises from PM Putin

that the Telenor shares would not be sold before all appeals

processes were exhausted. How this case is resolved will be

illustrative.



--Svalbard and the Maritime Boundary are also key test cases.

Russia disputes Norway's interpretation of the Svalbard

treaty regarding the exploitation of resources in the waters

around Svalbard. At present this primarily involves fish but

could in the future include sub sea energy resources. Russia

also has a very different interpretation of where the

maritime boundary should be drawn. Development of potential

energy resources in the disputed area has been put on hold

until a border is agree upon. If Russia gives ground on

either of these two issues it would be strong evidence of the

success of Norway's gentle approach.



Comment

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13. (C) Norway has succeeded in creating a low tension

relationship with Russia with real and functioning

cooperative agreements in the Barents. This is positive but

it is unclear that this is a result of GON policy or simply

of Russian disinterest. Some are wondering if this is worth

the price of GON reluctance to show solidarity when Russia

pushes allies or other states. Despite GON claims that other

nations should follow their lead, it appears to us that

Norway's relationship is unique and a model Russia might

favor, but not other allies.



14. (C) Norway's underlying concerns over Russia will however

continue to be an important piece of the continued close

U.S.-Norway bilateral relationship. Close intelligence and

military connections have continued despite the end of the

cold war, and Norway had maintained its Russian expertise

when others scaled back. Norway's desire for increased

attention to the High North is a healthy impulse and one

which should compliment increasing U.S. interest in the

Arctic. Norway has expressed a desire to re-start the dormant

U.S.-Norway High North talks and discussing ways to combine

our Russian expertise may be a topic of mutual interest for

this initiative. Norway strongly supports U.S. determination

to increase engagement with Russia and "reset" the

relationship. We should ask Norway to also support the firm

U.S. and NATO positions on Russia when necessary, rather than

relying on others to do so.

WHITNEY